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vABSTRACT
The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Emergence of the ‘Nationalist’
Croatian Democratic Union: A Discourse Analytic Reading
The thesis addresses the question of how the essentialist and exclusivist representation of
the Croatian nation that underlies the post-socialist democratic order came into being.
It does so by examining the emergence of the Croatian Democratic Union’s nationalist
discourse in the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, revealing its historical specificity.
The analysis covers the form of social division instituted by the Yugoslavian regime, the
politicizations of the Croatian nation during the Croatian Spring movement (1968-1971),
the identitary logics that underpinned Yugoslavia’s constitutional order, their contesta-
tions and the emergence of the League of Communist of Serbia’s transformist project in
the 1980s, the disarticulation of the form of social division instituted by the Yugoslavian
regime, and the contending democratic discourses that emerged in the Socialist Republic
Croatia during the first democratic elections (1990).
Drawing on a combination of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory and James Tully’s
work on constitutional development, the analysis develops a critical account of the ‘nation-
alist’ CDU’s emergence without reproducing the party’s own representations of its origins,
social unity, division and Croatian nationhood. Central to this analysis is the broader
movement from the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon to the ‘new’ myths that emerged in
the process of its dissolution and the discursive constructions of the nation in this process.
The thesis seeks to expose the limitations of CDU’s nationalist discourse and the complex
process of political identity formation and dissolution that made the party’s emergence
possible and that continues to shape Croatian politics today.
Keywords: political practices of nationhood, self-management, the break-up of Yu-




The first democratic elections in Croatia, held between April and May 1990, brought
the ‘nationalist’ Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) to power in the Socialist Republic of
Croatia. The party won the elections on a nationalist platform, one permeated with the
language of national self-determination and historical determinism. It claimed to express
the centuries old desire of the Croatian people to constitute themselves as an independent
nation within its own presumed historical borders. In the context of the emergence of
nationalist politics on the eve of the Yugoslavian dissolution, the party also declared that
it would protect the Croatian nation and its state from ‘great-Serbian expansionism’ and
that it would defend the nation’s ‘historical-geopolitical interests’. Although the party
received only 41,9% of the overall vote, due to the absolute majority electoral system,
it claimed 205 out of 356 seats in the Constitutive Assembly and it thus shaped the
terms under which the new democratic order was constituted.1 The party has governed
uninterrupted between 1990 and 2000 while its leader Franjo Tuđman became Croatia’s
first democratically elected president and remained in that position until his death in
1999. Under CDU’s rule Croatia ceased to be socialist, it seceded from Yugoslavia and it
fought the so-called ‘Homeland War’ (1991-1995) that broke out as part and parcel of the
secession process. The specific historical conjecture that was characterised by the collapse
of communism across Eastern Europe and the electoral victory, placed the party in the
position of shaping the trajectory of Croatia’s transition from a socialist republic in a
1For details about the electoral outcome see: Mirjana Kasapović. “Electoral Politics in Croatia 1990-
2000”. In: Politička misao 37.5 (2000).
2federal state to an independent market-oriented, multi-party democracy. The CDU has
remained one of the central players in Croatian politics until the present day, a position it
shares with the successor of the League of Communists of Croatia, the Social Democratic
Party of Croatia.
The present study seeks to investigate the emergence of the CDU as well as the broad
reception of its nationalist program, in the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the
pluralization of politics in the Socialist Republic of Croatia. It does so by examining
the discursive constructions of the nation in Yugoslavia (1958-1990), accounting for the
CDU’s emergence from within this particular historical context and by drawing out the
limitations of its nationalist programme. I believe that this examination is important
because the party shaped the first democratic constitution of the Republic of Croatia
promulgated in 1990, whose (historical) foundations have remained unchanged until the
present day, and because the violent events of Yugoslavia’s dissolution normalized its
nationalist perspective to such an extent that it is very difficult to criticize its positions
in a systematic manner. In fact, as I shall argue in this introduction, it is very difficult to
separate the party’s own nationalist programme from the overall trajectory of Croatia’s
transition to democracy.
By way of introduction, I problematize the assumptions that are embedded in the
present Croatian constitutional order and relate them to the CDU’s interpretation of the
Croatian nation, state and history to explain why I believe that the examination of the
party’s emergence is important. Thereafter, I summarize the contributions made by the
thesis, provide its outline and indicate the lines of argument that I will pursue.
1.1 Problematization
According to Croatia’s present constitution, the historical foundations of which were laid
down by the ‘nationalist’ CDU party after it came to power in May 1990, the Croatian
nation is a clearly delineated political subject whose development has determined the tra-
jectory of history. The existing democratic order is portrayed as the materialization of a
millennia old Croatian national identity, and as the expression of the historical continuity
3of its statehood. The historical foundations of the republic’s constitutional order read
like a chronology of instances where the nation’s essence was manifested in the expression
of ‘its’ desire to possess a state. These moments include various crypto-state formations,
ranging from the Croatian principalities of the 7th century to the Socialist Republic of
Croatia (1963-1990). They also include a series of political decisions, ranging from the de-
cision of the Croatian Parliament to elect a king from the Habsburg dynasty (1527) to the
decisions of the Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia (1943). The first
democratic elections (1990) form part and parcel of this national state-forming chronology.
They are portrayed as the reaffirmation of the millennial old statehood of the Croatian
nation that already existed in incipient form since the 7th century and the free expres-
sion of its democratic will.2 The portrayal of history and politics as revolving exclusively
around the Croatian nation and its state is identical to CDU’s nationalist representations
of these phenomena in its 1990 electoral programme in the run up to the first democratic
elections.3
Furthermore, although the historical foundations of the democratic order portray its
history as a logical and gradual evolution of the Croatian nation towards its state, in
1990, when they were laid down, dramatic changes were introduced to the Croatian po-
litical landscape. After 55 years Croatia ceased to be a socialist republic and the state
ceased to be understood as shared between the Croatian nation and the Serbian nation
in Croatia. The historical narrative embedded in the constitutional order normalized the
formal transformation of the Serbian nation in Croatia into a national minority living
in a republic that belonged to a Croatian national majority. This is precisely how the
CDU understood the relationship between the nation it claimed to embody in the first
democratic elections and the state.4
The first democratic constitution drawn up by a CDU dominated Constitutional As-
sembly also laid the legal grounds for Croatia’s secession from the Yugoslavian federa-
2The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Zagreb: Novi informator, 2010, Historical Foundations.
3Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica. “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb:
Niro Radničke Novine, 1990.
4Ibid., p. 76.
4tion.5 This ‘novelty’ was normalized in and through the historical foundations of the new
democratic order. Between 1945 and 1990 secession was deemed anti-constitutional, but
the historical foundations of the new democratic order rendered the secession a logical
outcome of the Croatian state-forming trajectory. In June 1991, after the Croatian inde-
pendence referendum made visible that more than 90% of those that did vote favoured
secession from Yugoslavia, the Republic seceded and became an independent state. The
‘nationalist’ Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), which participated in the first democratic
elections in Croatia too, called upon Serbian nationals in Croatia to boycott the inde-
pendence referendum. Under the SDP’s leadership a segment of the Serbian population
in Croatia declared first their autonomy within the borders of newly independent Croa-
tian Republic and, after holding their own secession referendum, the secession of ‘their
own’ Serbian-majority municipalities from Croatia with the aspiration to eventually join
the Republic Serbia. The clash between these antagonistic secessions gave rise to a war
officially called ‘the Homeland War’ (1991-1995) in Croatia. It resulted in the victory of
the Croatian Army and the consolidation of Croatian national sovereignty within borders
identical to those of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The war however expanded to
engulf Bosnia and Herzegovina and became just one episode of the wars of Yugoslavia’s
dissolution.6
All of these dramatic developments took place under the rule of the CDU and the
presidency of its leader, Franjo Tuđman. However, I argue that the nationalist CDU did
not just govern in this turbulent period but that its position as a central player in Croat-
ian politics was entrenched in and through these developments because they seemed to be
unfolding, in and of themselves, precisely in accordance with its ‘nationalist’ agenda. For
instance, CDU’s claim that it would defend the geopolitical interests of the Croatian na-
tion against great-Serbian expansionism that was constitutive of its electoral programme
in 1990, became ‘reality’ during the ‘Homeland War’. The great majority of Serbian
5Ustav Republike Hrvatske [The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia]. Narodne Novine, 56/1990.
[Electronic record]. url: http://narodne-novine.nn.hr/clanci/sluzbeni/1990_12_56_1092.html
(visited on 05/12/2016), Članak 140.
6For a chronology of events see: Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić, eds. Democratic Transition in
Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media. College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
2007, pp. xvi-xvii.
5nationals in Croatia had ‘in fact’ expressed their desire to expand Serbia by seceding
from Croatia and joining Serbia, while the governing CDU and the president Franjo Tuđ-
man were ‘in fact’ preventing the Serbian expansion and defending the nation’s borders.
Similarly, the war that broke out in the process of Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia
was rendered intelligible as the struggle of the Croatian nation for independence and
sovereignty.
This perspective is embedded in the present constitution because its historical founda-
tions include ‘the Homeland War’ as the very last instance when the Croatian nation ex-
pressed its ‘legitimate’ and ‘justified’ desire to establish and preserve its very own state.7
Yet, similar themes informed the CDU’s electoral programme already in 1990 prior to
Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia and the outbreak of armed conflict.8 Even the term
‘Homeland War’ as a representation of the Croatian episode of the War(s) of Yugoslavian
dissolution, reads like a logical extension of the CDU’s 1990 electoral programme. Like-
wise, Croatia’s secession from Yugoslavia and its victory in the ‘Homeland War’ under the
party’s rule made it possible to insert its leader and the first Croatian president, Franjo
Tuđman, into a sequence of figures from Croatia’s past that had presumably worked to-
wards realising the same state- forming idea. Again, the practical and theoretical work of
these historical figures formed the self-declared foundations of the CDU’s electoral pro-
gram already in 1990.9
Overall, the CDU’s unbroken reign during the 1990s had a profound effect on the
manner in which the socialist past came to be officially represented in the new demo-
cratic context. The transition from socialism to democracy was much more than the
introduction of a set of new economic and political rules. It involved the transformation
of the society at the fundamental level and called for the re-evaluation of who ‘we are’
and how this ‘we’ is to be expressed in the and through a new democratic constitutional
7The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Historical Foundations.
8Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”.
9Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica. “Prednacrt programske osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party
Program]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb:
Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 60.
6order.10 The first democratic elections held in 1990 centred precisely on issues such as
who constituted the ‘we’, how similarities and differences were to be understood, how
this new democratic community would relate to the socialist past, and where it sought to
go in future. The victory of the ‘nationalist’ CDU in the elections for Croatia’s Consti-
tutive Assembly (1990) and the central role it has played in shaping the foundations of
Croatia’s democratic order have made it extremely difficult to disentangle its nationalist
programme from the trajectory of Croatia’s democratic transition. Much like the League
of Communist of Yugoslavia that dissolved in January 1990, the CDU institutionalized
into a regime after May 1990 and grafted its own answers to these questions on to the
fabric of the democratic order.11
Central to the CDU’s understanding of Croatian nationhood has been the difference
between its Yugoslavian socialist variant and its post-Yugoslavian variant. The difference
is not understood as a matter of form/guise but as an essential difference in the political
import of national identity. The ‘new’ post-socialist Croatian nation is assumed to cap-
ture the ‘objective’ political state of being a nation, of Croatian nationhood in its very
essential form. In contrast, the ‘old’ socialist Croatian nation, that was constitutive of
Yugoslavian federalism, is treated as having been incomplete and, thus, empty of political
import. As a result, the ‘old’ Croatian socialist nation is retroactively measured against
the ‘objectivity’ of the post-socialist variant and ‘true’ Croatian nationhood assumed to
be essentially incompatible with Yugoslavism. In other words, the CDU party and Croa-
tian nationalists more generally, assume that the ‘objective’ Croatian nation was always
already present in Yugoslavia but that it could not express itself in that particular con-
text. This difference between the Croatian socialist identity and the democratic identity
it claimed to embody formed the very grounds of the CDU’s electoral programme in 1990.
In and through this difference the CDU represented its own political programme as the
political embodiment of the ‘objective’ Croatian nation that was distorted by the ideology
10Claus Offe and Pierre Adler. “Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the
Triple Transition in East Central Europe”. In: Social Research 58.4 (1991), pp. 869-870.
11Goran Čular. “Political Development in Croatia 1990-2000: Fast Transition-Postponed Consolida-
tion”. In: Politička misao 37.5 (2001), pp. 36-37.
7of Yugoslavism.12 In this sense, the CDU produced the Croatian nation whose interests
it claimed to embody in 1990 by contrasting it to the ‘old’ Croatian socialist nation.
This perspective on the relationship between the Croatian nation and Yugoslavia is
also embedded in the Croatian constitutional order. Yugoslavia is portrayed exclusively
as a particular legal framework laid down in the 1943-1990 period that created the formal
conditions of possibility for subsequently establishing the Croatian Republic as the Croa-
tian national state. The decisions of the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of
Croatia (1943), the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Croatia (1947) and the two
Constitutions of the Socialist Republic of Croatia (1963 and 1974) are argued to carry
traces of the very state-forming idea that materialized in the 1990s.13 Furthermore, the
nation is constituted as having become a full political agent in 1990 when it expressed
its will by drawing on that legal framework and realising its ‘true’ nationhood. Likewise,
although the Croatian nation is said to be millennia old, it is portrayed to be present in
an incipient form since the 7th century, erupting occasionally onto the political terrain to
transform it to its ‘full’ image after the collapse of communism.14
In this long state-forming trajectory that spans from the 7th century until the collapse
of communism, there is no trace of the agency of the Croatian socialist nation. The ‘na-
tionalist’ perspective embedded in the constitution omits the fact that this very nation was
already a political force during socialist Yugoslavia and that Croatian nationhood existed
as a particularity in the federation. Its political nature was understood to be expressed
in and through the Croatian branch of the federal League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(LCY), and in and through the Socialist Republic of Croatia. It also excludes the fact
that the Croatian socialist nation based the political order of the Socialist Republic of
Croatia for 55 years and that this identity was assumed to be a political force in and of
itself. The legal-constitutional rules that are retroactively understood to be expressions
of the ‘true’ post-socialist Croatian nation came into being precisely because the ‘old’
12Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Prednacrt programske osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party
Program]”; Vladimir Šeks. “Ciklus tribina: Izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of
Discussions: Elections in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj [Parties in Croatia].
Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990.
13The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Historical Foundations.
14Ibid., Historical Foundations.
8Croatian socialist identity had a political import; individuals identified with it, shaped
their practices in accordance with it, argued what it meant, how it could be expressed in
institutional forms, and how its institutional blueprints could be transformed, and/or im-
proved. However, the ‘new’ Croatian national identity has managed to dominate the past
to such an extent that it now seems ‘older’ than its Croatian-Yugoslavian predecessor.
Explaining how this state of affairs came into being, I believe, necessitates accounting
for the emergence of the ‘nationalist’ CDU within the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution
and doing so in a systematic and critical manner. By critical, I mean without reproduc-
ing the party’s own representations of its origins and the reasons behind its emergence. I
shall argue that the limits of the nationalist perspective on Croatian nationhood can be
exposed when related to the historical context of its emergence, before its actual sedimen-
tation in and through institutional forms. This is particularly important given the CDU’s
eerie ability to accommodate the dramatic events of the 1990s and the degree to which
it’s understanding of ‘objective’ Croatian nationhood is embedded in the constitutional
fabric of the present democratic order.
1.2 The Contributions and Outline of the Thesis
Different bodies of literature, ranging from the literature on Yugoslavia’s dissolution,
Croatian democratic transition and Croatian national identity, have addressed the party’s
emergence in their own ways. In the literature on Yugoslavian dissolution there is a gen-
eral consensus that nationalism(s) destroyed Yugoslavia, indirectly or directly, and that
Croatian nationalism formed part and parcel of this disintegrative process. The literature
assumes Yugoslavia was defective (be it economically, constitutionally, culturally, ideo-
logically) and that nationalisms emerged in response these defects. Within the logic of
Yugoslavia’s dissolution, Croatian nationalism tends to be treated as a ‘natural’ response
to Serbian nationalism and, since the ‘nationalist’ CDU party expressed it politically, its
very emergence is understood as a reaction to the politics of Slobodan Milošević. Simi-
larly, the party’s emergence is often represented as in continuity with the Croatian Spring
9(1968-1971), a cultural-political movement that emerged within the ranks of the League
of Communists of Croatia and expanded to include social groupings external to the party
in the period.
In the literature on Croatia’s democratic transition there is a general consensus that
nationalism became the dominant political ideology in post-socialist Croatia precisely be-
cause the ‘nationalist’ CDU played a central role in shaping the democratic order. In
general, this body of literature focuses on the negative effects that the party’s unbroken
rule has had on democratic consolidation and it is not interested in examining its emer-
gence within the context of dissolving Yugoslavia. From this perspective, the emergence
of the CDU forms part and parcel of the ‘inevitable’ first phase of transition when com-
munism collapsed and democratic rules were put in place to structure decision-making
processes. The CDU party becomes an object of analysis only after it became visible that
its understanding of politics and society was an obstacle for democratic consolidation,
and some authors even see in the party’s programme a reflection of pre-existing social
divisions in SR Croatia.
Yet, both bodies of literature fail to examine the specificities of CDU’s nationalist
programme, fail to problematize its particular essentialist understanding of the nation
and fail to specify the relationship between it’s own political project and the dissolving
Yugoslavian order. Furthermore, they tend to adopt aspects of the party’s own represen-
tation of its origins, the nature of the Croatian democratic identity, and the relationship
between the state and the nation. These include the assumption that CDU’s programme
bears, in one way or another, a continuity with the Croatian Spring movement, and/or
that it is a ‘normal’ Croatian response to Serbian nationalism, and/or that the party re-
alised an incomplete state-forming process. Within the context of the democratic elections
(1989-1990), these assumptions include the idea that the ‘nationalist’ CDU expressed the
Croatian national interest more accurately than its biggest competitor in the elections,
the League of Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change (LCC-PDC).
The poststructuralist strand within the literature on Croatian national identifica-
tion/nationalism has examined the relationship(s) between nationalism, Yugoslavian so-
10
cialism, and democratic transition in a more critical manner. This strand has criticized
the ontological presuppositions of primordial and modernist accounts of Croatian identity
and showed that the movement from Yugoslavian socialism to multi-party democracy was
both driven by and reflected in the transformation of collective political identities. The
transformations were shaped by Yugoslavian structures and by the context of political
struggles that related to those struggles, all of which preceded the formal introduction of
political pluralism. In this sense, this perspective unlocks the possibility of relating the
so-called millennia old Croatian national identitity(s) to the Yugoslavian-socialist context
and examining this relationship in a critical manner. The emergence of the ‘nationalist’
CDU in particular has not yet been systematically explored from this perspective.
By drawing on Poststructuralist Discourse Theory the present analysis engages with
the emergence of the CDU, in particular, within its broader historical context and its im-
mediate electoral context. It does so in a critical manner, by problematizing the party’s
own representations and drawing out their historical limitations. Furthermore, it avoids
subsuming the party’s emergence to another process such as the logic of Yugoslavia’s
break-up, the logic of democratic transition, and/or the logic of nation-state formation.
The analysis shows the party’s emergence formed part and parcel of contingent processes
of collective identity formation, sedimentation, transformation, and dissolution. It also
shows that it was not merely responding to events but actively involved in interpreting
them and carving out a specific notion of a specific nation out of its interpretation.15
The analytic focus of the thesis is placed on the movement from the universal Yu-
goslavian political imaginary to the particular myths that emerged as it was gradually
weakening in the 1980s.16 I examine the role that political frontier formation, sedimenta-
tion and dissolution played in the move from the universal to the particular as well as the
different modalities of political subjectivity that formed part and parcel of this process. I
substantiate the conditions under which different modalities of political subjectivity ap-
peared, specify what they included and excluded, how they were expressed in the rules
15Alan Finlayson. “Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism”. In: Journal of Political Ideologies 3.1 (1998),
p. 105.
16Ernesto Laclau. Emancipations(s). London: Verso, 1996, p. 20.
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that constituted the Yugoslavian imaginary, and how they were eventually subverted.17
Central to my analysis are the various ways in which nations were represented within the
Yugoslavian imaginary and the transformations these representations underwent in the
1958-1990 period.
The assumption that informs my analysis is that nations acquire meaning only in and
through political practices that are embedded in particular historical contexts. Or to put
it differently, I do not understand nations to be grounded in a set of positive attributes
and/or state-forming processes, against which their ‘reality’ can be measured. They can
gain a seeming objectivity but this is understood to be the product of power rather than
the expression of an objective nation that pre-exists political practices. In this sense, the
present analysis touches upon the debates about Yugoslavia’s constitution/dissolution,
Croatian democratic transition, and Croatian nationalism, but addresses these issues
from the perspective of political identity formation. It understands political identity for-
mation as a process of instituting and contesting particular forms of social division driven
by struggles for hegemony.
The present analysis contributes to our understanding of how the essentialist represen-
tation of the Croatian nation that underlies the present democratic order actually came
into being, and allows us to analyse its constitutive limitations. It also sheds light on how
the sedimentation of that particular representation impacted the trajectory of Yugoslavia’s
dissolution. Furthermore, it contributes to our understanding of the position that national
subjectivities occupied within the Yugoslavian order and the conditions under which these
positions were contested and transformed. It does not dismiss socialist-national identities
as a priori failed because of the developments in the 1990s, but examines in great detail
what they included and excluded and how they operated. Within this context, it also
contributes to our understanding of the Croatian Spring (1968-1971) and the emergence
of Slobodan Milošević (1987), because it draws out their relation to and impact on the
Yugoslavian order while simultaneously criticising the position that the CDU party was
17Aletta J. Norval. “Trajectories of Future Research in Discurse Theory”. In: Discourse Theory and
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Ed. by David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval,
and Yannis Stavrakakis. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000, p. 231.
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a natural continuation/reaction to these developments.
In a broader sense, the analysis presented here shows that engaging with a particular
nationalist project in a systematic and critical manner necessitates examining its represen-
tation of the nation, substantiating the historical context that has shaped it, and drawing
out its limitations and inconsistencies. In other words, it requires taking particular na-
tionalist projects seriously without dismissing them as ‘irrational’ or understanding them
to be a ‘normal’ reaction to the historical conditions they operate in. In a similar way,
the analysis shows nations are produced through a variety of different systems of meaning
and are thus not exclusive to ‘nationalist’ projects that place the nation at its very centre.
Given this, the thesis also makes a contribution to the development of theoretical tools
available to analyse phenomena such as the one under discussion.
In this thesis I first provide a critical overview of the literature relevant to the key
research themes and, drawing on their contributions and limitations, develop a post-
structuralist framework of analysis that suits the problem addressed.
Second, I examine the antagonistic frontiers that shaped the Yugoslavian imaginary
and based the hegemony of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and I draw out how
national identities were represented within that particular political horizon. I show that
two strands of discourse made the transition from the particular to the universal possi-
ble, namely the brotherhood and unity discourse and the self-management discourse. I
also show that the articulation of the us/them divide on a terrain structured by these
discourses had the effect of splitting national identities between the positive inside and
the negative outside, instituting a system of social division whereby nations were both
different from each other and united in an antagonism towards a set of others.
Third, since the existing literature often treats the emergence of Croatian national-
ism in 1990 as in continuity with the Croatian Spring (1968-1971) and the CDU party
represented its 1990 program as its continuation, I examine the relationship between the
politization(s) of the Croatian national identity during the Spring and the Yugoslavian
imaginary horizon. I draw out the ways in which different actors related to the political
horizon and show that its central protagonists in the League of Communists of Croatia
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(LCC) demanded a transformation of the rules of the Yugoslavian imaginary remaining
within its boundaries, while others transgressed its boundaries in different ways. I show
the LCY ‘produced’ the idea that there was a coherent movement and that this movement
articulated a coherent counter-revolutionary project.
Fourth, I examine the decontestation of the Yugoslavian identity in and through the
country’s last (1974) Constitution, and flesh out the identitary logic through which a
unified representation of the Yugoslavian society was sediment in institutional forms. I
show that the logic operated in a hierarchical way; an overarching working class subject
position was designated as the primary site of legitimate politics and that it contained,
limited and structured national subject positions. This logic was systematically informed
the design of the institutional order. I also show that the element self-management op-
erated as an empty signifier because it made the hierarchical articulation between the
working class identity and different national identities, possible.
Fifth, the thesis examines the 1980-1986 period as one characterised by a deepening
crisis of the LCY’s hegemony. I show that the period was marked by the gradual float-
ing of the signifier ‘self-management’ which embodied the fullness of Yugoslavian society,
linked different national identities into a unified social body and secured the LCY’s hege-
mony. I also show that the process of floating came about in and through the regime’s
inability to articulate a coherent self-managing response to the dislocatory effects of the
debt crisis, a failure that resulted in the weakening of the dominant imaginary.
Sixth, since the existing literature often treats the emergence of Croatian nationalism
in 1990 as a natural response to the emergence of Serbian nationalism and the CDU repre-
sented its 1990 program as a ‘defence’ against great-Serbian expansionism, I examine the
politicization of the Serbian national identity within the context of the weakening imagi-
nary and the gradual dislocation of the hegemonic representation of national identities. I
show that Slobodan Milošević’s political project was transformist in that it operated by
both absorbing nation-centred demands produced by active social elements in the Social-
ist Republic Serbia and deepening the hegemony of the League of Communists of Serbia.
Furthermore, I show that this strategy brought about the deepening of divisions between
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republican communist parties and the disarticulation of the system of social divisions that
based the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon.
Seventh, I re-activate the creative moment of constituting a new democratic order out
of the dying Yugoslavian imaginary in SR Croatia. I examine the articulation of new
political myths in the party programs of the Croatian Democratic Union, the League of
Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change, and the Serbian Democratic Party.
I flesh out the manner in which each party situated its project within the context of
the dying imaginary, the particular demands that constituted these projects, how they
inscribed the past into the 1989-1990 context, and how they represented the nature of
social unity, division and political subjectivity. I show that CDU’s articulation of na-
tional subjectivity was contingent upon the broader and immediate context and that its
identitary logic resembled that of the Serbian Democratic Party; both parties subverted
the terms of social division that based the Yugoslavian imaginary and made the signifier
‘Yugoslavia’ contingent upon the signifier ‘nation’. To do so, both included previously
excluded elements back into the signifier ‘nation’ and represented national difference as
national and thus ‘by nature’ political division. In doing so, they drew a new frontier
constituted by the logic the political and the national are essentially identical terms. I
also show the LCC PDC reiterated the identitary logic of the dying imaginary and decon-
tested national identities through a common social-democratic project, providing thereby
an alternative to CDU and the SDP’s representation. This representation was excluded
once CDU’s project expanded into an imaginary through the promulgation of the 1990
Constitution.
The thesis concludes with a summary of the main arguments, their broader implica-
tions, and suggestions for further research.
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CHAPTER II
The Existing Literature and the Theoretical and
Methodological Framework of the Thesis
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a critical overview of the literature relevant to
the topic of this thesis, namely the emergence of the ‘nationalist’ Croatian Democratic
Union in the context of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
and, in the light of its contributions and limitations, map out an alternative theoretical
approach to the topic. For these purposes, this chapter is divided into two sections. The
first section contains a critical overview of three bodies of literature in relation to their
(tacit or explicit) treatment of the CDU phenomenon. These literatures cover Yugoslavia’s
break-up, the Croatian democratic transition, and Croatian identity and nationalism. In
this section I argue that, despite their contribution to understanding various aspects of
the party’s political practices and the socio-political implications of these practices, these
approaches either take the party’s emergence for granted or reduce it to other processes,
and thus fail to account for it in a systematic and critical manner. In the second sec-
tion, I articulate a specific theoretical approach that can critically address the problem
of the party’s emergence and map out the research design that forms the backbone of my
thesis. My approach draws on the ontological presuppositions and conceptual tools of
Poststructuralist Discourse Theory, combined with James Tully’s work on constitutional
development. After mapping out the main theoretical devices that inform my approach
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— ‘politics’, ‘articulation’, ‘discourse’, ‘myth’, ‘imaginary’, ‘identity’, ‘subjectivity’, ‘an-
tagonism’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘transformism’— I explain how, by drawing out the historical
context conditioning it as well as the limits of its political representations, this particular
approach can be critically deployed to account for the CDU’s emergence. The chapter
closes with an explanation of the chapter breakdown of the thesis, and methodological
remarks.
2.2 Current Approaches to the Emergence of the CDU Party
(1989-1990)
2.2.1 The break-up of Yugoslavia
The body of literature focusing on the break-up of Yugoslavia deals, albeit tacitly, with
the emergence of the ‘nationalist’ CDU party. In what follows I provide an overview of the
main arguments regarding the causes of Yugoslavia’s break-up, based on this large body
of work.1 Since this process of dissolution was inextricably bound up with the emergence
of the ‘nationalist’ CDU, after summarizing these arguments I draw out their implications
for understanding the mechanisms behind the party’s emergence. Thereafter, by looking
at the underlying assumptions of each approach regarding the nature of politics, I flesh
out the strengths and limitations of each in accounting for the dissolution and the emer-
gence of the party.
1Its scope has given rise to edited volumes summarizing and systematizing the main arguments for the
purpose of tracking the state of the debate. See for instance: Jasna Dragović-Soso. “Why did Yugoslavia
Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations”. In: State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe:
New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Ed. by Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso.
West Laffayet: Purdue University Press, 2008; Charles W. Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert, eds. Con-
fronting the Yugoslav Controversies: A Scholars’ Initiative. West Laffayet: Purdue University Press,
2012; Florian Bieber, Armina Galijaš, and Rory Archer, eds. Debating the End of Yugoslavia. Sur-
rey: Ashgate Publishing, 2014; Sabrina P. Ramet. Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about
the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005; and Dejan Djokić and James Ker-Lindsay, eds. New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and
Controversies. London: Routledge, 2010.
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2.2.1.1 Arguments and implications
The literature specifies a number of distinct factors that account for the break-up of Yu-
goslavia, and for the subsequent emergence of the CDU. The inability of the Yugoslavian
state to generate wealth and equalize development across the federation is one such key
factor identified as a systemic weakness that resulted in the country’s disintegration.2 The
argument is that antagonistic economic interests crystallized between the developed north
and the underdeveloped south,3 stemming from different objective economic realities, and
giving rise to constant criticisms of the state’s economic policy and developmental strat-
egy. These (economic) differences translated into different positions within Yugoslavia’s
communist elite regarding Yugoslavia’s form, thus triggering constitutional debates. The
economic restructuring policies introduced under IMF pressure in the 1980s widened the
gap in these positions as they had different effects in different territorial units due to
already existing inequalities. In this sense, it is argued, the crisis in the 1980s was caused
by the economy and driven by the positions of political actors determined by the eco-
nomic interests of their respective territorial units. Furthermore, these elite positions
were adopted by the Yugoslavian working class, because of unemployment, unmanage-
able inflation and a dramatic drop in living standards.4 Following the economic logic of
the country’s dissolution, the pro-independence program of the CDU party reflected the
economic interests of the developed SR Croatia, whose development was impeded by its
membership in the crisis-ridden federation. The party’s project is thus seen as the final
2For example: John B Allcock. Explaining Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000,
p. 90; Susan L Woodward. Socialist Unemployment: the Political Economy of Yugoslavia, 1945-1990.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995; Dijana Pleština. Regional Development in Communist
Yugoslavia: Success, Failure, and Consequences. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992; and Michael Palairet.
“The Inter-Regional Struggle for Resources and the Fall of Yugoslavia”. In: State Collapse in South-
Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration. Ed. by Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna
Dragović-Soso. West Laffayet: Purdue University Press, 2008.
3The interest of the developed north (Croatia and Slovenia) lay in widening the scope of the and
retaining the income earned in the republics without central (federal) redistribution. The interest of the
underdeveloped south (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Belgrade as the
center of the federation) lay in centralizing economic resources and redistributing them from developed
to underdeveloped regions.
4For summaries of the argument see: Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about
the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, pp. 55-57; Dejan Jović. Yugoslavia: a State
that Withered Away. West Laffayet: Purdue University Press, 2009, pp. 15-16 and Andrew Wachtel
and Christopher Bennett. “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia”. In: Confronting the Yugoslav Controversies:
A Scholars’ Initiative. Ed. by Charles W. Ingrao and Thomas A. Emmert. West Laffayet: Purdue
University Press, 2012, p. 16.
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(developed) Croatian response to the inability of the Yugoslavian regime to manage the
economy adequately and fairly. In this sense, the party’s program resembles the Croatian
Spring movement (1971), which also stemmed from the objective economic interests of
SR Croatia as a developed Yugoslavian republic.
Yugoslavia’s constitution has also been identified as a weakness that brought about
its dissolution.5 Its decentralized intra-republican bargaining system has been blamed for
failing to ground strong federal institutions that could effectively deal with internal po-
litical divisions and thus deliver order. Equally so, its articles on ‘self-determination’ and
‘sovereignty’ were said to be ambiguous to such an extent that, during debates regarding
reform, both ‘separatist’ and ‘centralist’ forces legitimized their positions in reference to
the existing constitution. According to this perspective, the weak and decentralized con-
stitutional order gave rise to competing centers of power at lower territorial levels and
made the democratization process in the second half of the 1980s a republican-centered
and not an all-Yugoslavian process.6 Following this logic, the emergence of the CDU as
an actor in the dissolution was preconditioned by the institutional disarray at the center.
Furthermore, its programme was a ‘natural’ product of the republican-centred democra-
tization which brought about the emergence of parties that appealed to ‘national’, and
not ‘Yugoslavian’, interests.
Further analysis focuses on the regime’s (mis)management of Yugoslavia’s internal
national and religious diversity as one of the causes of the country’s dissolution.7 In-
5For example: Branka Magaš. The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92].
London: Verso, 1993, p. 82; Audrey Helfant Budding. “Nation/People/Republic: Self-Determination in
Socialist Yugoslavia”. In: State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s
Disintegration. Ed. by Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso. West Laffayet: Purdue University
Press, 2008; Vojin Dimitrijević. “Sukobi oko ustava 1974 [The Conflicts arround the 1974 Constitution]”.
In: Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju [The Serb Side of the War: Trauma
and Catharsis in Historical Memory]. Ed. by Nebojša Popov. Beograd: Republika, 1996; Robert M.
Hayden. Blueprints for a House Divided: the Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts. Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1999; and Valerie Bunce. Subversive Institutions: the Design and the
Destruction of Socialism and the State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
6For summaries of the argument see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 32-33; and
Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations”, pp. 10-13.
7For example: Andrew Wachtel. Making a Nation, Breaking a Nation: Literature and Cultural Politics
in Yugoslavia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998; Aleksandar Pavković. The Fragmentation of
Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State. London: Macmillan, 1997; Paul Lendvai. “Yugoslavia
without Yugoslavs: The Roots of the Crisis”. In: International Affairs 67.2 (1991); and Gale Stokes.
Three Eras of Political Change in Eastern Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
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stead of diminishing internal differences and forging a common Yugoslavian culture, the
Yugoslavian regime promoted and deepened national-cultural differences through (differ-
ent) republican education systems, media, cultural institutions and policies. According to
this perspective, national narratives ‘overwhelmed’ the Yugoslavian narrative because the
latter was unsubstantiated. The overwhelming of what was shared in Yugoslavia by the
‘particularities’ of cultural and religious institutions led to the strengthening of national
political movements.8 Cultural nationalism(s) took on more pronounced political forms
in moments such as the Croatian Spring (1968-1971), the Kosovo protests (80s) and the
Serbian national movement (80s).9 Following this logic, the emergence of the CDU party
can be understood as the political expression of an existing Croatian cultural identity
that was ‘fuller’ than the Yugoslavian identity. Furthermore, the identity expressed by
the party was ‘fermenting’ culturally in the socialist period and occasionally taking on a
more pronounced political form.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia has also been explained through the prism of individ-
ual acts with the aim of assessing the moral responsibility of the actors involved in the
country’s demise.10 According to this perspective, Tito was the only real decision maker
in Yugoslavia and a sovereign above the law. He is blamed for having designed a dys-
functional constitutional order which could not have survived his death. After his death,
a power vacuum came into being and Milošević tried to fill this by instrumentalizing the
Serbian national cause and mobilizing the masses. Since he introduced the language of
nationalism into politics, he is the primary culprit for the country’s dissolution. Franjo
Tuđman, the leader of the CDU and the first Croatian president, is seen as a (Croat-
ian) response to Milošević’s instrumental nationalism, primary responsible for reinforcing
8On the role of religious and cultural institutions in the conflict see: Vjekoslav Perica. Balkan Idols:
Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
9For various national movements in Yugoslavia see: Nick Miller. “Return Engagement: Intellectuals
and Nationalism in Tito’s Yugoslavia”. In: State Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on
Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Ed. by Leonard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso. West Laffayet: Purdue
University Press, 2008 For summaries of the argument see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away,
pp. 19-25; Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations”,
pp. 5-10; Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars
in Bosnia and Kosovo, p. 63; and Wachtel and Bennett, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, pp. 17-18.
10For example: Christopher Bennett. Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences.
Washington Square: New York University Press, 1995; and Louis Sell. Slobodan Milošević and the
Destruction of Yugoslavia. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003.
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enmities instead of mitigating them.11 Following this logic, the CDU political program
is identified with its leader Franjo Tuđman and understood as the product of his will to
power. It is a ‘natural’ response to the Serbian nationalism instrumentalized by Milošević.
The self-managing ideology – a set of ideas and beliefs about the nature of the state
driving the actions of Yugoslavia’s ruling elite – is also identified as a key reason for Yu-
goslavia’s disintegration.12 According to this perspective, the dissolution of the country
was an unintended consequence of the institutionalization of an ideological tenet regard-
ing the withering away of the state. This ideological tenet also accounted for the choices
made by the ruling elite regarding the structure of the economy, the nature of Yugosla-
vian identity, and the constitutional form of the state. The institutionalization of self-
management brought about decentralization and fragmentation, the state withered away
into disorder and anarchy. This state of affairs created the grounds for the emergence of
state-forming doctrines in Yugoslavia’s constitutive units.13 Following this logic, the CDU
party emerged out of the disorderly realities generated by the anti-statist self-managing
ideology; its state-forming project was an attempt to institute order in the context of SR
Croatia.
Lastly, the dissolution of Yugoslavia has also been explained through the transfor-
mation of the bipolar international order in which it enjoyed a strategically important
intermediary position between the East and the West.14 This position was rewarded
economically from both sides of the Iron Curtain, and the country’s internal stability,
cohesion and economic success depended on this particular articulation of global forces.
According to this perspective, the position Yugoslavia occupied ceased to exist with the
11For summaries of the argument see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 18-29;
Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview of Contending Explanations”, pp. 13-15;
and Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in
Bosnia and Kosovo, pp. 66-67.
12For this account see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away.
13For summaries of the argument see: Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview
of Contending Explanations”, p. 11; Wachtel and Bennett, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, pp. 19-20;
and Ramet, Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in
Bosnia and Kosovo, p. 70.
14For example: Kate Hudson. Breaking the South Slav Dream: The Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia.
London: Pluto Press, 2003; Susan L Woodward. Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the
Cold War. Washington: Brookings, 1995; and James Gow. Triumph of the Lack of Will: International
Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War. London: Hurst, 1997.
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rearticulation of global forces after the collapse of Eastern European communism, giving
rise to both a crisis of its economy and of its purpose. Since the Yugoslavian commu-
nist party came to power through (domestic) political struggles and not (foreign) Soviet
intervention, the transition from ‘socialism’ to ‘democracy’ was understood as a process
of liberation from a ‘domestic’ communist regime centered in Belgrade.15 Following this
logic, the CDU emerged on the waves of a democratization whose form was determined
by the particular position Yugoslavia enjoyed in the bipolar world order. The party’s
antagonistic stance towards Belgrade and its demands for Croatian independence were
formed by the manner in which the LCY came to power in 1945.
2.2.1.2 Strengths and limitations
Despite focusing on the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, each perspective discussed
carries implications for understanding the emergence of the CDU party in SR Croatia.
The different explicatory frameworks of these approaches are characterized by different
strengths and deficiencies.
According to the economic logic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, politics is a surface that
reflects objective economic interests. In a federalized and decentralized state characterized
by different levels of development, politics reflects the different economic interests of its
constitutive territorial units. Since these were incommensurable, so the argument goes,
the country fragmented, while the actors that brought about the dissolution were simply
following the economic interests of the territorial units they came from. The economic
logic of the country’s dissolution however, fails to capture anything specific about the
CDU party in the 1989-1900 periods, since the same logic can be deployed to explain the
political program of its key electoral competitor the League of Communists of Croatia-
Party of Democratic Change.16 It also represents the politicizations of 1989 in SR Croatia
15For summaries of the argument see: Dragović-Soso, “Why did Yugoslavia Disintegrate? An Overview
of Contending Explanations”, pp. 23-24; Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 21,26; and
Wachtel and Bennett, “The Dissolution of Yugoslavia”, pp. 27-28.
16The latter’s program also included the demand for further economic decentralization and republican-
isation, which reflected, according to this logic, the interests of a developed republic.
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as a continuity of the reformist Croatian Spring movement of 1971, which operated in a
radically different context. To account for the CDU’s emergence in particular within the
context of the economic crisis in the 1980s, it is necessary to depart from the presuppo-
sition that Yugoslavian politics was just a surface that reflected the economic interests
of republics at different levels of development, since this assumption renders economic
interests as fixed and neglects the transformations they undergo through interacting with
other political interests at particular moments in time.
According to the constitutional logic of Yugoslavian disintegration, politics is a sur-
face determined by constitutional rules, institutions and decision-making procedures. In
this sense, the emergence of nationalist parties in Yugoslavia resulted from its structural
form (a decentralized constitutional design) and the failures of this form. The strength
of this approach is that it shows that the actors in the disintegration were bound by
political rules and structures that shaped their interests. However, from this perspective,
the emergence of the CDU party and its project are completely subsumed to this (failing)
structure, leaving little room for seeing in it a (political) intervention into these rules that
produced something conceptually new. This approach also fails to address the historical
circumstances and struggles that gave rise to that particular type of constitutional order
at the time it was drawn up, focusing primarily on its dysfunctionality in retrospect.
According to the national-cultural logic of Yugoslavian disintegration, politics is a
surface determined by nations whose members are bound together by a shared cultural
identity that differentiates them from other nations. From this perspective, the failure
to forge a culturally homogeneous Yugoslavian identity brought about the dissolution of
Yugoslavia’s political order ‘naturally’, as the order lacked a coherent (political) subject.
The CDU emerged as the political expression of an objectively existing Croatian cultural
identity in a political terrain emptied out of a Yugoslavian subject. This perspective rep-
resents the ‘nationalist’ CDU as continuity with the reformist Croatian Spring movement
(1971), since it too was one political manifestation of Croatian identity within the frame-
work of Yugoslavian socialism. The strength of this approach is that it makes visible the
‘deeper’ identity issues at stake in Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the emergence of the CDU,
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something overlooked by previous accounts. The problem with this account, however, lies
in its assumption that political identity is derivative of culturally unified national commu-
nities. It represents the position of the Yugoslavian regime as having faced an either-or
choice; to deplete its constitutive nations and nationalities of their internal cultural sub-
stratum and forge a unified Yugoslavian national identity or to preserve their mutual
differences and empty out the Yugoslavian identity of cohesive cultural matter. By choos-
ing the latter, the regime set the country on a disintegrative course. This, however, seems
to be a retroactive oversimplification of the issue; first, because the Yugoslavian identity
successfully grounded the political order despite its internal cultural-national diversity, for
decades and, second, because ‘Yugoslavian culture’ and its constitutive ‘national cultures’
were not understood as exclusive loci of identity, neither vis-à-vis each other, nor vis-à-vis
the Yugoslavian identity.17 In this sense, Yugoslavian politics could not have been (just)
about nations as subjects, despite the politicizations of the 1980s.
According to the agency-focused approach to the dissolution, politics resembles a stage
for individual actors to make decisions, weighing out different options with the aim of
increasing their power in the decision-making process. Furthermore, they can be held
morally accountable for the outcomes of the decisions that they make. The strength of
this approach is that it introduces power-struggles into the debates regarding Yugoslavia’s
dissolution, by demonstrating that power-struggles underpinned economic and constitu-
tional factors as well as the politicization of ‘national’ identities. In this sense, neither
of these factors can be ‘abstracted’ out of politics and be said to be driving the dissolu-
tion. The limitation of this approach lies in downplaying the ideological and contextual
constrains that bound agency. It completely subsumes structural factors to agency and
(mis)represents the latter as strictly individual. It fails to consider collective actors –
such as the LCY and the CDU – as a form of agency and simply assumes that they are
‘extensions’ of their leaders and the products of their will to power. It is also problematic
17See: Lenard J. Cohen. Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia’s Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition.
2nd. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 25; and Lenard J. Cohen and Jasna Dragović-Soso, eds. State
Collapse in South-Eastern Europe: New Perspectives on Yugoslavia’s Disintegration. West Laffayet:
Purdue University Press, 2008, p. 8.
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because it deduces intents of actions from consequences.18
According to the ideological logic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, politics is a field of inter-
action between elite driven decision-making about (political) structures, the political and
social consequences of their operation, and the social responses. This approach stresses
the importance of focusing on the elite’s belief system in the Yugoslavian context, pre-
cisely because a single (communist) party ruled the country and its members legitimized
their decisions in reference to a set of defined ideological tenets and aims. The strength
of this approach is its introduction of the ideological dimension into the debate about
Yugoslavia’s demise. It brings to light that, in order to understand economic interests,
the Yugoslavian constitutional order, Yugoslavian political identity and the behaviour of
agents, we must examine its ideological backbone. These features can be understood pri-
marily through an internalist account that takes their ideological commitments seriously,
rather than ignoring them or dismissing as ‘irrational’ and/or a-priori failed because of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the fall of Eastern European communism. The problem
of this approach is that it focuses exclusively on the articulation of the idea of the ‘state’
within ideology and neglects its political identity-forming role. In doing so it fails to
account for the politicization of national identities in the 1980s, and it reduces the emer-
gence of the CDU to a state-centered argument regarding the dissolution of the country.
If the ideology-focused approach were to be applied to the CDU itself, then understand-
ing the party’s emergence would necessitate examining its political program within the
ideological context of Yugoslavia.
According to the exogenous logic of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, politics in and of Yu-
goslavia was determined by the dynamic of the international political system. The fall of
state-directed socialism and changing global conditions account for Yugoslavia’s lack of
political purpose and its economic decline. The strength of this approach lies in contextu-
alizing the problem within the framework of the international power relations and tracking
the genealogy of the state’s development in relation to global trends. The limitation of
this approach is that it fails to grasp why Yugoslavia collapsed into its constitutive terri-
18It is very difficult to prove that Milošević ‘wanted’ to be the new Tito or that Tuđman ‘intended’ to
reinforceing enimities between Croats and Serbs, nor that any of them ’intended’ to destroy Yugoslavia.
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torial units, instead of transforming into a democratic state. In this respect, it is difficult
to understand how the CDU in particular emerged within one of Yugoslavia’s constitutive
republics in the process of democratization and managed to become the dominant force
in forging a new sense of political purpose. To be able to relate the Yugoslavian crisis
of purpose to the rise of the CDU, one must examine the ways in which the movement
‘read’ the Yugoslavian crisis and articulated a new sense of purpose our of its reading.
In sum, this subsection has mapped out the strengths and limitations of the main
existing arguments regarding Yugoslavia’s demise, in light of their implications for the
emergence of the CDU party. The economic argument reads the party’s emergence as
the expression of objective economic interests and traces a continuity between develop-
ments in the 1980s and the Croatian Spring movement (1968-1971). The constitutional
argument sees the party’s emergence as an outcome of particular (dysfunctional) political
rules, failing to see the party as something new that intervened in the political landscape.
The national-cultural logic of Yugoslavian disintegration also traces a continuity between
the Croatian Spring movement and the politicizations of the 1980s, ‘normalizing’ it as
a political expression of an existing Croatian cultural identity. The agency and ideol-
ogy focused approaches complicate this picture and introduce power and meaning into
the process. The former represents the CDU as Tuđman’s project and as a ‘natural’ re-
sponse to Milošević’s instrumental nationalism. The later represents it as a state-forming
doctrine that emerged ‘naturally’ out of the disintegrating ideological order. The last ap-
proach discussed introduces global political forces and brings to light that they shaped its
purpose and the form of its dissolution. In the following subsection I examine the litera-
ture on Croatia’s democratic transition which was triggered by the changing international
dynamics identified as one of the causes of Yugoslavia’s dissolution. While the body of
literature discussed so far has dug into the past to explain Yugoslavia’s fragmentation,
the literature on democratic transition treats the socialist past as a (more or less) blank
slate and focuses on the new political orders, in particular the Republic of Croatia, that
emerged out of its ruins.
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2.2.2 The Croatian democratic transition
In contrast to the abundant literature on Yugoslavia’s disintegration, the body of litera-
ture on the Croatian post-socialist transition is remarkably scarce.19 Broadly speaking,
it can be sub-divided into two streams, depending on their respective understanding of
democracy and their degree of engagement with the process of democratic consolidation.
In this subsection I discuss both positions and examine the ways they have treated the
CDU’s emergence within the framework of their problematizations.
2.2.2.1 Arguments and implications
Drawing on Robert Dahl, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba the ‘liberal’ stream under-
stands democracy in a broad sense to include both formal institutions and the civic values
that underpin them. From this perspective, the Croatian post-socialist political landscape
was determined by a struggle between (inclusive) liberal and (exclusive) nationalist forces
for the domination of the trajectory of Croatia’s development. This perspective sought to
strengthen the liberal-democratic camp by fleshing out problematic aspects of the value
system and suggesting policies for improving them.20
According to the theoretical framework underpinning the analysis, ‘liberal democracy’
and ‘nationalism’ are mutually exclusive political doctrines. Liberalism is understood an
inclusive form of government, whereby political subjects are constituted as equal indi-
viduals and politics is based on the rule of law, the separation of powers, a the respect
for human rights, and the inclusion of minorities. Nationalism, on the other hand, is
19This has to do with the difficulty to grasp Croatia’s transition in comparative perspective because
of the idiosyncrasy of Yugoslavia’s transitions(s) in relation to other Central and Eastern European
countries. The only comparative study is Sharon Fischer. Political Change in post-Communist Slovakia
and Croatia: from Nationalist to Europeanist. New York: : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. I will not
discuss Fisher’s book in particular since the liberal stream, which I do discuss, espouses its general
position. Fisher’s work focuses on making a broader argument about catalysing the process of European
integration, and in this subsection I chose to focus on the literature that looks into the Croatian case in
particular due to the topic of the thesis.
20See: Sabrina P. Ramet. “What’s Love (of Country) got to do with it? Civic Values in Democratic
Transition”. In: Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media. Ed. by
Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007, p. 10; and
Knut Vesterdal. “Conclusion: Building Liberal Democracy in Croatia”. In: Democratic Transition in
Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić.
College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007, p. 374.
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an exclusive ‘affectivity’ based on the identification of a particular state with a particu-
lar nation and the exclusion of minorities and non-members. Its central objective is the
preservation of the body of the nation through the institutional system.21
Since the ‘nationalist’ CDU dominated the trajectory of the Croatian transition to
democracy, the liberal steam focuses on identifying its negative impact on the quality of
Croatian democracy in the 1990s. It does not problematize the emergence of the party
in the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution because it focuses its attention on the process
that came after the transition to a democratic system of representation had already taken
place in a formal sense. The party’s emergence, its electoral victory, and the construction
of a democratic-institutional order out of the rubble of self-management, are simply sub-
sumed under ‘the first phase of transition’ that spans from 1989 to 1995.22 This period
also includes the trajectory of the war that broke out in independent Croatia, in the terri-
tories with a substantial Serbian population, after the terms of the democratic settlement
were codified in the 1990 Constitution. The CDU’s electoral victory is attributed to the
behaviour of voters,23 the absolute majority electoral system, the simplicity of its plat-
form for change, (eliminating communism and establishing an independent state), and
its focus on the national reconciliation between Croatian fascists and communists.24 This
stream maintains that the war strengthened the party’s position about the centrality of
state-building and national unity.25 The party had a negative impact on the quality of
Croatian democracy only after 1995, when Croatia’s state borders were consolidated, and
institutions put firmly in place.26 In this sense, the CDU party’s emergence is simply not
constituted as an object of analysis in itself, but ‘normalized’ under a phase of transition
that was (also) a state-building process.
21Ramet, “What’s Love (of Country) got to do with it? Civic Values in Democratic Transition”, p. 4.
22Marius Søberg. “Croatia Since 1989: The HDZ and the Politics of Transition”. In: Democratic
Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet and
Davorka Matić. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007, p. 32.
23This argument is that the reformed communists lost the votes of Croatia’s Serbs to the newly formed
Serbian Democratic Party, while the voters that opposed CDU’s ‘nationalism’ did not immediately cast
their votes to their main competitors the reformed communists, but dispersed them between small newly
formed parties and initiatives.




The second stream understands democracy in a narrower sense, to mean the particular
set of rules and institutions that came into being through the transition process. Contrary
to the liberal stream, this approach is neither explicitly positioned in a political struggle,
nor does it prescribe political strategies for improving the quality of Croatia’s democracy.
Rather, it seeks to explain the features of the Croatian democratic order through theory-
driven quantitative analyses.
One such approach draws on the work of Adam Przeworski, Giuseppe Di Palma, Guil-
ermo O‘Donnell, Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan. It understands transition as completed
once the democratic ‘rules of the game’ (institutions and procedures) are settled down and
views consolidation as a subsequent step which is about the degree of stability and the
quality of functioning of these rules.27 From this perspective, the Croatian transition was
a two phased-dominant player game completed after the proclamation of the 1990 Consti-
tution. The first phase was determined by the actions of the reformed communists, who
called for multiparty elections in response to the conflicts within the federal LCY. The
second phase was determined by the actions of the CDU, which came to power through
elections and shaped the new democratic order.28 This particular form of transition ex-
plains the instability of the new democratic order that came into being in the 1990s. Both
steps followed the logic of unilateral decision making regarding the new institutions — the
election law, the semi-presidential system, the borders of the state, and the constitutional
position of Croatian Serbs— and these came to reflect partial interests as opposed to a
democratically forged consensus. Furthermore, this perspective maintains that the CDU
party itself failed to undergo the transition necessary for the consolidation of democracy,
transforming from an opposition party in the socialist regime into a party in a democratic
regime. Instead, it institutionalized into a new regime and transferred its values, vocab-
ulary and interpretations of reality into the common symbolic and institutional patterns
of the Republic of Croatia. The transition process therefore resulted in an ‘authoritarian
27Čular, “Political Development in Croatia 1990-2000: Fast Transition-Postponed Consolidation”, p. 31.
28Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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democracy’29 characterized by the low quality of the democratic game.30 This perspec-
tive, thus, does not problematize the party’s emergence. It subsumes the process under
a phase dominated by the actions of the reformed communists and ascribes the party’s
electoral victory to its simple project of transition (Croatian state sovereignty) and its
highly emotional, nationalistic and historically oriented populism, maintaining that they
were ‘suited’ for this context.31
Another such approach explains the formation of the Croatian party system in the
transition process by deploying Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan’s concept of political
cleavages. Following this perspective, the political divisions, or cleavages, that shaped the
Croatian party system in the post-socialist period originated in the national and industrial
revolutions in Europe. Cleavages are understood as objective social facts, dichotomous in
nature, which presuppose a coincidence between social group identity and political par-
ties. They become part of party identity through mobilizations by elites.32
According to this approach, the parties that competed in the first multiparty elections
drew on two existing cleavages, the territorial-cultural and the ideological-cultural. The
former accounts for the opposing positions existing among the masses and the elite, re-
garding Croatia’s relationship to the state centres it has historically been subject to and
the relationship between Croatia as a state center and its minorities and regions. It is im-
bued with opposing–exclusive vs. inclusive–conceptions of national and state integration,
and its origins are traced back to the first Croatian political movements in the Austrian-
Hungarian Monarchy.33 The latter accounts for the opposing positions existing among the
masses and the elites regarding the role of religion in society. It originates in the process
29The CDU regime did not abolish the democratic game; institutional constraints precluded the com-
plete institutionalization of the party into the state and forced it to test its legitimacy at regularly held
elections. Hence the syntagm ‘authoritarian democracy’.
30Čular, “Political Development in Croatia 1990-2000: Fast Transition-Postponed Consolidation”,
pp. 36-38.
31Ibid., pp. 35-36.
32Nenad Zakošek and Goran Čular. “Croatia”. In: The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern
Europe. Ed. by Sten Berglund, Joakim Ekman, and Frank J. Aarebrot. 2nd. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
Publishing Limited, 2004, pp. 457, 471.
33Internally, ‘centralism’ overlaps with an exclusive understanding of culture and ‘periphery’ with
non-exclusive conceptions, historically variations of Yugoslavism. According to this perspective, this
historical cleavage emerged in the form of opposing national identities Croats vs. Serbs and Yugoslavs in
the transition process. See ibid., p. 458.
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of cultural modernization and secularization. The two cleavages were intertwined in the
1990s elections because the Catholic Church publicly embraced the notion of Croatian
national autonomy and an exclusivist conception of national identity.34 According to this
approach, the CDU’s emergence was the political expression of pre-existing social divi-
sions; the party expressed the position of the segment of Croatian society which identified
as Catholic Croats, demanded Croatian independence from Yugoslavia, opposed commu-
nism and understood national culture in an exclusive manner.
2.2.2.2 Strengths and limitations
Despite focusing on the process of Croatia’s transition to democracy, in which the CDU
party played a pivotal role, the two streams discussed fail to account for the party’s emer-
gence within the context of Yugoslavia’s disintegration. The liberal stream treats the first
five years of the party’s rule in an apologetic manner due to the war and state-building
processes, thereby manifesting the limitations of its own assumptions regarding the exclu-
sive relationship between ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘nationalism’.35 In the Croatian context,
the coming to power of the ‘nationalist’ CDU and the transition to democracy were part
and parcel of a single trajectory to such an extent that the democratic institutional order
and the identity grounding it were ‘created’ by the party. By focusing exclusively on
the negative practices associated with the party’s rule in the post-war period, the liberal
approach ‘normalizes’ a set of assumptions regarding the nature of that identity and its
relation to the Serbian identity in Croatia, as well as their mutual relations to the state.
34Zakošek and Čular, “Croatia”, p. 459 This research ‘proves’ that the cleavages were mobilized in the
first elections by deploying a quantitative analysis of party-preferences and political attitudes. The data
shows that those identifying as ‘Croatian Catholic’ were much more likely to support Croatian indepen-
dence and multi-partyism than those that identified as ‘Serbs’ or ‘Yugoslavs’, while those identifying as
‘Croatian atheists’ were in between. Their results also show that those that voted for the CDU were
much more likely to support Croatian independence and multi-partyism than those that voted for the
reformed communists. Furthermore, those that voted for the CDU were much more likely to oppose
self-management than those that voted for the reformed communists.
35For more on the problem of conceptualising ‘nationalism’ and democracy as mutually exclusive in the
Croatian context see: Davorka Matić. “Is Nationalism Really that Bad? The Case of Croatia”. In: Demo-
cratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and Media. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet and
Davorka Matić. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007; and Garth Massey, Randy Hodson,
and Duško Sekulić. “Nationalism, Liberalism and Liberal Nationalism in Post-war Croatia”. In: Nations
and Nationalism 9.1 (2003).
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The ‘scientific’ stream treats the CDU in accordance with its theoretical apparatus
about the transition process and the new institutions which came into being through it.
The first approach sees in the CDU-directed authoritarian democracy the reason for the
failure to consolidate the democratic game, while the second approach sees in the party
the political re-emergence of historically determined social divisions whose political ex-
pression was ‘blocked’ in Yugoslavia. The first approach overlooks the struggles regarding
the terms under which the new democratic subject would be forged in the post-socialist
order, and it thus fails to address the central assumptions that were inscribed into the
fabric of the new order and structured its institutional rules. The second approach maps
out the voting preferences of those that were more likely to vote for the CDU, assuming
the party was a channel for their (political) representation. This approach shows that
conflicting conceptions of national identity and state competed in the 1990 elections, but
precludes their problematization in the context of their emergence by tracing their origins
back to modernity and not locating them in the context of existing political struggles.
Despite their critique of the practices associated with the CDU’s regime in the 1990s,
these accounts fail to address the implications of CDU’s electoral victory for the represen-
tation of the (political) subject of the transition process, namely the (Croatian) ‘nation’
and (its) state. In the following subsection I examine the literature on Croatian national
identity and nationalism, which places its analytic focus on the phenomenon of the nation
as a political subject.
2.2.3 Croatian national identity
While the approaches discussed so far have placed the CDU’s emergence within the context
of Yugoslavia’s dissolution and the transition from socialism to democracy, the literature
on Croatian national identity and nationalism situates it within the field of the study of
nations and nationalism.36 In this subsection I focus on the different ways in which this
body of literature has understood the notion of Croatian national identity in relation to
36For an overview of current debates on nations and nationalism see: Umut Özkırımlı. Theories of
Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000.
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politics, and how these positions have been reflected in different treatments of the ‘na-
tionalist’ CDU party.
2.2.3.1 Arguments and implications
Drawing on the work of Ernest Renan and Anthony Smith, the primordialist perspective
on Croatian national identification sees contemporary Croatian national identity as an ex-
pression of a particular (Croatian) South-Slavic ethnic community that was forged through
a shared language, territory (the medieval kingdom of Croatia), culture (Slavic-Catholic)
and historical ancestry (the Slavic tribe that migrated to the South-West Balkans in the
7th century). This perspective identifies the medieval Kingdom of Croatia as a Croatian
state, since the kings that were ruling over it identified as ‘Croats’ and entered into unions
with different empires by their own will, assuring a continuity of (particular) Croatian
statehood. According to this perspective, the creation of the Yugoslavian Monarchy and
the integration of the Croatian nation into a South-Slavic national body (Yugoslavian)
mark the end of this continuity and the loss of Croatian statehood. In this sense, the 20th
century was determined by national attempts to establish an independent, ethnically ho-
mogeneous state as a restoration of the medieval state and the affirmation of its national
particularity. This process underpinned the constitution and dissolution of the proto-
fascist independent state of Croatia (1941-1945), and the establishment of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Croatia (1945-1990). It also ‘caused’ the emergence of the Croatian
Spring movement (1971) which was an expression of the failure of the Yugoslavian regime
to adequately resolve the national question. According to primordialists, the transition
from single party rule to multi-partyism created the conditions for the free articulation of
the nation’s historic interests and its constitution into an independent political sovereign
in its own state.37 The CDU’s leader and Croatia’s first president, Franjo Tuđman, un-
derstood nations in primordial terms. In his own words:
[nations are] the result of the development of all those material and spiritual forces
37Miroslav Vujević. “Nacionalna identifikacija u Hrvatskoj”. In: Društvena istraživanja-časopis za opća
društvena pitanja 16.3 (2007), pp. 392-394.
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which in an given area shape the national being of individual nations on the basis
of blood, linguistic and cultural kinship, and the common vital interests and links
of fate between the ethnic community and the common homeland and the common
historical traditions and aims. The drive towards survival and the desire of a nation
to live and retain its national identity, to assert itself and be free and recognized in
the world community are invincible.38
Drawing on the work of Hans Kohn, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Andersen, the modernist
perspective challenges the primordial account by maintaining that it projects contempo-
rary ideas regarding the state and society back into the past. The modernists see the
Croatian nation as a modern phenomenon that came into being through national mobi-
lizations that accompany modern state-formation processes.39 In this sense, the nation is
understood as a new locus of identity, made possible by the termination of feudal relations,
cultural standardization, the expansion of markets, and the emergence of print capitalism.
The nation as a locus of identity is the product of 19th century romantic-nationalists who
created it out of religious, linguistic and historical elements and defined it through dif-
ferentiation from ‘others’.40 They did so to introduce the principle of self-determination,
liberate Croatian society from foreign centres of power and ‘catalyze’ its transition from
feudalism to capitalism. The process of transforming the Croatian ‘people’ into a ‘na-
tion’ was completed through the political activities of the Croatian Peasant Party (CPP)
at the beginning of the 20th century. The CPP took the intellectual endeavours of the
political elite ‘down’ to the peasant-majority, thereby linking the different segments of
society into a modern national body. In this sense Croatian nationalism, and the so-
38Franjo Tuđman. Nationalism in Contemporary Europe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1981,
pp. 288-298.
39Duško Sekulić. “Civic and Ethnic Identity: the Case of Croatia”. In: Politička misao 40.2 (2004);
Edvard Kardelj. The Nation and Socialism. Belgrade: Socialist Tought and Practice, 1981; Nikša
Staničić. Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću [The Croatian Nation and Natonalism in
the 19th and 20th Century]. Zagreb: Barbat, 2002.
40The literature differentiates between four definitions of the scope of the nation in the 19th century
and maintains that they all drew on common ancestral origins to explain to the people who they were as
Croats; one identified Croatian identity as primarily South Slavic and thus equivalent to other South Slavic
‘ethnic’ groups; one saw Croatia as a constitutive part of a federalized Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy;
one based on an exclusive Croatian identity that saw the future Croatian state as independent; one,
dominant among a segment of the nobility that wanted to preserve their feudal rights and saw Croatia as
inextricably linked with Hungary. See: Sekulić, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: the Case of Croatia”, p. 146
The Yugoslavian communists followed the same logic, although they maintained that the national interests
articulated by the progressive intellectuals were infused with their particular class interests. At the time,
these partially overlapped with the interests peasants and workers, despite their class antagonisms. See:
Kardelj, The Nation and Socialism, p. 41.
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cial entity produced through it, served the purpose of social emancipation.41 According
to modernists the Croatian nation came to be defined in exclusive terms because of the
context of modernization. Since Croatian territories were under foreign rule, national
mobilization occurred against existing state-formations.42
The League of Communist of Yugoslavia espoused a modernist conception of the na-
tion, seeing in them modern completed formations with a ‘socio-economic substance’.
Nationalism was considered to be a retrograde bourgeois political doctrine which had
exhausted its emancipatory potential.43 After Yugoslavia’s dissolution, modernists main-
tained that the demise of socialism was naturally paralleled by the politicization of na-
tional identity in exclusivist terms because the communists never challenged the pri-
mordial logics of national identification.44 From this perspective, the emergence of the
‘exclusivist’ and ‘nationalist’ CDU party is seen as part and parcel of a modern process of
state formation whose trajectory was determined by the context of Croatian moderniza-
tion. Furthermore, CDU’s political project is understood as part and parcel of a Croatian
national state-forming process.45
More recently, scholars have come to question the terms of the debate regarding the
Croatian nation, noticing that the academic field has, to varying degrees, been compla-
cent in the reproduction of the positions of those in power. Although these approaches
differ in terms of the literature that they draw on and the particular questions that they
address, none of them understand nations as historically completed formations, but as
41Sekulić, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: the Case of Croatia”, pp. 146-147.
42See: ibid., pp. 147-148; and Kardelj, The Nation and Socialism, pp. 51-53.
43Ibid., pp. 24, 27, 49.
44Sekulić, “Civic and Ethnic Identity: the Case of Croatia”, pp. 151, 155.
45Staničić, Hrvatska nacija i nacionalizam u 19. i 20. stoljeću [The Croatian Nation and Natonalism
in the 19th and 20th Century], p. 138.
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on-going political problems in need of exploration.46
Bellamy bridges the divide between the first and second perspective on Croatian na-
tional identity by drawing on the work of Liisa Malkki, Michael Billing, Sarah Radcliffe,
Sally Westwood, Paul James and Katherine Verdery. From his perspective the Croatian
nation is a much too complex phenomenon to be reduced to either an a-historic eth-
nic core or a particular kind of state-forming process shaped by modernity. Rather, he
understands national identity as constituted at different levels of abstraction, which de-
termine the degree to which it appears as a continuity.47 From this perspective, Croats
are constituted as a nation at the most abstract level through a shared belief in a con-
tinuous history of statehood tracked back to the medieval Triune Kingdom.48 By looking
at three different articulations of this abstract national narrative – the dominant CDU
articulation, the articulations of the opposition parties, and the articulation of dissident
intellectuals’ and of the diaspora – Bellamy shows the different ways in which the ‘nation’
was imagined in 1990.49 He also shows that the dominant CDU conception of national
identity was challenged at the least abstract level of social practices.50
Bellamy does not problematize the emergence of the CDU such; he simply looks into
the way the party ‘imagined’ the abstract narrative of statehood, understanding it as a
structural backbone of Croatian national identification. His account is informed by the
assumption that there is an abstract narrative that lays at the core of Croatian national
identification, external to politics. Drawing on the insights of poststructuralist theories
of identity, the following approaches I discuss reject this premise. In their own way, they
46Due to the scope of my research, I have left out the feminist perspective from the reviewed literature.
For feminist accounts of Croatian nationalism and identity see: Biljana Bijelić. “Women on the Edge
of Gender Equality”. In: Democratic Transition in Croatia: Value Transformation, Education, and
Media. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet and Davorka Matić. College Station: Texas A&M University Press,
2007; Svetlana Slapšak. “Nationalist and Women’s Discourse in Post-Yugoslavia”. In: Transitions,
Enviorments, Translations: Feminisms in International Politics. Ed. by JoanW. Scott, Cora Kaplan, and
Debra Keates. New York: Routledge, 1997; Ðurđa Knežević. “Affective Nationalism”. In: Transitions,
Enviorments, Translations: Feminisms in International Politics. Ed. by Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan,
and Debra Keates. New York: Routledge, 1997; and Julie Mostov. “Sexing the Nation/Desexing the
Body: Politics of National Identity in the Former Yugoslavia”. In: Gender Ironies of Nationalism: Sexing
the Nation. Ed. by Tamar Mayer. London: Routledge, 2000.
47Alex J Bellamy. The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-old Dream? Manchester:





understand ‘nations’ and ‘nationalisms’ as emerging in certain contexts and within spe-
cific systems of meaning that are produced and subverted through power struggles.
Ragazzi focuses on overlooked aspects of contemporary Croatian nationalism by draw-
ing on the work of authors such as Michele Foucault, William Connolly, Pierre Bourdieu,
John L. Austin, John R. Searle and Rogers Brubaker.51 Ragazzi does not problematize the
emergence of the CDU as such but focuses on the operation of the ‘diasporic discourse’
within its articulation of nationalism and national identity. He differentiates post-socialist
Croatian nationalism from its preceding historical forms because of the centrality of the
‘diasporic discourse’ – the practices done in the name of the diaspora – in its political
articulation.52 His analysis shows the party deployed that discourse to translate an old
notion of an ethnically clean and territorially expanded Croatia into acceptable terms for
the post-socialist context.53 Consequently, it redefined both the borders of the nation and
the scope of state sovereignty.54 By tracing a genealogy of the practices of the transna-
tional control of populations in the 20th century, Ragazzi shows the extent to which the
‘diasporic discourse’ was conditioned by the normalization of the idea that the state can
govern groups outside of its territorial borders as if they were within them. In doing so
he renders visible that the party’s project was shaped by the struggles and institutional
forms that preceded it.55
Salecl draws on the work of Ernesto Laclau and Jacques Lacan to explain the emer-
gence of nationalist politics in the former Yugoslavia.56 She contends that nations come
into being through identification processes that are driven by passions, emotions and af-
fect. These processes are structured by enemy fantasies that threaten the nation and
from which the nation has to be protected. From her perspective, right-wing parties op-
erate by weaving enemy figures and positioning themselves as protectors of the nation.57
51Francesco Ragazzi. “The Croatian “Diaspora Politics” of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?” In:
Transnational Societies, Transterritorial Politics: Migrations in the (Post-)Yugoslavian region 19th–20th




55Ibid., pp. 156, 163.
56Renata Salecl. “The Crisis of Identity and the Struggle for New Hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia”.
In: The Making of Political Identities. Ed. by Ernesto Laclau. London: Verso, 1994.
57Ibid., pp. 211-212.
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Within this framework, the emergence of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia can only
be understood in the light of Yugoslavia’s crisis of meaning in the 1980s. Once the Yu-
goslavian ideology failed to provide a backbone for identification and articulate a coherent
vision of reality, a political space was opened up for a power struggle over defining a new
identification framework.58 Nationalist forces won in the struggle because they managed
to subordinate all political problems to the problem of national identity and construct a
symbolic space – filled out with images of hatred of other nations and of the happy future
that would arrive after national liberation – from which individuals appeared likeable to
themselves.59 From her perspective, the CDU emerged out of Yugoslavia’s crisis of mean-
ing and became hegemonic due to the centrality that ‘the nation’ and its ‘enemies’ played
within its discourse. The victory was predicated by the failure of other forces to place the
nation at the forefront of their discourses.
Bowman draws on the work of Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Benedict Ander-
sen to tackle the same problem as Salecl but focuses on the Croatian case in particular.60
According to him, ‘the nation’ as a collective body emerges out of identification processes
that are constituted through shared experiences of inflicted violence. These experiences
propel individuals to unite through a state-forming project articulated in defence against
the perceived antagonism. By identifying in such a manner they give rise to a national-
ist imaginary horizon.61 Bowman maintains that Yugoslavian communists preserved ‘the
nation’ as an identitary category but tried to depoliticize it by constituting ‘national-
ism’ as a threat and a potential source of violence against all Yugoslavian citizens. The
shift to particularist nationalist imaginaries came after the break-down of Titoist ideol-
ogy through the political interventions of republican politicians. They aimed to increase
their own power by creating enemies and articulating nationalist myths in the process.62
58Salecl, “The Crisis of Identity and the Struggle for New Hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia”, p. 208.
59Ibid., p. 225.
60Glenn Bowman. “Constitutive Violence and the Nationalist Imaginary. Antagonism and Defensive
Solidarity in ‘Palestine’ and ‘former Yugoslavia’”. In: Populism and the Mirror of Democracy. Ed. by
Francisco Panizza. London: Verso, 2005; Glenn Bowman. “Constitutive Violence and the Nationalist
Imaginary. Antagonism and Defensive Solidarity in ‘Palestine’ and ‘former Yugoslavia’”. In: Social
Anthropology 11.3 (2003).
61Bowman, “Constitutive Violence and the Nationalist Imaginary. Antagonism and Defensive Solidarity
in ‘Palestine’ and ‘former Yugoslavia’ ”, p. 319.
62Ibid., pp. 329-332.
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From this perspective, CDU’s political project re-articulated the Yugoslavian state into
an instrument for the realization of the Serbian national project and a source of violence
against the ‘Croatian nation’. It offered individual Croats an imaginary horizon to in-
scribe the instances of violence inflicted against them. Through these inscription(s) the
Croatian nation as a collective body came into being.63
2.2.3.2 Strengths and limitations
In the primordial account of Croatian national identity, the Croatian nation is abstracted
out of politics and understood as an objective, synchronically and diachronically, unified
entity that determines historical development. In this sense, the CDU’s emergence is ‘nor-
malized’ as but one expression of the nation’s desires against those that have historically
suppressed it. Nationalism as a form of politics emerges ‘naturally’ as the struggle of the
nation against the enemies that oppress it. The strength of its approach lies in showing
the theoretical presuppositions about the nature of national identity that underpinned
CDU’s own representations in the 1990s and the new democratic constitutional order.
However, this is also its explicatory limitation since it fails to account for the emergence
of that form of identity in the context of the 1990s, but merely reproduces the party’s
own representations.
The modernist approach maintains the nation is a product of structural factors that
drive history and, to that extent, it introduces it into the political terrain. The strength
of this approach is that it shows the limitations of the primordial account as well as
the theoretical presuppositions of the Yugoslavian regime about nations and their place
in history. Yet this approach falls short in accounting for the emergence of the CDU
party in the context of dissolving Yugoslavia; the ‘origins’ of the CDU’s representations
of identity are attributed to structural factors that preceded the emergence of the party
by a century. According to the modernists, these representations were not affected by the
legacy of Yugoslavian socialism and were in fact just a continuation of an old identitarian
63Bowman, “Constitutive Violence and the Nationalist Imaginary. Antagonism and Defensive Solidarity
in ‘Palestine’ and ‘former Yugoslavia’ ”, p. 333.
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logic in a democratic context.
Bellamy shows that the nation was neither ‘completed’ nor ‘formed’ by the 1990s, but
that it continued to be a contested locus of identity. He also shows that the CDU’s par-
ticular articulation of the ‘nation’ – as realized through sovereignty and unity – despite
its dominant position at the institutional level, was just one possibility. The limitation
of his approach is that it focuses on continuities at the (abstract) political level and fails
to account for ‘newness’ in the post-socialist representation of the nation as a political
identity.
Ragazzi shows that the CDU’s nationalism was a post-socialist novelty, although the
discourses constituting it were shaped by past institutional practices beyond the party’s
control. His reading of Croatian nationalism shows tacitly that the party reinvented the
notion of Croatian national identity out of the context of political struggles and institu-
tional logics of Yugoslav socialism, and not just out of an abstract narrative of historical
statehood. Yet his approach does not show alternatives to CDU’s articulation of the na-
tion but focuses on the CDU’s deployment of the ‘diasporic discourse’ and its historical
conditions of possibility.
Salecl shows that the politicization of national identities in the 1990s cannot be un-
derstood without considering the failures of Yugoslavian ideology. However, she fails to
concretize the processes of failure and emergence, and accounts for them in terms of
universal psychological drives and antagonistic inclinations. In this sense, she ‘reduces’
all national identities that emerged to the same mechanism and fails to engage with
their particular representations in the post-socialist period and the historical context that
shaped them. Bowman pays close attention to emergence of the CDU in the process of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration, and argues that the Croatian nation was brought into being
during the 1990-1991 period through an identification process driven by national antag-
onisms. The strength of his approach lies in concretizing, the historical trajectory that
brought national politicizations in Yugoslavia into being and fleshing out the political
character of national identity. However, since he also maintains that the ‘nation’ existed
as an identitary category in Yugoslavian socialism, the argument that the ‘Croatian na-
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tion’ only came into being through the political intervention of the CDU in 1990s seems to
suggest that the ‘nation’ was a somewhat unreal or unsubstantiated identitary category
in Yugoslavian socialism.
Despite engaging with the ontological presuppositions of the primordial account, both
Salecl and Bowman’s reading paradoxically reproduce the CDU’s position that the ‘na-
tion’ became a ‘proper’ subject of politics in the 1990s. This paradox, I believe, originates
in their understanding of national identity as emerging exclusively out of identification
process driven by (national) antagonisms. Although both authors place Yugoslavia’s
crisis of meaning at the forefront of their account of the emergence of national identifi-
cations and imaginaries in the post-socialist period, they fail to explain how this crisis
was reflected at the level of the political representation and the constitution of the nation.
2.2.4 Reflections on the existing approaches
In this subsection I have explored a wide range of literature dealing with the emergence of
the CDU party in SR Croatia in the 1989-1990 period. Evidently, the reviewed literature
is not all at the same level of abstraction and it does not all share a common object of anal-
ysis; each field of study focuses on its own particular ‘objects’ and explores them through
idiosyncratic theoretical paradigms. However, the CDU party is a theme that cuts across
these different approaches, despite the fact that they do not account for its emergence in
a systematic and critical manner. I have illustrated how the literature on Yugoslavia’s
disintegration reduced the process to factors that ‘caused’ the break-up of Yugoslavia. In
this sense, some accounts have rendered the CDU an expression of objective economic
interests, institutional structures of national-cultural identities. Furthermore, the party’s
emergence has also been normalized as the continuation of the Croatian Spring move-
ment (1971) or a ‘reaction’ to the politics of Slobodan Milošević and Serbian nationalism.
In addition, I have illustrated the extent to which the literature on the Croatian demo-
cratic transition failed to constitute the emergence of the CDU party within the context
of dissolving Yugoslavia as an object of analysis because of its focus on the new demo-
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cratic institutions/values. These approaches problematize the practices associated with
the party’s rule in the post-socialist period and tacitly normalize assumptions derived
from its political project about the meaning of Croatian national identity, its relation
to the Serbian national identity in Croatia and their mutual relationship to the state.
Lastly, I have illustrated the manner in which the party’s emergence has been treated by
the existing approaches to Croatian national identity and nationalism. I have shown that
primordialism naturalizes the party’s emergence as an expression of the political desires of
the ‘oppressed’ Croatian nation, reproducing in a literal sense the party’s own representa-
tions. I have argued that the modernist approach and Bellamy’s ‘narrative approach’ fail
to account for the political role that the party played in the representation of Croatian
national identity in the post-socialist period. I have also maintained that poststructural-
ist accounts, despite placing the phenomenon of the Croatian nation in the ideological
context of its emergence, have failed to concretize how the party’s coming to power was
reflected in the transformation of the nation’s representation from the socialist to the
post-socialist period. In this sense, by maintaining that ‘nations’ emerge exclusively out
of antagonistic identification processes, Salecl and Bowman have reproduced the position
of the ‘nationalist’ CDU, that the nation only became a political subject in the 1990s.
In the following subsection, I map out my own theoretical apparatus to account for the
party’s emergence within the context of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, which falls within the
poststructuralist approach and draws on Political Discourse Theory. However, in contrast
to Salecl and Bowman’s reading, my theoretical apparatus is designed to account for the
emergence of the CDU party by drawing out the historical context that has shaped its
‘nationalist’ project and by showing the limitations of its political representations of the
‘nation’.
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2.3 The Emergence of the CDU Party in the Context of Yu-
goslavia’s Dissolution: a Discourse Analytic Reading
I do not aspire to develop a universal theory about Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Croatia’s
transition to democracy or Croatian nationalism in this thesis. Rather, by drawing on
insights from these fields of study, I aim to critically engage with the emergence of a
particular nationalist party that came to dominate the manner in which the Croatian na-
tion, state, and society were represented in the post-socialist period. By drawing on the
ontological pre-suppositions and theoretical tools of Poststructuralist Discourse Theory
(PDT), my thesis addresses the process of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Croatian national-
ism, and democratic transition from the vantage point of political identity formation. In
the following subsection, I map out the main concepts and ontological presuppositions of
PDT that I deploy in the course of the analysis to draw out the context that has shaped
CDU’s emergence and to show the limitations of its political representations.
2.3.1 Poststructuralist Discourse Theory as a research paradigm
PDT assumes that all social objects and human subjects are meaningful and that meaning
is conferred by systems of socially constructed rules that are produced politically.64 In the
case of Croatia, for instance, this means that one cannot assume the existence of a nation
that pre-exists the practices that give meaning to the term and that are embedded in a
particular historical context. Since all social objects acquire meaning only once they are
inserted into language and rendered intelligible, no object or subject can be abstracted
from the political process as an essence that grounds it and determines its trajectory.
Discourses are the theoretical horizons through which the meaning of objects, sub-
jects, and social relations is constituted. They involve the exercise of power since their
constitution requires the exclusion of certain possibilities.65 In this sense, the CDU’s na-
64David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis. “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis”.
In: Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Ed. by David




tionalist project can be understood as a particular discourse which was oriented towards
the production, exploration, and promotion of particular kind of nation and its identity.66
Equally, ‘Yugoslavian socialism’ can be viewed as a particular form of discourse through
which the meaning of various subjects, objects, and institutions was constituted. Al-
though both discourses represented the same subject, the Croatian nation, the differences
between them can be fleshed out in terms of the different theoretical horizons and exclu-
sions through which the subject was constituted.
PDT views politics as a struggle that different discursive formations enter into so as
to define the terms of forging social unity. Politics, in other words, is the process whereby
the meaning of social objects, subjects, and relations is fixed, transformed and/or sub-
verted.67 In this sense, the national subject can acquire different connotations over time,
depending on the relations of power grounding it and thus defining its meaning. For
instance, this means that processes like the Croatian Spring (1968-1971), the protests
of Kosovo’s Albanians and Serbs (1980s), the anti-bureaucratic revolution of Milošević’s
supporters (1988-1990), and the coming to power of the CDU party, could not have been
determined by national interests that pre-existed the concrete system of social relations
and practices they were situated in. Rather, they can be viewed as struggles that aimed
at transforming and/or subverting the terms of social unity, in response to which they
emerged.
Furthermore, since the meaning of social objects, subjects, and relations is both fixed
and changed through political struggles, there is nothing inevitable or determined in the
outcome(s) that are produced. The meanings that become dominant, or hegemonic in
PDT terms, are contingent upon the political process itself and the historical context
that shapes it.68 In this sense, the hegemonic representation of the Croatian democratic
subject in the post-socialist period can be viewed as contingent upon the political strug-
66Finlayson, “Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism”, p. 105.
67David Howarth. Discourse. Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000, pp. 104-105; and Ernesto
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics.
London: Verso, 2001, p. 111.
68Ernesto Laclau. The Making of Political Identities. London: Verso, 1994, p. 3; Aletta J. Norval.
“Theorising Hegemony: between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis”. In: Radical Democracy: Politics
Between Abundance and Lack. Ed. by Lars Tønder and Lasse Thomassen. Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 2005, p. 8; and Howarth, Discourse, pp. 109-110.
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gles in Yugoslavia and the systems of meaning these struggles were embedded in. From
this perspective, the new form of unity could thus not have been determined by Yu-
goslavia’s economic, institutional and/or cultural practices exclusively, nor by teleological
processes like democratic transition and/or nation-state formation. According to PDT,
these practices and processes themselves were internal to the category of discourse, since
they could not have been rendered intelligible outside of a meaningful system of represen-
tation.69 While Yugoslavian economic, institutional and cultural practices and processes
of democratization did impact the form that the CDU’s nationalist discourse took, from
this perspective they could not have caused it, nor determined its constitutive parts in a
linear fashion.
PDT offers conceptual tools for tracing the constitutive practices behind discursive
representations and accounting for the universalization of particular discursive forma-
tions into a shared common sense. For analytical purposes, it distinguishes between two
dimensions of discourse; discourse as a process, which refers to its (particular) emergence
and universalization, and discourse as a representative structure, which refers to its in-
ternal representations and the mechanisms which structure them. The first dimension
treats discourse as a diachronic/genealogical phenomenon evolving over time, while the
second focuses on its working at a particular point of time. Although in practice both
dimensions are constitutive of each other to the extent that they cannot be fully grasped
independently, for pragmatic and analytical purposes, different sets of conceptual tools
are deployed to account for them.
2.3.1.1 Discourse as a diachronic phenomenon: myth, imaginary, dislocation,
identity and ideology
Accounting for discourses as horizons of intelligibility developing over time necessitates
mapping their movement from the domain of the particular to the universal and/or vice-
69PDT understands discourses as more than sets of beliefs/ideas shared by politicians and social move-
ments about the nature of social relations. They are horizons of representation constitutive of all social
practices and relations. See: Howarth and Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political
Analysis”, p. 4.
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versa. Since, according to PDT, reality always transgresses the boundaries of what is rep-
resented through political concepts and identities within discourses, the movement from
the particular to the universal is contingent upon the historical context and relations of
power that shape it. As such, universal forms of discourse are vulnerable to the forces
that have been excluded in the process of their constitution and to events that are beyond
their control, but can still disrupt the semantic efficiency of constitutive representations.
For instance, the hegemonic representation of social unity in post-WWII Yugoslavia was
constituted through the universalization of the discourse of the Communist Party of Yu-
goslavia. During the war, the communist representation was a particularity that competed
for hegemony with various other representations of social unity, most notably the ustaša
(Croatian-Nazi) and the četnik (Serbian-monarchist) representation. The communist rep-
resentation of the Yugoslavian identity, as the hegemonic form of social unity, was carved
out of the war-context and the party’s reading of history. However, this representation
was refashioned after the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 to include the notion of workers’ self-
management. In this sense, discourses move from the domain of the particular to the
universal, and universal representations transform in relation to changing circumstances.
This example also illustrates one of PDT’s central assumptions, namely that there is
always a surplus of meaning that can overflow signification fixed within a system of rep-
resentation and subvert it.70 Since the hegemonic representation of Yugoslavian identity
was fixed in and through hegemonic struggles that originated in a particularity, it could
potentially be subverted as it was by 1990, when different nation-centred systems of rep-
resentation universalized in its constitutive republics. Precisely because there is always
a surplus of meaning behind universal representations, already existing terms (such as
‘nation’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘self-determination’, etc.) could acquire different meanings in this
process and form part of nation-centred systems of representation. Furthermore, since
the surplus of meaning was present, although not necessary visible, even when the Yu-
goslavian system representation seemed like a universal common sense, there was always
room for contestations and struggles about the meaning of terms, even within the scope
70This assumption is captured under the term ‘field of discursivity’ in PDT terminology. See: Laclau
and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. 111.
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of its universality. For instance, the Croatian Spring movement and the politicizations
of Kosovo’s Serbs/Montenegrins and Albanians were made possible precisely because the
representation of the terms ‘nation’ and ‘equality’ could not be fully exhausted by the
Yugoslavian horizon.
The subversion of a dominant system of representation – constitutive subjectivities,
practices and institutions – boils down to instances when its representational failures be-
come visible, and its terms of unity contestable. According to PDT, the moments (events)
that disrupt representational orders are called ‘dislocations’. The representative disrup-
tions are the precondition of hegemonic struggles since the latter emerge as attempts to
suture the former through (new) fixations of meaning.71 For instance, in the Yugoslavian
context, the introduction of market forces into a centrally planned socialist economy in
the ‘60s and the death of Josip Broz Tito (1980), the effective hegemon in Yugoslavia, can
be viewed as dislocatory events that opened up the space for contesting the hegemonic
system of representation.
According to PDT, dislocations, hegemonic struggles and politics are possible precisely
because it is impossible to base a particular form of social unity in an essence that tran-
scends its discursive representation. If there was a fixed, extra-discursive point against
which particular discursive representations of unity could be measured, it would mean
that social reality, as a totality, could become fully and accurately represented. It would
also mean that politics, as a struggle to define the terms of representing social unity, could
be halted. In the Croatian case, for instance, this would mean that the nation could have
been represented in its ‘actual’ form in the post-socialist period, after a history of its mis-
representation. Equally so, this would mean that the Yugoslavian communists could have
calculated, as they claimed they did, an appropriate legislative and ideological formula
to resolve ‘the national question’ once and for all. However, since, according to PDT,
every representation of identity, ‘socialist’, ‘democratic’ or ‘nationalist’, is moulded out a
71Dislocation is the primarily ontological level of the constitution of the social and is a central phe-
nomenon of the discourse analytical approach to the study of politics because it is the condition of its
possibility. See: Ernesto Laclau. New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time. London: Verso, 1990,
p. 44. For an account on the relationship between dislocation and identity see: ibid., p. 39. For an
account of dislocation in relation to the movement between myth and imaginary see: ibid., pp. 61-69.
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particularity, its universality rests in power not in objectivity. From this perspective the
‘nation’ cannot be immutably fixed into an essence that transcends its representations.
In the long run, through dislocations, the surplus of meaning will overflow the systems of
representation within which it is constituted and new readings of its meaning emerge.
‘Myth’ and ‘imaginary’ are the conceptual tools that PDT deploys, to map the move-
ment of a discourse from the particular to the universal and vice-versa. Bound up with
them, as both their conditions of possibility and constitutive forms, are the concepts of
‘dislocation’, which I have already discussed, as well as ‘demand’, ‘identity’ and ‘ideology’.
A myth is a discourse associated with the experience of a particular group.72 It emerges
in times of dislocation when a hegemonic system of representation fails to represent
emerging social demands and operates by reading the situation under different terms,
thereby constructing a new space of representation. In this sense, myths are associ-
ated with alternatives to existing spaces of representation, their constitutive institutions,
practices and identities.73 According to this perspective, the politicizations of Kosovo’s
Serbs/Montenegrins and Albanians can be viewed as new myths that emerged in moments
when the hegemonic system of forging social unity failed to represent their demands. Sim-
ilarly, the new democratic parties that emerged in SR Croatia can be viewed as attempts
to construct new spaces of representation out of the failures of the Yugoslavian space to
represent events on the ground.
A myth that does succeed in becoming a (new) universal space of representation ex-
pands into a horizon that acts as the surface of inscription for the ordering of all social
relations and transforms into an imaginary. It is no longer of the same order as social
objects, identities, relations and institutions. Rather, it becomes the limit structuring
the social field and the condition of possibility for the constitution of all social objects,
institutions, practices, rules of conduct and identities.74 For instance, despite being the
product of a particular (communist) party, Yugoslavism expanded into an imaginary hori-
72Aletta J. Norval. Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. London: Verso, 1996, p. 9.
73Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 61; and Norval, “Trajectories of Future
Research in Discurse Theory”, p. 124.
74Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 62; and Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid
Discourse, p. 9.
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zon that ordered all social relations, institutions and identities on a delimitated territory,
from 1945 until the dissolution of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1990. In
this sense, Yugoslavism can be viewed as an imaginary horizon.
Myths and imaginaries signify a different discursive modality in terms of the inclusive-
ness of political demands; a myth is based on a demand associated with a particular group
while an imaginary operates by incorporating a wide range of demands and groups within
its representative field.75 Once a myth has expanded into an imaginary, its mythical origins
and the indeterminacy of the social are covered up.76 From the diachronic/genealogical
perspective, politics as a process is understood as this very movement and the question of
identity formation and reproduction is central to it.77 By representing society as a coherent
entity and covering up indeterminacy, discourses also produce images for individual and
collective identification. Both the Yugoslavian imaginary, and the nation-centred myths
that emerged out of its ruins, produced particular systems of representative identities such
as class, nation, citizenship and minority. According to PDT, these identities were not
containers of innate characteristics that exhaust all possibilities of representation. They
were instead produced through hegemonic struggles and acted as a symbolic cover for
indeterminacy.
For pragmatic and analytic purposes, PDT views political identities as two-sided. On
the one hand, they are conferred upon social agents in the form of ‘subject positions’
embedded in hegemonic horizons of meaning. On the other, social agents form them in
moments when the conferred images fail to represent emerging social demands and agents
become (active) ‘political subjects’.78 Although both cover over indeterminacy, subject
positions perform that function within the imaginary order, and ‘political subjectivities’
within the mythical order of discourse. This distinction allows differentiation between
the Yugoslavian socialist identity/Croatian democratic identity, as subject positions con-
ferred upon social agents through institutional forms and instances such as the Croatian
Spring, the protests of Kosovo’s Serbs/Montenegrins and Albanians, and the emergence
75Howarth, Discourse, p. 111.
76Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 69.
77Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, p. 301.
78Howarth, Discourse, pp. 108-109.
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of democratic parties in 1989, as expressions of political subjectivity that contested the
hegemonic system of representation and/or the institutional forms embedded in them.
Although all of these examples can be viewed as expressions of political identity, they
were significantly different in form.
According to PDT, the precondition for the emergence of political subjectivity is the
failure of subject positions within a discursive horizon to offer a meaningful framework
for representing emerging social demands.79 In the previous example, this meant that
the Croatian Spring movement, the politicizations in Kosovo, and the new democratic
parties, were not just contestations of the institutionalised forms of identity, but that
these contestations were preconditioned by the failure of the institutionalised forms. In
the Croatian case, this means that understanding the emergence of the nationalist CDU
party necessitates understanding the failure(s) of the subject positions rooted in the Yu-
goslavian imaginary, since these failures formed the discursive conditions of possibility for
its emergence. Most importantly, the emergence of the party’s ‘nationalist’ project cannot
be accounted for in terms of an expression of the same national identity that manifested
itself in the Croatian Spring, nor as a natural response to Serbian nationalism, which
allegedly threatened the existence of the Croatian nation. From this perspective, the
Croatian Spring and ‘Serbian nationalism’ were manifestations of political subjectivity
that emerged in response to, and with the aim of refashioning, the terms of social division
instituted by the Yugoslavian imaginary.
Furthermore, following the presuppositions of PDT, the relationship between the
CDU’s political discourse on the one hand, and the contestations of the Croatian Spring
movement and Serbian nationalism on the other, can be understood in terms of the im-
pact the two had on the terms of social division instituted by the Yugoslavian imaginary
and thus on the context of the CDU’s emergence. These impacts can be specified in
terms of what James Tully calls the ‘practices of freedom’ of those governed by particu-
lar ‘forms of government’ and ‘forms of subjection’ constitutive of an imaginary horizon.
As contestation processes, practices of freedom can take up two forms. They can be di-
79Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 61; and Norval, “Theorising Hegemony:
between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis”, pp. 86-87.
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rected at particular rules that are conferred through subject positions with the aim of
their transformation without challenging the locus of power. Or they can be directed
against the very terms of subjection, with the aim of their complete redefinition and the
rearticulation of power relations.80 Within this analytic framework, constitutional ar-
rangements can be viewed as objects of the imaginary order of discourse, since their very
aim is to constitute a unified representation of society by substantiating its identity and
fixing institutional forms for its realisation. According to James Tully, subject positions,
normative principles that inform identification, fixed rules of political conduct, fixed pro-
cedures and institutions for discussion, and the alternation of the hegemonic system of
rules and constitutions, attribute a society with an identity.81 I would add that, in doing
so, they organize/structure the terrain of legitimate politics, which is situated within the
boundaries of an imaginary. Tully’s differentiation of political contestations in terms of
their impact on the rules constitutive of an imaginary horizon makes an account of the
relationship between the Croatian Spring, Serbian nationalism, and the nationalist CDU
that does not reproduce the CDU’s own representation of this relationship, possible. This
can be done by examining their respective relations to the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon
and its constitutive system of rules.
Following the ontological presuppositions of PDT, identity can only be grasped in
terms of difference. Conferring subject positions through a constitutional order or cre-
ating new forms of political subjectivity through contestations, necessitates drawing to-
gether different demands and interests into a unified representative space and equalising
them through a common denominator. To generate sameness, something external has to
be fixed in relation to which all that is included is rendered identical. In this process,
lines that delineate what is included from that what is excluded are drawn, giving rise
80Tully also identifies following the rules as a modality of ‘practices of freedom’. However, since I am
interested in the movements from subject position to political subjectivity, or from myth to imaginary,
following the rules means basically following the conferred rules. See: James Tully. Public Philosophy
in a New Key. Vol. Volume I: Democracy and Civic Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008, pp. 22-24.
81Tully does not deploy the term ‘constitute’ but to ‘recognise’. Given the ontological assumptions
discussed in the course of this chapter, Tully’s term is, in the ontological sense limited, since it implies
that there is ‘something’ external to these systems of rules, that can be better or worse recognised by
the constitutional document. For that reason, I have modified his framework in line with the ontological
assumptions of PDT. See: ibid., p. 195.
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to a ‘constitutive outside’82 in relation to which identity attains a positive meaning. Ac-
cording to PDT, the lines that delimit identities and institute forms of social divisions
are called ‘political frontiers’.83 Politics emerges out of the perpetual tension between
what identities represent (sameness) and their origins (difference and/or exclusion). On-
tologically, this means that all identities are non-sutured, although the extent to which
their non-sutured character is visible depends on the political conjunction and the degree
of the dislocation of the hegemonic system of rules.84 From this perspective, both the
Yugoslavian identity and the post-socialist Croatian identity were thus rooted in (par-
ticular) exclusions thorough which identity as sameness was produced. Understanding
their nature necessitates examining both the exclusions they were forged out of and their
operation in practice. Furthermore, since the drawing of political frontiers is not confined
to the domain of dominant imaginary horizons/subject positions but is equally constitu-
tive of political subjects/myths, the identities and demands articulated by the CDU, the
Croatian Spring movement, and Serbian nationalist movement, were also founded upon
particular exclusions that delimited these projects and in relation to which they attained
meaning.
PDT views ideology as that which renders identity sutured and produces a sense that
social fullness is founded in an extra-discursive essence that transgresses the political ter-
rain. Ideology operates by eternalizing and naturalizing existing terms of social division,
its myths of origin, its institutional rules and practices, and images for identification.85
Furthermore, although ideologies are based on sets of ideas and beliefs about the nature of
politics, according to PDT they are not confined to the semantic domain. Rather, ideology
is understood as constitutive of the very process of identity formation and reproduction,
82Constitutive outside is a term coined by Henry Staten in his reading of Derrida. See: Henry Staten.
Wittgenstein and Derrida. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986 For Laclau’s usage of the concept
in relation to politics and identity formation see: Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our
Time, pp. 17-18; and Lasse Thomassen. “In/Exclusions: Towards a Radical Democratic Approach to
Exclusions”. In: Radical Democracy: Politics Between Abundance and Lack. Ed. by Lars Tønder and
Lasse Thomassen. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005.
83Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, p. 4 For a summary of the role frontiers play in the
political process according to Laclau and Mouffe and the limitations of their account see: Aletta J.
Norval. “Frontiers in Question”. In: Filozofski Vesnik 18.2 (1997).
84Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, p. 5. See in particular footnote 19, p. 308.
85Aletta J. Norval. “Review Article: The Things We Do with Words-Contemporary Approaches to the
Analysis of Ideology”. In: British Journal of Political Science 30.2 (2000), p. 316.
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because it works by decontesting the bonds between political concepts, historical narra-
tives, and identities.86 In this sense, by gluing together the building blocks of discursive
formations, ideology normalizes its forms of identification and their constitutive exclu-
sions. For instance, in the Croatian case, the transition from (Yugoslavian) self-managing
socialism to multiparty-democracy was represented as the end of ideological ‘distortions’
and the beginning of ‘real’ politics. Through this narrative, the new democratic subject
was normalized into one that seemed not to be based in any exclusion. This point was
made in contrast to the Yugoslavian order, which was highly ideologized, distorted, and
exclusive. From the perspective of PDT, this very narrative can be viewed as the product
of ideology. In this sense, the difference between the post-socialist and the socialist order
is a matter of ideological form not of ideological presence and absence.
2.3.1.2 Discourse as a synchronic phenomenon: discursive formations, logics
of equivalence and difference, moments, elements, nodal points and
empty signifiers
Accounting for discourse as a system of rules that confers meaning in a specific point of
time necessitates explaining the linking of its constitutive parts (identities, concepts, de-
mands) and the dissolution of bonds. Since reality always transgresses the boundaries of
what is represented, ‘discursive formations’87 that appear decontested at a specific point
of time can always be re-contested, internally transformed, or re-arranged into new se-
mantic formations.
According to PDT, the processes of linking up and dissolving discursive building blocks
86Michel Freeden deploys ‘decontestation’ to explain the manner in which ideologies operate. He
maintains that ideologies aim at ending the contentions of their constitutive political concepts by fixing
their meanings. In this sense, ideologies understood to be configurations of decontested meanings of
political concepts. See: Michael Freeden. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 54-55, 76. I deploy ‘decontestation’ as a term that relates
to both political concepts and political identification. For an analysis of the strengths and limitations of
Freeden’s understanding of ideology and decontestation from a poststructuralist perspective see: Norval,
“Review Article: The Things We Do with Words-Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology”.
87The mutifarious subject positions, institutions, rituals and practices fixed into a system of difference
through the practice of articulation. See: Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards
a Radical Democratic Politics, p. 109; and Howarth, Discourse, p. 102.
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follow two different logics, that of equivalence and that of difference.88 The former refers
to the process of dissolving particularities within a discourse, by equating various de-
mands and condensing them under a common denominator.89 Equivalence in difference is
most radically forged once a common enemy is proclaimed and an ‘antagonistic outside’
defined.90 For instance, national mobilizations against a common enemy are an example
of the logic of equating differentiated social identities and interests and condensing them
into sameness. In the Croatian case, the discursive field was structured by the logic of
equivalence after the proclamation of the 1990 Constitution and the outbreak of the armed
conflict between the Croatian Serbs and the Yugoslav People’s Army on the one hand,
and ‘the Croatian nation’ and ‘its’ army on the other. Within this discursive field, ‘Serbs’,
‘Slobodan Milošević’, and the ‘Yugoslavian Army’ were drawn together into a single rep-
resentative system, antagonistic to the Croatian nation and attributing it with a positive
meaning. This is an example of an antagonism that translated into a violent war, and
it thus illustrates the logic of equivalence and antagonism in a very immediate manner.
However, the same logic was also constitutive of the working class identity in Yugoslavia,
which was the product of the homogenization of several differentiated identities (nation,
gender, class, religion) and their representation as equivalent and united against a set of
‘anti-social forces’.
The logic of difference refers to the process of dissolving an existing chain of equivalence
and the emergence of differentiated demands and identities.91 This process is character-
ized by the complexification of meaning and the visibility of different/particular interests
within a community. In these instances, political frontiers are not articulated in antag-
onistic terms and the social field is criss-crossed with a variety of discursive formations.
The same process can be illustrated with the examples of national identity and working-
class identity. Once the common enemy threatening them is not pinpointed as a source
that actively works against national or class interests, and thus gives these identities a
88See: Howarth and Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis”, pp. 11-12 for
examples of the workings of the logics of equivalence and difference and their relationship to political
antagonisms.
89Howarth, Discourse, p. 120.
90Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. 125.
91Howarth, Discourse, p. 120.
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meaning, these identities differentiate from within.
In the Croatian case, the process of internal (national) political differentiation into a
variety of left wing, right-wing, and regional identities in the post-war period, led ‘nation-
alists’ to make a paradoxical observation. Namely, that Milošević, whom they deemed to
be the enemy of the ‘nation’, could in fact be honoured with a statue in Croatia because
he managed to generate a Croatian political homogeneity during the war, unlike any
Croatian regime in the post-war period.92 This position captures the logics of difference
and equivalence underlying collective identity formation and shows the role that frontiers,
antagonisms, and enemies play in creating sameness out of multiplicity.
The operation of these two logics in the construction of political frontiers can be fur-
ther substantiated in reference to the Gramscian idea of transformism; or the gradual and
continuous absorption and domestication of ‘active elements’ produced by allied groups,
even those which come from antagonistic groups’. Expressed in terms of logics, a trans-
formist political project is characterised by attempts to expand the systems of difference
that define a hegemonic formation. A successful transformist project results in a decrease
in antagonisms and the broadening of the hegemonic formation, while a failing one in the
solidification of frontiers into clear-cut antagonisms.93 For instance, the anti-bureaucratic
revolution can be understood in terms of a Yugoslavian transformist project since it at-
tempted to include the emerging demands of the Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and the
Serbian intellectuals within the framework of the hegemonic formation, through their ab-
sorption by LC Serbia. Its failure at the all-Yugoslavian level produced a discursive field
characterised by clear-cut antagonisms, which eventually contributed to the dissolution
of the country.
Although the two logics describe different states of the ‘discursive field’, they do not
specify the nature of the constitutive parts of discursive formations. For this purpose PDT
deploys the concepts of ‘articulation’ ‘elements’, ‘moments’, ‘empty signifiers’, ‘floating
signifiers’, and ‘nodal points’.
Articulation is the practice of establishing relations between basic discursive units,
92For instance, see: Vujević, “Nacionalna identifikacija u Hrvatskoj”.
93Norval, “Trajectories of Future Research in Discurse Theory”, p. 220.
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or ‘elements’, in such a way that their meaning/identity is modified as a result of the
practice and they are transformed into ‘moments’ of a particular discursive formation.94
The practice of articulation results in the (partial) fixing of meaning of political concepts
(freedom, equality, justice, democracy, etc.) and identities (workers, individuals, nations,
minorities, women, etc.). Since reality always transgresses the boundaries of what is repre-
sented through articulatory practices, the same concepts and identities can attain different
meanings within different discursive formations. Furthermore, depending on the politi-
cal conjuncture and the state of the discursive field, different articulations of the same
concepts and identities can also co-exist and/or compete for hegemony. The practice of
articulation is possible precisely because the transformation of ‘elements’ into ‘moments’
of discourse is never fully completed.95 For instance, in the Croatian case, the articulation
of the term ‘nation’ had undergone a series of semantic transformations depending on the
historical context that it was embedded in and the source of power that fixed its meaning.
In 1945-1990, the same term travelled from being articulated within the framework of a
broader Yugoslavian identity to being represented as an internally homogenous identity,
sometimes politically different from, and at other times completely antagonistic to, other
South Slavic identities. This semantic trajectory was possible precisely because ‘nation’
was never fully fixed into a ‘moment’, despite the fact that it often seemed as though this
transformation was completed.
Ideology plays a central role in the articulation of elements into moments of discourses.
Well-established ideologies, such as communism or liberalism, provide ordering principles
for elements because they decontest certain conceptual patterns and discriminate against
others in an a priori fashion. These conceptual patterns are translatable to political
practices, identities, and institutions.96 Communism, for instance, defines its enemies as
‘imperialists’, ‘capitalists’ and ‘bourgeois nationalists’ and articulates in opposition the
subject position ‘working class’ that embodies a universal identity. This articulation of
identity is bound up with a specific articulation of the elements ‘nation’, ‘freedom’ ‘eman-
94Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, p. 105.
95Ibid., pp. 106-107.
96Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach, pp. 54-55; and Norval, “Review
Article: The Things We Do with Words-Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of Ideology”.
56
cipation’, ‘democracy’, and ‘equality’. Within this semantic constellation, ‘democracy’
cannot be articulated with ‘multi-partyism’ nor can ‘emancipation’ be articulated with
the ‘bourgeoisie’. Similarly, liberalism defines ‘democracy’ through subject positions such
as ‘individual’, ‘nation’ and ‘minority’. The subject positions ‘working class’ and ‘bour-
geoisie’ are in principle absent from the liberal constellation. This articulation of identity
is bound up with a specific articulation of ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ and ‘equality. Within
this semantic constellation ‘democracy’ is articulated with ‘multi-partyism’ and ‘freedom’
with ‘individual’.
However, although well-established ideologies provide blueprints for articulatory prac-
tices, the particular context they are embedded in also has to be articulated through
these constellations. In this sense, there is nothing determined about how a particular
well-established ideology translates into a particular discursive system of representation.
Without being enacted in a specific context, well-established ideologies remain at a level
of abstraction and fail to found actual institutions, practices, and identities on the ground.
In the Yugoslavian case, this means that one has to take the (universal) communist ide-
ology seriously, as well as examine the particular demands, identities (subject positions
and political subjectivity), institutions, and rules that were inscribed into its constitu-
tive elements (‘working class’, ‘justice’, ‘imperialism’, and ‘equality’) to understand the
hegemonic order. Similarly, to be able to understand the working of ‘liberal democracy’
in Croatia’s transition, it is necessary to examine how the context was inscribed into the
meanings of the elements ‘citizen’, ‘nation’, and ‘freedom’, etc., once the political land-
scape was pluralised. Neither can be understood exclusively in terms of the universal
ideological framework which they claimed to embody.
To be able to grasp the working of ideology at the level of specificity and, at the same
time, take into account the semantic biases constitutive of established ideologies, PDT
deploys a set of conceptual tools for assessing the semantic force that specific moments of
discourse exercise in defining the representative structure.
The concept ‘nodal point’ refers to elements of discourse that gather other elements
together and colour their meanings. These moments are semantically privileged because
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they dictate the common sense of the space of representation.97 For example, articu-
lating ‘communism’ or ‘liberalism’ with ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ gives rise
to radically different representative structures, precisely because the former terms are
semantically privileged over the others. ‘Communism’ and ‘liberalism’ infuse ‘justice’,
‘freedom’, and ‘democracy’ with different meanings and the difference is translatable to
social relations and institutions.
There are two further specifications of the points that partially fix meaning within a
discourse. The concept ‘empty signifier’ denotes a nodal point that attempts to embody
the impossible, the full closure of the social field and the fullness of a community. Empty
signifiers are ideals around which a discursive structure is centred, but which can never
be fully achieved.98 Generally speaking, ‘communism’ can be understood as a nodal point
that embodies the fullness of society, which cannot be achieved, although the ideology is
structured around the belief that it will be achieved in the future. In the Yugoslavian
case, ‘self-management’ can be viewed as an empty signifier through which the Yugosla-
vian working class, and its constitutive nations and nationalities were articulated into a
coherent representative structure and the social field thus given a seeming closure. Simi-
larly, in the Croatian case, the empty signifier the ‘Croatia nation-state’ played a unifying
role; through this nodal point different identities were represented as constitutive elements
of the Croatian national body, while others were expelled from it. Empty signifiers de-
fine and delimit the terrain in which political relations are constituted, and thus produce
certain exclusions.99
According to PDT, ‘hegemonic operations’ are reflected in the presentation of the par-
ticularity of the group as the incarnation of the empty signifier that refers to the social
order as an ‘unfulfilled’ reality.100 Not every element is equally predisposed for taking
97Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, pp. 112-
113. In the former example ‘communism’ and ‘liberalism’ are privileged over the elements ‘democracy’,
‘freedom’, and ‘justice,’ fix the meaning of the latter. Articulating ‘communism’ and articulating ‘liber-
alism’ with ‘justice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ in a chain of equivalences gives rise to radically different
representative structures.
98Laclau, Emancipations(s), pp. 36-37.
99Norval, “Theorising Hegemony: between Deconstruction and Psychoanalysis”, p. 86; and Thomassen,
“In/Exclusions: Towards a Radical Democratic Approach to Exclusions”, pp. 104-106.
100Laclau, Emancipations(s), p. 44.
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up the role of an empty signifier. The struggles for hegemony operate within particular
contexts, with a particular historical baggage, and the outcomes of previous struggles
are inscribed in the existing representative structures. In this sense, a particular context
limits which nodal point can become an empty signifier and what that specific form of
fullness will include and exclude.
Conceptually, the existence of empty signifiers in society corresponds with the notion
of imaginary and subject positions. In the Croatian case, for instance, the signifiers ‘Croa-
tian nation-state’, ‘self-determination’, and ‘national identity’, were not newly introduced
in the 1990s. On the contrary, these terms were constitutive of the Yugoslavian imagi-
nary and articulated within a representative structure whose fullness was incarnated in the
empty signifier ‘self-management’. This past inevitably shaped the meanings these terms
could acquire in the post-socialist period. In this sense, understanding the emergence of
the nationalist CDU party, without reproducing its own political discourse, necessitates
looking into the semantic shifts that these terms underwent and fleshing out the political
struggles underlying them.
According to PDT, ‘floating signifiers’ are terms that are subject to a great deal of
contestation and, as a result, have no clearly delimitated meaning.101 They are floating
between being ‘elements’ and ‘moments’. Due to their semantic indeterminacy, floating
signifiers are sources of contestations and hegemonic struggles for fixing their meaning.
A hegemonic crisis, in turn, is characterized by the floating of a vast array of signifiers,
including the empty signifier, and the possibility of their re-articulation into antagonis-
tic camps.102 As it deepens, the very nature of social division upon which the political
ordering of society rests is contested and the un-sutured nature of identity is rendered
visible.103 In the Croatian case, this means that the emergence of the nationalist CDU
party can be viewed in the context of the League of Communists’ failure to fix the mean-
ing of the signifier ‘nation’ within the hegemonic representative structure, its ‘floating’
101Norval, “Review Article: The Things We Do with Words-Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis
of Ideology”, pp. 331-332.
102Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, pp. 113,
135-136.
103Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, p. 219.
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and the consequent emergence of competing myths as attempts to fix it. Furthermore,
this means that the emergence of Sloboan Milošević in the Socialist Republic of Serbia
can be understood as part of the same political process without understanding the CDU’s
project as having been determined by the emergence in Serbian nationalism.
2.3.2 Yugoslavian dissolution and the emergence of the CDU party: a dis-
course analytical reading
Since PDT assumes that the social is discursively constructed through historically specific
systems of rules, its analytical focus is placed on the various ways in which political forces
and social actors construct meanings within incomplete and undecidable structures.104
From this perspective, ‘method’ is not understood as pre-constituted framework that a
researcher brings to bear on the object of analysis, but as an approach that results from
an encounter with a particular case or a problem. Whether particular research focuses on
myths, imaginaries, political subjectivity, subject positions, logics of difference, and/or
equivalence, etc., depends on upon the specific problem addressed by the analysis. Al-
though each new application of the concepts enhances the general understanding of the
specific forms and moments of discourses, PDT’s primarily concern is to offer new read-
ings of events and practices. In terms of the materials of analysis, PDT looks at different
empirical material and information as discursive forms. Speeches, reports, manifestos,
declarations, historical events, interviews, policies, and institutions are viewed as sets of
signifying practices that constitute discourses which, in turn, enable subjects to experi-
ence the world of objects, words, and practices.105
In the overview of the conceptual framework and ontological presuppositions of PDT, I
have already signalled the multiple ways in which this approach facilitates an explanation
of the emergence of the nationalist CDU party, without reducing it to something external
to the political process and, equally importantly, without reproducing its own discursive
representations of reality. Furthermore, I have also shown that the approach makes a
104Howarth, Discourse, p. 129.
105Howarth and Stavrakakis, “Introducing Discourse Theory and Political Analysis”, p. 2.
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critical account of the party’s emergence possible, precisely because it is equipped with
the necessary tools for rendering the historically constructed nature of its representations
visible in a systematic manner. In the light of the themes addressed in the literature
review and the PDT framework, I aim to show, in six steps, the historicity of the party’s
national discourse and thus the limitations of its representations.
First, I will examine the precise manner in which the hegemonic League of Commu-
nists of Yugoslavia articulated ‘national identities’ within the framework of a broader
Yugoslavian identity into a meaningful system of difference. I will do so through a close
reading of the LCY’s Party Programme from 1958, which remained its official platform
until the party’s dissolution in January 1990. Due to its hegemonic position and the
immutability of its general theoretical framework for 30 years, this programme is crucial
for understanding, at an abstract level, the system of differences instituted by the Yu-
goslavian imaginary horizon. I will focus on the antagonistic frontiers that were drawn
in this process and the manner in which the ‘positive’ inside and ‘negative’ outside were
constituted.
Second, I will examine the politicization of the Croatian nation as a form of political
subjectivity during the Croatian Spring, in relation to the system of differences instituted
by the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. I will look at the different actors that participated
in the politicization in the 1968-1971 period, drawing out the relationship between their
demands/strategies and the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. In terms of the materials
of analysis, will look at a wider range of textual material, including the 1963 Consti-
tution, the Declaration of the Croatian Language, keynote speeches and excerpts from
interviews with communist party members, the publications of the cultural institution
Matica hrvatska, student banners, transcripts of LCY Congresses, as well as secondary
literature. In terms of secondary literature, I draw mostly on the analysis of the late Den-
nison Rusinow,106 who was in SR Croatia at the time and had written about the events
of the 1970s. I also look at other secondary sources to contextualise these events. My aim
is to focus as much as possible on the sources written in the language from the period,
106Dennison Rusinow was one of the leading scholars on Yugoslavia, who has written extensively about
the country before, during and after its dissolution.
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to challenge the representation of the CDU and the Croatian Spring as constitutive of a
broad and coherent Croatian national project.
Third, I will examine the manner in which Yugoslavian unity was decontested into a
hegemonic system of rules and subject positions through Yugoslavia’s 1974 Constitution,
promulgated shortly after the suppression of the Croatian Spring. I will focus on the fix-
ation of elements such as ‘nation’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘working-class’, and ‘self-management’,
and their translation to the new institutional set-up of the Yugoslavian imaginary. This
constitution is cardinal for understanding the subsequent events because it formed the
system of rules in which later contestations were embedded and in relation to which they
emerged.
Fourth, I will examine the 1980-1987 period through the prism of the hegemonic cri-
sis of the LCY, which I understand to mean a crisis of representation. I will look at
the institutional limitations of the constitutional rules at the federal level and the pro-
tracted economic crisis which, in synergy with the institutional limitations, translated
into a political crisis within the hegemonic LCY. I will focus on the (in)ability of the
hegemonic LCY to suture the dislocated space of representation and the deepening of the
crisis. I will differentiate between economic and political practices for pragmatic reasons
and understand them as categories internal to a system of representation. In terms of
the material of analysis, I will look at a wide range of textual material which includes
the LCY’s Long-term Programme of Economic Stabilization, its Critical Analysis of the
Political System of Socialist Self-management, party documents and excerpts from inter-
views with communist party members as well as public intellectuals, and background and
situation reports from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s archive, which covered the sit-
uation in Yugoslavia at the time in great detail and contain many excerpts of statements
and speeches by members of the governing party. I will also draw on secondary sources
from the period, as well as those written subsequently, for the purpose of contextualising
these developments and debates. My aim is to draw on sources from the time as much as
possible as these debates were often retroactively (mis)represented as expressions of the
national antagonisms that escalated into a war, given the dissolution of the country.
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Fifth, I will examine the emergence of Slobodan Milošević in 1987, within the context
of the politicization of Serbian/Montenegrin and Albanian national identities in the 1980s,
through the prism of the hegemonic crisis. I will focus on the manner in which the existing
terms of social division were contested and the new myths that emerged through these
contestation processes. In terms of the materials of analysis, will look at a wider range of
textual material, which includes the 1974 Constitution, LC Serbia’s documents, excerpts
from interviews, speeches and statements of LCY members, a petition drawn up by Ser-
bian intellectuals, the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well
as the archives of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. I will also draw on a wide range of
secondary literature to contextualize the primary literature and to further substantiate it.
My aim is to focus, as much as possible, on the sources written in the language from the
period, to challenge the representation of the CDU as a natural response to the Serbian
national project which threatened the Croatian national body.
Finally, I will examine the CDU’s emergence in the Socialist Republic of Croatia in the
context of the hegemonic crisis and as an attempt to resolve it through its own reading.
I will focus on drawing out the contingency and historicity of its representation of the
nation by looking at its political project, as well as the political project of the League of
Communists of Croatia-Party of Democratic Change and the Serbian Democratic Party,
in the electoral campaign for the Croatian Constitutive Assembly. In terms of the materi-
als of analysis, I will look at a wide range of textual material, including LC Croatia’s party
documents, the electoral programmes of the parties, excerpts from interviews with party
members in the electoral campaign, newspaper articles from the period, the archives of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the Croatian ‘Christmas’ Constitution from 1990.




The Frontiers of the Yugoslavian Imaginary:
Self-management and Brotherhood and Unity
3.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter, in this chap-
ter I examine the manner in which the hegemonic League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(LCY), articulated a space of representation to universalize its project into an imaginary
horizon that served as a surface for the ordering of all social relations and institutions.
As in other socialist regimes, the pivotal mechanism in asserting and reproducing LCY’s
hegemony was its ability to universalize the working class identity while simultaneously
putting itself froward as the cardinal articulator of its interests and translating them
into the institutional fabric of the country. In the Yugoslavian case, the process of uni-
versalization operated by also fixing different national identities within a single space of
representation. Through a close examination of the LCY’s 1958 Party Programme in this
chapter I look at the boundaries of the Yugoslavian ‘society’ and explore how Yugoslavia’s
identity was defined against a set of ‘others’ which imbued it with a ‘positive’ meaning.
The 1958 Party Program remained the official platform for LCY’s ideological and political
action until its dissolution in January 1990. Therefore, the constitutional rules as well
as the contestations that I discuss in the subsequent chapters emerged in relation to this
programme, either as attempts to translate it into institutions, by challenging existing
political practices to ‘truly’ realise it, or in opposition to the very system of social divi-
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sion instituted by it.
In this chapter I argue that two discursive strands made the transition from the par-
ticular to the universal possible namely, the discourses of ‘brotherhood and unity’ and
‘self-management’. The frontiers separating the ‘positive’ inside of the Yugoslavian iden-
tity and its antagonistic/hostile outside were drawn through these interwoven spaces of
representation, stabilizing a system of differences into an undivided meaningful whole. I
also argue that the articulation of the us/them divide on a terrain structured by these
discourses had the effect of splitting the identities of Yugoslavia’s constitutive nations
and nationalities between a ‘positive’ inside and a ‘negative’ outside, thus instituting a
system of social division whereby nations were represented as both different and united
in an antagonism towards a set of ‘others’.
In the first section, I map out the contours of Yugoslavia’s socio-political landscape in
broad strokes, to delineate the context out of which the 1958 Party Program was to pro-
duce coherence/unity. This context is paramount for understanding the themes explored
in subsequent chapters. In the second section, I explore the system of differences insti-
tuted by the self-management discourse. I look both into the manner in which signifiers
such as ‘society’, ‘socialism‘, ‘politics’, ‘democracy’, ‘state’, ‘nations and nationalities’,
etc. were articulated in positive terms and into the manner in which signifiers such as
‘nationalism’, ‘bourgeois’, ‘centralism’, ‘bureaucratism’, ‘liberalism’, etc. were articulated
as enemies threatening to subvert the positive inside. In the third section, I explore the
system of differences instituted by the brotherhood and unity discourse. Much like in the
previous section, I look both into the way in which signifiers such as ‘nations and nation-
alities’, ‘equality’, ‘peace’, ‘order’, ‘progress’ etc. were articulated in positive terms while
‘great-Serbian hegemonism’, ‘centralism’, ‘nationalism’ etc. were articulated as enemies
threatening to subvert it. In the concluding section, I point to the tensions between these
two discursive strands and introduce the following chapter of the thesis.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important that the limits of my discussion are
clearly specified. Given the topic of the thesis, the point of this chapter is not to investi-
gate the actual expansion of the myth of the Communist Party into an imaginary after its
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victory in World War II and the institution of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia
in 1945. Similarly, the point of this chapter is not to investigate the immediate post-war
period that preceded the introduction of workers self-management in Yugoslavia. Rather,
both WWII and the pre-1958 period are treated in terms of their representations within
the system of differences instituted by the 1958 Party Programme.
3.2 The Contours of the Yugoslavian Socio-Political Landscape
Making sense of the frontiers shaping the Yugoslavian identity and delimiting the ‘posi-
tive’ inside from the ‘negative’ outside necessitates describing the structural components
that shaped identity politics in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In
the light of the ontological presumptions discussed in the previous chapter, it is important
to stress that the components described in this subsection are not understood as essential
characteristics of collective identities and/or factors driving politics in themselves. To
the contrary, they are understood as political only to the extent that they are articulated
within a political discourse, be it a myth or an imaginary. This is important to bear in
mind since it means that the different categories mapped out here could acquire multiple
and contradicting meanings, depending on the manner and context of their articulation.
The SFRY was a multinational state composed of six nations: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians, Montenegrins and, after 1971, Muslims. No nation formed an absolute
majority in the federation, but the Serbian nation formed a relative majority. Further-
more, Yugoslavia was composed of eleven nationalities, whose homeland was outside of
Yugoslavia: Albanians, Hungarians, Turks, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Romanians, Ruthenes/
Ukrainians, Czechs and Italians. The nations and nationalities spread over six Socialist
Republics and two Autonomous Provinces and were thus not located in geographically dis-
crete areas. Each federal unit was multi-national, but the degree of national heterogeneity
per unit varied. The nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia were also divided in historical
experiences (belonging to different empires, being on opposing sides in WWI and, to a
large, extent in WWII, having different state-building trajectories) and religious affilia-
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tion (Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim). Historical experiences, religious affiliation and
national belonging were to a large extent incongruous with the territorial-administrative
units. The republics still carried the names of nations, and particular republics were still
represented as corresponding to particular nations, despite their internal heterogeneity.
Administratively, the SFRY was composed of six Socialist Republics (the SR Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the SR Croatia, the SR Macedonia, the SR Montenegro, the SR Serbia and
the SR Slovenia) and two Socialist Autonomous Provinces (the SAP Kosovo and the SAP
Vojvodina). The two Provinces were formally part of SR Serbia, making Serbia somewhat
of an anomaly within the framework of the Yugoslavian federation. SAP Vojvodina was
ethnically very mixed and Kosovo predominantly Albanian, but an important nodal point
of Serbian nationalism. The SR Croatia was predominantly Croatian, with a significant
Serbian population that traced its settlement in Croatia back to medieval times. It was
concentrated geographically in specific regions, but these regions were not expressed in the
internal administrative division of SR Croatia.1 I will return back to the case of SR Serbia
and its constitutive provinces in Chapter 7 and to the relationship between Croats and
Croatian Serbs in SR Croatia in Chapters 4 and 8 of the thesis. The point here is to make
clear that the context out of which the the Programme was to construct unity was very
heterogeneous, and that the contextual features that historically informed the identity
formation of Yugoslavia’s constitutive nations and nationalities varied greatly. Contrary
to the heterogeneity of the society, the LCY served as the space of for forging its political
homogeneity. It was the (only) space of legitimate politics and it that sense the realization
of the principle of pure political spatiality, together with its affiliated organizations the
Alliance of Socialist and the Socialist Youth.2 To forge a common representative space,
the LCY mobilized two strands of discourse, self-management and brotherhood and unity.
1See Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], pp. 16-17; and Milojko
Drulović. Self-Management on Trial. Nottingham: Spokesman Books for the Bertrand Russell Peace
Foundation, 1978, pp. 16-17
2Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 69; and Laclau, Emancipations(s), p. 21
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3.3 The Differential System Instituted by Self-Management
Broadly speaking, the existing literature treats self-management either from the perspec-
tive of its inception and uniqueness or from the perspective of its failures in the 1980s.
The former perspective tends to treat it as an qualitative ‘improvement’ in socialist prac-
tice vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the so-called ‘administrative socialist’/‘revolutionary
statist’ order that characterized Yugoslavia’s immediate post-war period, until its expul-
sion from the Cominform (1948).3 Western social scientists from a socialist background
explored it to resolve the problem of alienation in Western and East European economies
within a non-reformist model of socialism.4 It was also studied as a particular form of
industrial relations and managerial techniques rooted in a high degree of worker’s par-
ticipation.5 Furthermore, both its compatibility with single party rule6 as well as its
economic efficiency have been explored.7 The second perspective focused on assessing
the model’s overall performance and exploring its possibilities and limitations in the light
3Drulović, Self-Management on Trial, p. 38.
4See for example: Alan Whitehorn. “Alienation and Workers’ Self-Management”. In: Canadian
Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 16.2 (1974); Alan Whitehorn. “Yugoslav Workers’
Self-Management: A Blueprint for Industrial Democracy?” In: Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Cana-
dienne des Slavistes 20.3 (1978); Albert Meister. Socialisme et Autogestion; l’Expérience Yougoslave
[Socialism and Self-management: the Yugoslavian experience]. Éditions du Seuil, 1964; and Albert Meis-
ter. “Où va l’Autogestion Yougoslave? [Where is Yugoslavian Self-management going?]” In: L Homme et
la Société 17.1 (1970), quoted in:Bogdan Denitch. “Notes on the Relevance of Yugoslav Self-management”.
In: Politics and Society 3.4 (1973), p. 474.
5See for example: Jiri Thomas Kolaja. Workers’ Councils: the Yugoslav Experience. London: Tavis-
tock Publications, 1965; Sharon Zukin. “The Representation of Working-Class Interests in Socialist Soci-
ety: Yugoslav Labor Unions”. In: Politics & Society 10.3 (1981); Gary K. Bertsch and Josip Obradovic.
“Participation and Influence in Yugoslav Self-Management”. In: Industrial Relations: A Journal of
Economy and Society 18.3 (1979); Ichak Adizes. Industrial Democracy: Yugoslav Style. New York: Free
Press, 1971; Marius J Broekmeyer. “Self-Management in Yugoslavia”. In: The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 431.1 (1977); and Ellen T. Comisso. “The Logic of Worker (Non)
Participation in Yugoslav Self-management”. In: Review of Radical Political Economics 13.2 (1981).
6See for example: April Carter. Democratic Reform in Yugoslavia: the Changing Role of the Party.
London: Frances Pinter, 1982 and James F. Sitton. “On the Political Limitations of Self-Management
Socialism”. In: Social Theory and Practice 12.2 (1986)
7See: Saul Estrin. Self-management: Economic Theory and Yugoslav Practice. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1984.
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of its failure by 1990.8 While both perspectives answer important questions regarding
Yugoslavian self-managing socialism, in this section I look at it from a different vantage
point. I explore its discursive (synchronic) role in drawing the boundaries between the
‘positive’ Yugoslavian inside and the antagonistic outside in LCY’s Party Programme. In
this sense, my analysis touches upon aspects from both perspectives but it looks at them
from the vantage point of LCY’s representation of social unity and division.
The LCY represented self-management as the social and political foundation of socialist-
democracy in Yugoslavia, as a form of ‘true democratic unity and a contributing factor to
the internal stability of society’.9 In economic terms it embodied a specific form of pro-
duction relations, whereby it was possible to realise ‘the principle of awarding everybody
according to his labour in the forms corresponding to the achieved degree of development
of the forces of production’.10 Since it structured both the economic and the political
terrain, the nodal point ‘self-management’ represented the very essence of Yugoslavian
unity.
Cardinal political concepts were also represented within a discourse semantically de-
fined by it. The element ‘society’ was articulated as becoming towards a community of
self-managing producers.11 Within this framework the term carried two meanings, signi-
fying both the path to be taken to realise socialism and socialism as a state of collective
being wherein social antagonisms are obliterated.12 The element ‘man’ was also artic-
ulated through the nodal point self-management and the essence of his/her humanity
represented as managing the products of his/her labour and cooperating with others in a
self-managing socialist community.13 The element ‘politics’ was also articulated through
8See for example: Josip Županov. “Self-Managing Socialism: the End of a Utopia”. In: Politička
misao 26.4 (1989); James Simmie and Jože Dekleva, eds. Yugoslavia in Turmoil: after Self-management?
London: Piner Publishers, 1991; Saul Estrin. “Yugoslavia: The Case of Self-Managing Market Socialism”.
In: The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5.4 (1991); Diane Flaherty. “Self-Management and the Future
of Socialism: Lessons from Yugoslavia”. In: Science and Society 56.1 (1992); Monty L. Lynn, Matjaz
Mulej, and Karin Jurse. “Democracy without Empowerment: the Grand Vision and Demise of Yugoslav
Self-management”. In: Management Decision 40.8 (2002); and Harold Lydall. Yugoslavia in Crisis. New
York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
9Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije [The Programe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia].






self-management, since it came to signify direct citizen participation in all spheres of life
and the resolution of conflicts in the social spheres through (self-managing) participa-
tory practices.14 In this sense, it determined the meaning of the element ‘Yugoslavian
socialist democracy’, since the latter was represented as the participation of the masses
in economic and political decision-making through self-managing practices. By engaging
in self-managing practices, the Yugoslavian working class would gradually bring about a
new type of socio-political order and bridge the gap between particular and common (Yu-
goslavian) interests.15 Furthermore, the element ‘state’ was also articulated through the
signifier. In the course of time and with the development of self-managing practices, the
state was to transform from being an instrument of power into being a channel for collec-
tive social self-management. This new state-formation would be rooted in the awareness
of the shared interests of all working people and in the specific needs of their organizations
of production.16 ‘Economic equality’ was also articulated through self-management, since
through its practise full economic equality was expected to be realised eventually.17
Self-management also played a cardinal role in the representation of the ‘nations and
nationalities’. Their (economic and cultural) equality was to be realised through decen-
tralisation and the development of self-managing practices in the communes and republics,
within the framework of common federal interests.18 In this sense, the nodal point also
fixed the meaning of the nations and nationalities as subjects of politics in the Yugosla-
vian federal order and of the territorial units as sites for national and working class
self-management.19 The link between the territorial units and the nations was not speci-
fied, leaving room for ambiguity and undecidability in their actual content. The territorial
units were represented as corresponding to national differences but not expressing social
divisions. This articulation was possible precisely because the essence of territorial units,
and the shared interest of all the nations and nationalities were fixed by the the signi-
14Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije [The Programe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia],
p. 153.
15Ibid., pp. 166, 171.
16Ibid., p. 121.
17Ibid., p. 133.
18Ibid., pp. 172, 192.
19Ibid., pp. 135, 172, 180-181.
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fier self-management. In addition, the working class whose interests were identical with
the progressive interests of mankind was represented as the primary subject responsi-
ble to bring about self-management, not the nations and nationalities. The latter were
represented as realising their ‘independence’, ‘self-determination’ and ‘cultural equality’
through self-management, and were thus assigned a politically more passive role.20
In the economic terrain, the elements ‘market’, ‘social property’ and ‘enterprise’ were
also represented through the nodal point; the first as controlled to be a tool for self-
management, the second as an object of self-management and the third as the site of
self-management.21 The meaning of progress was also determined by the nodal point self-
management as the transformation of producers into direct managers of the production
and re-distribution process.22 The role LCY was represented ambiguously within the dis-
course. On the one hand, it was defined as a weapon of the working class in the class
struggle and a force that directs the workers efforts toward the positive aim of building
self-management. On the other hand, its leading role was expected to disappear with the
strengthening of direct participatory democracy/self-management. Much like the state,
the LCY was expected to wither away in perspective and make room for workers’ self-
management.23
The ‘positive’ terrain articulated through the nodal point self-management was pro-
duced through a determinate relation to a set of ‘others’. The presence of antagonistic
forces was deployed by the party as a legitimization for its hegemonic role in society.24
Broadly speaking, the forces antagonistic to self-management were subdivided into in-
ternal an external. The external enemies were fixed as ‘Soviet-socialism’ and ‘bourgeois
liberal democracy’. The former was articulated as a deviation from true Marxism, be-
cause it concentrated power in the state-apparatus and led to the appropriation of the
value produced by the state instead of the working class:
[In the Soviet Union] the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the prole-
20Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije [The Programe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia],
pp. 143, 231.





tariat as a political system of a state which is withering away and as an instrument
of the struggle of the working class to dismantle the economic foundations of capi-
talism and creating the political and material conditions for the free development of
new socialist relations [...] was transformed into Stalin’s theory of the state which
is not withering away, which is growing stronger in all areas of social life and whose
apparatus itself plays the cardinal role in building socialism [...]25
Soviet socialism was represented as a binary opposite of self-managing socialism since in
the latter the state was not withering away and transferring power to various self-managing
organizations to make the working class the primary agent in socialism. Bourgeois democ-
racy on the other hand, was represented as a system rooted in the exploitative interests
of the bourgeois class and a fundamental misrepresentation of the very essence of politics,
as the LCY understood it:
The system of bourgeois democracy [...] is just a specific form of political monopoly,
shared by the leaderships of political parties. Through a sharp division of legislative
and executive powers– the executive being de-facto in the hands of bureaucrats tied
to the hegemonic class– the political forces of the bourgeois secure their power. This
system in principle excludes direct influence of the people’s masses on the execution
of power and is organized so that party leaderships rule instead of the people.26
Bourgeois democracy was represented as a binary opposite of self-managing socialism
since the latter was rooted in the universal interests of the working class which partici-
pates directly in the decision-making process.
The LCY forged Yugoslavia’s identity on a terrain of positivity in between these two
orders, as a fullness whose positive meaning was determined by their failures. The bound-
aries between the ‘positive’ Yugoslavian inside and the terrain of its negation were articu-
lated as porous because the logics structuring the systems that negated and gave identity
to Yugoslavian community externally were also represented as (constantly) threatening
to subvert the community from within. The LCY represented these external enemies
within as ‘negative tendencies’ that work to undermine the process of becoming towards
self-management and drew ‘two fronts of struggle’ against them.27
The first front of struggle was against ‘bureaucratism’, and its manifestations repre-





sented as ‘centralism’, ‘etatism’, ‘selfish particularism’ and ‘nationalism’.28 This ‘enemy’
would would disempower the working class and relocate power in the state’s administra-
tion. The latter’s interest would thus become antagonistic to that of the self-managing
community of workers.29 The LCY’s programm represented bureaucratism as ‘a disease
which weakness the whole body of the socialist community and breaks the bonds between
the leading political forces and the working class intensifying thereby internal social an-
tagonisms’.30 Although forms of bureaucratic centralism were represented as practices
that were necessary for the consolidation of the (new) socialist order in the immediate
post-war period they were represented as ‘regressive’ and ‘dogmatic’ at the present stage
of development because they inhibited the ‘necessary’ process of the withering away of
the state.31 The second front of struggle was drawn against ‘bourgeois ideology’, ‘oppor-
tunism’, ‘reformism’ and ‘anarchism’ which worked to subvert socialism by amplifying
social antagonisms, generating disorder and attempting to bring about a ‘bourgeoisie lib-
eral reform’.32 ‘Anarchism’ was represented as a threat because it fully undermined the
state and order and ‘liberalism’ because it undermined the socialist character of the state
and its central role in the struggle against the remnants of bourgeoisie ideology.33 The
dissemination of bourgeois, anarchist, and liberal ideas among the working class was rep-
resented as ‘regressive’ since it inevitably gave rise to the need to empower the Yugoslavian
state to fight them off.34 The tendencies constituting the second front of struggle were
not treated as a threat in themselves, but rather as a thereat that would inevitably give
rise to the first enemy bureaucratic-centralism from within the regime. Thus, although
the frontier against bureaucratic-centralism was represented as primary, it was acknowl-
edged that the LCY would itself resort to bureaucratic-centralist practices in defence of
the socialist order. This lead to a paradoxical position whereby the enemy bureaucratic-
centralism was simultaneously de-legitimized and legitimized by the LCY, depending on
28Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije [The Programe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia],
p. 149.
29Ibid., pp. 55, 123, 149.
30Ibid., p. 37.





its own reading of developments on the ground.
The drawing of frontiers in this manner meant that social division did not correspond
to national difference. The so called ‘negative tendencies’ were potentially present in all
Yugoslavian nations and nationalities. The two fronts of struggle in fact cut through
these identities, dividing them between the included and the excluded – ‘bureaucrats’,
‘centralists’, ‘nationalists’, ‘liberals’, ‘opportunists’, and/or ‘anarchists’ that threatened
the whole community from within. The brotherhood and unity discourse, to which I turn
in the next subsection, further cemented this frontier by grounding it in the WWII strug-
gle on the Yugoslavian front.
3.4 The Differential System Instituted by Brotherhood and Unity
Compared to self-management which has been the topic of much academic research, the
notion of brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities is somewhat
under-explored. It traces its origins to the Second World War struggle of the Anti-fascist
Front in the territories of Yugoslavia. It had formed the backbone of the socialist state
ever since its inception and preceded the introduction of self-management. During the
war it served as a nodal point for drawing together a variety of different national identities
into a common project which aspired to liberate the territories of the future SFRY from
foreign occupation and to prevent the reinstitution of the old monarchical order. Accord-
ing to the existing literature, brotherhood and unity embodied the ideal of harmonious
relations between nations and nationalities after the victory of the Communist Party and
the establishment of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The notion was ‘not
just a political slogan but also a key norm in the standard of relations in a multinational
state’.35 However, since it captured the very essence of the partisan victory in WWII that
‘birthed’ the SFRY also denoted the source of legitimacy for the socialist regime.36 Tito’s
35Vesna Godina. “The Outbreak of Nationalism on Former Yugoslav Territory: A Historical Perspective
on the Problem of Supranational Identity”. In: Nations and Nationalism 4.3 (1998), p. 413.
36See: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 54-61; and Drulović, Self-Management on
Trial, p. 23.
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speeches were marked by the constant appeals to the peoples of Yugoslavia to, above all
else, preserve their brotherhood and unity.37 Although the notion refers to about bind-
ing/connecting, it (also) operated by excluding and dividing. In this subsection, I explore
brotherhood and unity from the vantage point of both social unity and the exclusions
underpinning it.
The nodal point brotherhood and unity also fixed the meaning of moments into el-
ements of discourse and delineated the ‘positive’ Yugoslavian inside from the ‘hostile’
outside that threatened to subvert it. However, while self-management embodied an ideal
towards which the Yugoslavian community was to become in the future tense, ‘brother-
hood and unity’ embodied its symbolic origins. Its meaning could not be fully separated
from that of self-management because the very purpose of its preservation was to make
the building of the self-managing future possible.
The brotherhood and unity discourse fused the present with the past by overdeter-
mining the meaning of World War II on the Yugoslavian front. Through it the war
was articulated as the ‘National Liberation Struggle’ of ‘brotherly and unified’ nations
and nationalities against ‘foreign imperialists’ and ‘domestic collaborators’. The victory
of the communist-led Anti-fascist Front was represented as conditioned by its ability to
draw members of different national background into a common struggle for ‘freedom’ and
‘unity’ against external and internal enemies .38 Since the ‘enemy’ in the war was ‘excep-
tionally strong’, the victory of the materially weaker Front was attributed to the moral
superiority of its brotherhood and unity strategy.39 The war causalities and the moral
superiority of the Front translated into an ethical imperative to preserve brotherhood and
unity in the present and in the future. The necessity of its preservation was represented
through its binary opposite namely, the intra-national slaughter on the Yugoslavian front
during WWII. According to the LCY, if brotherhood and unity failed to materialize be-
tween the nations and nationalities, and national differences transformed into national
37Godina, “The Outbreak of Nationalism on Former Yugoslav Territory: A Historical Perspective on
the Problem of Supranational Identity”, p. 413.




divisions, WWII would be re-enacted.
The partisan’s role in WWII was represented as morally superior and beyond question-
ing precisely because they struggled for the emancipation of the (universal) working class
subject that included all the nations and nationalities and not for particular national
interests. In this sense, the National Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution
were represented as synonymous elements within the discourse of the LCY.40 Or to put it
differently, the ‘National Liberation Struggle’ of the united nations and nationalities was
represented as having been simultaneously the ‘Socialist Revolution’ of the working class:
The peoples of Yugoslavia, the working class and the Communist Party, fighting for
national liberation and socialist aims, found themselves in advanced positions and in
the midst of acute international antagonisms. They had to tackle these antagonisms
and accelerate social development by revolutionary means in fierce, long and bloody
battles. Socialist Yugoslavia was born in and grew out of the National Liberation
War and Socialist Revolution.41
Furthermore, the so-called ‘national question’ which divided the South Slavs in the Yu-
goslavian Monarchy and in the course of the war was represented as having been resolved
through the partisan victory and the federal organization of new socialist Yugoslavia:
The unresolved ‘national question’ was one of the fundamental contradictions that
destroyed the socio-political order of bourgeois Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian Com-
munist Party has consistently articulated its position regarding the issue, which
recognised the individuality, equality and self-determination of all Yugoslavian na-
tions – the Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians – and their unity rooted in a
federal organization of the state [...] The unity of Yugoslavia is possible only on the
basis of free national development and full equality of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians and Montenegrins, as well as national minorities. For this reason, so-
cialist Yugoslavia was born as a federal state of equal and sovereign peoples. It could
not have been created otherwise.42
The hegemonic LCY was represented as a bridge between the past and the present, since
it attributed itself with the task of carrying on the revolutionary partisan legacy and
providing the political space for materializing the unity of the nations, the nationalities
and the working class.43




43Ibid., pp. 6-7, 213.
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The relationship between the nations and the nationalities was also fixed through
brotherhood and unity; the term brotherhood captured their differences while the term
unity excluded the possibility of representing difference as (political) division. In this
sense, national equality became the very essence of nations and nationalities because it
was represented as the cardinal precondition of realising (their) brotherhood and unity.44
Equality was represented as the inherent property of all regardless of population size.
Or to put it differently, Yugoslavia was not attributed with minority and majority na-
tions, neither at the federal level nor within the republics.45 All nations, were to realise
brotherhood and unity by participating equally in federal institutions and engaging in
self-managerial practices.46 The link between particular national interests and the inter-
est of the Yugoslavian working class was also articulated in and through brotherhood and
unity:
[the brotherhood and] unity of Yugoslavia’s nations is not just an national-political
interest of each particular nation; it has become the social and material interest of
every working man as such. Unity is based on the social character of the means of
production which can be used to their fullest potential for the benefit of all only
through the cooperation of all nations.47
In addition, the nodal points ‘peace’, ‘order’, ‘progress’ and ‘Yugoslavian independence’
were represented as preconditioned by the preservation of the brotherhood and unity of
Yugoslavia’s nations, nationalities and the working class in general.
The brotherhood and unity discourse fixed the limit of the ‘positive’ terrain in a
determinate relation to a set of others around which political frontiers were constituted.
Its ‘enemies’ derived from ‘old’ Yugoslavia and the ‘National Liberation Struggle’ which
was represented as caused by its political failures. Old Yugoslavia was represented as
the historical ‘other’ of socialist Yugoslavia because it was rooted in the interests of the
Yugoslavian bourgeoisie and served as an instrument of class exploitation:
44Program Saveza komunista Jugoslavije [The Programe of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia],
pp. 172, 191, 193-194.
45The term ‘nationality’ captured the meaning of a ‘minority’ but this again was not represented in
numerical terms, but rather as nations whose homeland is outside of Yugoslavia. For example Hungarians,
Albanians, etc.




Yugoslavia came into being after the First World War, as the expression of the cen-
turies old aspirations and struggles of the Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian, Macedonian
and Montenegrin people for unification. This unity was forged however, according
to the terms imposed by Great Powers and it represented the class interests of the
domestic bourgeoisie.48
Furthermore, the old order was represented as the expression of the interests of the Ser-
bian bourgeoisie and the Serbian royal dynasty in particular, at the expense of both the
Yugoslavian working class as a whole and the bourgeois classes of other nations.49 The
skewed distribution of power between the bourgeoisie of different nations in favour of the
Serbian bourgeoisie was represented as the cause for the emergence of ‘bourgeois sepa-
ratist fascist formations’ during WWII. These formations were represented as attempts
to redistribute power within the different national bourgeoisies.50 On the one hand, there
was the bourgeoisie that affiliated its interests with the fascist occupation during WWII.
These included the Croatian ustaša movement and Nedićevci and Ljotićevci in Serbia.
They were represented as instruments of the foreign occupier who wanted to divide Yu-
goslavia from within, weaken it, and rule over it. On the other hand, there was the
bourgeoisie affiliated with the old exiled government and its royal četnik army in Serbia.
This ‘enemy’ wanted to re-establish the old order which was rooted in great-Serbian hege-
mony and centralism. The identity of the Communist Party was represented through its
differentiation from these bourgeois enemies as the only political force capable of mobi-
lizing the democratic forces and the working class in different nations through a universal
Yugoslavian political movement against ‘foreign occupiers’, ‘domestic supporters’ and the
‘old order’.51 In this sense, according to the LCY, the antagonistic frontier between the
‘particular’ and ‘divisive’ bourgeoisie and the ‘universal’ and ‘unified’ working class drove
the war in the Yugoslavian territories.
The enemies from the past also manifested themselves in the socialist present in
the form of ‘regressive forces’ that threatened to subvert the ‘positive’ inside and di-
vide the community from within. They took the form of ‘national chauvinist tenden-






cies’,‘particularistic egoistic tendencies’, ‘centralism’, and ‘nationalism’, all of which were
the expression of the the working class/bourgeoisie antagonism. The enemy from the past
was externalized and frozen in time in the ‘enemy migration’ which came to be overdeter-
mined by signifiers such as ‘ustaše’, ‘četnici’, ‘bourgeoise’ ‘Stalinists’, all of those which
worked towards undermining the brotherhood and unity institutionalised in Yugoslavia
and overthrowing the constitutional order.52
The drawing of frontiers in this manner meant that social division did not correspond
to national difference, since the enemies of brotherhood and unity were potentially present
among all nations and nationalities. The front of struggle against them cut through these
identities dividing them between (potential) ‘ustaše’, ‘četnici’, ‘bourgeoise’, ‘royalistis’ and
the ‘positive’ working class. Within this system of representation specific enemies were
linked to specific nations in a binary manner, such as ‘good Serbs’ vs. ‘četniks, royalists,
centralists’ and ‘good Croats’ vs. ‘ustaše’. In their own way, all of the ‘enemies’ around
which the frontiers were constructed were represented as adopting a viewpoint foreign to
the working class, the nations and nationalities and Yugoslavia as a whole.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have shown that the Yugoslavian identity as a terrain of positivity was
constituted through two intertwined spaces of representation semantically determined by
the signifiers ‘brotherhood and unity’ and ‘self-management’. While brotherhood and
unity fixed the mythical origins of the Yugoslavian imaginary in a particular interpreta-
tion of WWII, self-management fixed the meaning of that towards which the Yugoslavian
52The enemy migration was not mentioned explicitly in the LCY program, but it played a cardinal role
in the manner in which the frontiers between inside and outside were constituted in practice. The enemy
migration was represented as constantly trying overthrow the state and realise the different projects that
the partisans fought against in WWII. In the post-1948 period, the Tito-Stalin split was also grafted
into the signifier and it came to include ‘Stalinists’ too. The manner in which the ‘nation’ came to be
represented in the post-socialist period was shaped by this system of exclusion. For an excellent overview
of LCY’s position regarding the multifaceted ‘enemy migration’ see: Milenko Doder. Jugoslavenska
neprijateljska emigracija [Yugoslavia’s Enemy Emigration]. Zagreb: Centar za informacija i publicitet,
1989; for the manner in which the regime dealt with the emigration institutionally see: Ragazzi, “The
Croatian “Diaspora Politics” of the 1990s: Nationalism Unbound?”
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community was to become towards in the future. I have also argued that both discourses
constituted frontiers that marked the limits of the Yugoslavian imaginary. Most im-
portantly, I have argued that the two discursive strands operated by differentiating and
equating national identities vis-a-vis each other while simultaneously naturalizing their
internal division between included/excluded. It is only within the discursive horizon in-
stituted by these two strands of discourse that Yugoslavian socialist patriotism attained
meaning:
[...] not antagonistic to the democratic national consciousness but its necessary
internationalist supplement within the context of the socialist community of nations.
It does not aspire to create a new ‘Yugoslavian nation’ to replace existing nations,
but to [...] strengthen the socialist community of producers, the working people
of all of Yugoslavia’s nations, to affirm their mutual interests founded in socialist
relations. This form of Yugoslavism cannot inhibit the free development of national
languages and cultures, to the contrary it presupposes it.53
Lastly, it is important to make note of the tension between self-management, which car-
ried the connotation of an indeterminate degree of de-centralisation and volutnarism and
brotherhood and unity which implied indeterminate degree of centripentality and res-
onated with the notion of ‘democratic centralism’. In this sense, the ‘enemies’ fixed by
one space of representation could easily be articulated as expressed in the practices repre-
sented as legitimate within the other space of representation. This indeterminacy renders
visible the non-essential character of both the ‘enemies’ and the Yugoslavian identity con-
stituted in opposition to them. Any person or political movement both inside or outside
of the party could occupy the ‘enemy’ position if the context permitted and the LCY
saw necessary. Or to put it differently, the enemies were not fixed in a positive set of
characteristics precisely because Yugoslavism as an identity did not have an authentic
core beyond the difference from these ‘others’. This constitutive indeterminacy was the
condition of possibility for the emergence of the Croatian Spring movement in the late
1960s, to which I turn in the following chapter.




The Croatian Spring: Transforming Rules and Crossing
Boundaries
4.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, and the social divisions discussed in
Chapter 3, in this chapter I examine the politicization of the Croatian nation as a form of
political subjectivity during the Croatian Spring, at the end of the 1960s and the beginning
of 1970s. The ‘mass movement’, as it was called at the time, emerged in the context of the
economic, political and constitutional reforms carried out by the LCY in the 1960s. Its
main protagonists were the ‘liberal’ wing of the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC),
the cultural institution Matica hrvatska and the Croatian Student Union. In December
1971, the movement was crushed by the LCY and many of its participants excluded from
the public scene. As part of the regime’s response, the leader of the Croatian Democratic
Union and the first elected Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, was imprisoned for his
publications in the journals of Matica hrvatska. In Chapter 8, I will show that the Croa-
tian Spring became an important nodal point in the political project of the CDU, during
the first democratic elections in 1990. In 1971, however, Belgrade’s leading newspaper
labelled the events as ‘Yugoslavia’s most serious post-war political crisis’.1 To ensure there
would be no conceptual confusion about the movement’s nature, and to explain the ‘ob-
jective’ reasons for the exclusions in 1971, the Central Committee of the LCC adopted an
1Dennison I. Rusinow. “Post-Mortems of the crisis in Croatia [June 1972]”. In: Yugoslavia: Oblique
Insights and Observations. Ed. by Gale Stokes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, p. 107.
81
extensive report which ‘proved’ its counter-revolutionary and nationalist character.2
The existing literature on the Croatian Spring can be subdivided into work published
before and after Yugoslavia’s dissolution. The former sees the movement as part and
parcel of the federal reform of the party-state in the 1960s, and as rooted in the economic
problems caused by the introduction of self-management in 1953.3 The latter focuses
on the relationship between the post-socialist democratic order and the repressed move-
ment. Some authors trace a direct continuity between the Croatian Spring and democratic
transition and see in the Croatian Spring an embryonic expression of political pluralism,
national identity4 and state independence.5 Others contest this continuity, arguing that
none of the actors involved articulated liberal-democratic demands.6 Finally, some also
maintain that the claims of continuity are just a retroactive inscription of the post-socialist
present onto the socialist past, that forms part of the a broader struggle for a ‘better past’
in the post-1990 period.7
In this chapter I account for the movement without reducing it to the conditions of its
emergence or to developments in the post-1989 period. I argue that its actors aimed at
transforming the articulation of forces between federal and republican institutions within
the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon and that the movement can only be understood in
relation to the system of social division discussed in the previous chapter. In this sense,
the Croatian Spring was neither the beginning of something that was only realised in
1990, nor an inevitable consequence of the political and economic reform initiated by the
2Savez Komunista Hrvatske; Centralni Komitet. Hrvatsko proljeće: presuda Partije [The Croatian
Spring: the Verdict of the Party]. Zagreb: Dom i svijet, 2003 An academic version of the CC LCC report
also appeared in which the actors of the Croatian Spring were assessed against the official program of
the LCY. See: Ivan Perić. Ideje "masovnog pokreta" u Hrvatskoj. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politicki
studij, 1974.
3See for example: Sabrina P. Ramet. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991. 2nd.
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1992; and Dennison I. Rusinow. The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978
4Ivica Šušak. “Hrvatsko proljeće-početci političkog interesnog pluralizma [The Croatian Spring-the
inception of political pluralism]”. In: Hrvatska i Komparativna javna Uprava 8.3 (2008); and Vesna
Pusić. “Korijeni hrvatskog političkog identiteta [The roots of Croatan political identity]”. In: Erasmus-
Časopis za kulturu demokracije 15 (1996).
5Marko Zubak. “The Croatian Spring: Interpreting the Communist Heritage in Post-communist
Croatia”. In: East Central Europe 32.1-2 (2005).
6Dušan Bilandžić. Hrvatska moderna povijest [The Modern History of Croatia]. Zagreb: Golden
Marketing, 1999.
7Tonči Kursar. “Prijeporni pluralizam 1971 [Disputable pluralism 1971]”. In: Politikča misao 43.4
(2007), p. 153.
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hegemonic LCY with the introduction of self-management. Furthermore, I argue that
the actors that formed part of the movement problematized the rules fixing the federal-
republican relationship in different ways and consequently ‘activated’ the notion of the
Croatian nation, a form of political subjectivity, differently. The LCC remained within
the boundaries of the imaginary horizon and its constitutive system of divisions despite
demanding the re-articulation of its constitutive elements. The Matica hrvatska and the
student movement transgressed the instituted limits and challenged the social divisions
upon which the horizon was premised. Lastly, I argue that the regime’s response to the
heterogeneous movement was an act of hegemonization which operated by reducing the
events, actors and demands to a single ‘enemy’ denominator, attributing them thereby
with an coherence that could not be read off from the demands and strategies deployed.
Despite of their substantive differences, the regime excluded all of the protagonists from
the political field and absorbed the general logic around which the actors converged into
the new rules constituting the Yugoslavian imaginary.
In the first section, I delineate the dislocations that characterised the context of the
1960s and made the emergence of new forms of political identification possible. In the
second section, I disentangle the movement into its constitutive discursive practices and
look into the manner in which the LCC, Matica hrvatska and the student movement
articulated political demands and spaces of representation within the context of those
dislocations in an attempt to suture them. More specifically, I map out their demands
and strategies and examine their relationship to the system of social division instituted by
the Yugoslavian imaginary. In the third section, I look at the regime’s response in 1971
as an attempt to articulate the excess of the social in terms of the system of inclusions
and exclusions which based the Yugoslavian imaginary. In the concluding section, after
summarizing my main points, I point to the impact that the movement had on the manner
in which social division became sedimented in institutional forms, and then introduce the
following chapter.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important that the limits of my discussion
are clearly specified. Due to the scope of my thesis, in this chapter I will not look into
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developments occurring simultaneously in other republics during the reform process; in
particular the policies pursued by LC Serbia and the 1968 student protests in Belgrade. I
will also not be looking into the debates about the constitutional reform that took place
in federal institutions in the 1967-1974 period.8
4.2 Dislocations and Antagonisms: the Context of the Croatian
Spring Movement
The 1963 Constitution was the first attempt to sediment the system of divisions discussed
in the previous chapter, into institutional forms and subject positions. The 1963 Con-
stitution entered history as ‘the charter of self-management’9 despite the fact that its
1974 successor, which I will examine in the following chapter, worked out the institu-
tional forms for realising self-management in much greater detail. Conceptually speaking,
the promulgation of the new constitution signaled the beginning of the decentralization
already articulated in the 1958 Programme. Self-management became the inalienable
right of all citizens and producers.10 A degree of polycentrism in governance was in-
troduced by granting republics the right to enter into agreements about some social and
economic issues although the methods of decision-making were not worked out in detail.11
Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian were recognized as the official languages in
the federation, with equal rights of usage.12 Citizens were granted the right to express
their nationality, culture and to develop them, while the pursuance of national inequality
was deemed unconstitutional.13
Decentralization had its limits; the workers and peoples realized their sovereignty in
8For an detailed analysis of these matters see: Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, pp. 139-
307; and Dejan Jović. “The Constitutional Debate 1967-1974: Why did Serbia Accept the Kardelj
Concept and the 1974 Constitution?” In: Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away. West Laffayet:
Purdue University Press, 2009. Chap. 5.
9Ivo Goldstein. Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008]. Zagreb: Europa Pressholding, 2008, p. 497.
10The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Beograd: Secretariat for Information





the federation and not in the socialist republics.14 The republics were represented as terri-
torial units based on the power of the working class and its self-management without any
mention of their relationship to the nations and nationalities, despite the fact that they
carried national names.15 Four out of the five chambers constituting the supreme legisla-
tive body, the Federal Assembly, were composed following the principle ‘one deputy to an
equal number of inhabitants’,16 privileging in practice the more populous republics. The
only chamber that did follow the logic of equal representation of republican and provin-
cial assemblies was the Chamber of Nationalities, but it had minimal competencies.17 The
tension between what the LCY claimed to be doing – decentralizing power to realise the
principle of working class and national self-management – and the possibility of realising
its stated objective within the institutional forms sedimented through the constitution,
was one of the dislocations out of which the Croatian Spring movement emerged.
During the VIII Congress of the LCY, the party recognised the limitations of the ex-
isting institutional forms. For the first time since the National Liberation Struggle, Tito
claimed that the ‘national question’ had not yet been resolved in Yugoslavia because some
party members still failed to understand the nature of social division:
They confuse the unity of nations with the liquidation of nations and want to create
something new and artificial: one integral Yugoslav nation. Their idea sounds closer
to assimilation and bureaucratic centralism, to unitarism and hegemony [...] such
people can do a great deal of harm. For any within the League of Communists it
must be stated that there is no place for them in our League because of the harm
that they do.18
At the VIII Congress it was decided that the republican LCs would henceforth hold their
particular congresses prior to the all Yugoslavian congress, to come up with their own
platforms for discussion.19 The ‘opening up’ of the national question and the relative
politicization of republican party branches loosened up the uniformity of the LCY and
transformed it into a space for negotiating between different republican self-managerial




18Josip Broz Tito. “Report to the Eight LCY Congress held in Belgrade from December 7 to 13, 1964”.
In: The National Question. Beograd: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1983, p. 111.
19Leslie Benson. Yugoslavia: A Concise History. 2nd. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 109.
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interests.20 In the following years, the LCY recruited a quarter of a million new members,
one third of them workers and 80% under the age of 25.21 These structural changes from
within the hegemonic party created the conditions of possibility for the emergence of a
younger leadership in the republican parties. The re-opening of the national question
within the multinational federation, and the decentralization of the federal party within
a single party system rooted in ‘democratic centralism’, had a dislocatory effect on the
imaginary, and the Croatian Spring emerged in response to these dislocations, as an at-
tempt to suture them.
Immediately after the VIII Congress, a market oriented reform of the centrally planed
economy was introduced to integrate the Yugoslavian economy with the world economy,
improve the living standards of workers and increase overall economic productivity.22 The
economic reform was also represented as part of the solution to the ‘national question’,
since the decentralisation of the investment system was expected to destroy the ‘material
basis’ of the ‘centralist-hegemony’ which threatened the freedom of Yugoslavia’s constitu-
tive nations.23 The market reform strengthened the power of republics and enterprises at
the expense of the powers of the federal government.24 It also brought about an increase
in unemployment, the migration of Yugoslavian workers to ‘capitalist’ Western-Europe
and the growth of regional/republican inequalities.25 The dislocation between the objec-
tives behind the reform and its contradictory and uneven results was also a condition in
response to which the movement emerged.
In July 1966, at the Brioni Plenum of the LCY, the head of the Internal Security Forces
20The Congress decided to further decentralise the economy by transferring the funds for extended
production from state-organs to workers’ collectives and by granting workers the rights to decide about
the distribution of what was to be done with the incomes made in their enterprises. For an detailed
discussion of the VIII Congress and the analysis of reports presented at it see: Rusinow, The Yugoslav
Experiment 1948-1974, pp. 168-175.
21Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, p. 118.
22The reform aimed to create a capital intensive, high productivity manufacturing industry, capable of
placing its goods on world markets, and to diversify investment into neglected branches of the economy,
particularly agriculture and tourism. Subsidies to industries for domestic sales were ended and the dinar
allowed to float against the US dollar. The proportion of net income disposed of by enterprises raised
from 40% to 70%, in order to encourage innovation and savings. See: ibid., p. 112.
23Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 167.
24Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, pp. 85-89.
25For the overall impact of the reform see: Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008], p. 499;
and Benson, Yugoslavia: A Concise History, p. 113. For a detailed analysis of its implementation in
different sectors see: Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, pp. 172-179.
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Aleksandar Ranković was relieved from his party and state offices for opposing the eco-
nomic reform, the decentralization of the federation, the ‘federalization’ of the LCY and
for attempts to sabotage official party policies and impose ‘conservative views’ through the
institutions under his competency.26 Ranković’s removal as head of the secret police was
paralleled by the relative liberalization of the socio-political space; cultural institutions,
news outlets and the broader public were given more room to discuss the present and
future forms of the self-managing order. The purge of the ‘centralist’ Ranković and the
opening up of the socio-political space for the inclusion institutions and actors external
to the party into political debates within the framework of a single party regime also had
a dislocatory effect on the system. The movement’s emergence was both conditioned by
this ‘opening’ as much as it attempted to suture it.
Lastly, after the re-opening of the national question, the relative decentralization of
the LCY, the introduction of the market reform, the purge of the head of the security ser-
vice and the ‘liberalization’ of the political space, the first set of amendments to the 1963
Constitution were passed in 1967. The amendments increased the power of the republics
by broadening the competency of the Chamber of Nationalities in the Federal Assembly.27
The constitutional debate gave rise to a variety of different positions regarding the future
form of the self-managing order within the federal LCY. Some thought that decentralisa-
tion and the marketization had already gone too far and that further transformation was
dangerous. Others, like the ‘liberal’ leadership of the LCC, claimed that further economic
and political transformations were necessary for the realisation of self-managing socialism.
In this sense, the constitutional debate formed the immediate context out of which the
movement emerged as an attempt to, in different ways, transform the institutional form
of the Yugoslavian imaginary.
26Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 187.
27Ibid., p. 225.
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4.3 Disentangling the Croatian Spring Movement
4.3.1 The Declaration: posing the ‘national’ problem in cultural terms
In March 1967, one year after Ranković was relieved of his offices, a group of 130 promi-
nent Croatian intellectuals, 80 of them Communists, inscribed the unresolved national
question into the context of SR Croatia by signing the ‘The Declaration Concerning the
Characterization and Status of the Croatian Literary Language’ and contesting the rep-
resentation of the Croatian language within the existing order.28
The Declaration came in response to the two published volumes of the Serbo-Croatian
dictionary and it contested the practice of naming the language Serbo-Croatian for its ‘cen-
tralist’ and ‘hegemonic’ tendencies.29 According to the Declaration, the existing language
practices failed to capture the particularity of the Croatian language and thus blocked
Croatian national equality. This position was articulated in reference to the existing social
divisions and Tito’s position at the VIII Congress; the Serbo-Croatian dictionary was rep-
resented as the expression of ‘etatism’, ‘unitarism’ and ‘hegemony’ because it promoted
‘a unified state language’ Serbian, under the guise of Serbo-Croatian. This was possible
precisely because of Belgrade’s dual and ‘dominant’ position, as the capital of SR Serbia
and the capital of Yugoslavia.30
The Declaration demanded the transformation of the constitutional article about ‘the
Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian language’, and their representation as two separate lit-
erary languages, along with Slovenian and Macedonian. It also demanded the consistent
usage of the Croatian literary language in the Croatian education system and in the pub-
lic and political life of SR Croatia. This included civil servants, teachers and officials
coming from other parts of Yugoslavia, who were expected to use the official language of
the territorial unit in which they worked. This demand problematized the position of the
Serbian bureaucrats working in SR Croatia and of the Croatian Serbs, who in practice
28Dennison I. Rusinow. “Facilis Decensus Averno [September 1972]”. In: Yugoslavia: Oblique Insights
and Observations. Ed. by Gale Stokes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, p. 143.
29For more on the language debate see: Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 225.
30For the full text of the Declaration to which I refer in this subsection see: “Deklaracija o nazivu i
položaju hrvatskog književnog jezika [The declaration regarding the name and position of the Croatian
language]”. In: Telegram (17 March 1967).
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spoke variants of Croatian although they identified as Serbian. It was met with an antag-
onistic response from a group of Serbian writers that drafted a reply demanding the use of
Cyrillic on Belgrade television and the education of 700, 000 Serbs in Croatia in ‘their own
language’. Regardless of their appeal to national equality and the platform of the VIII
Congress for realising self-management, the LCY and LCC maintained the Declaration
was hostile towards the Yugoslavian community and it undermined its ‘brotherhood and
unity’. The party members that had signed the Declaration were punished or purged.31
In practice, the demands for realising equality translated national difference under-
stood in cultural terms, into national antagonism. Similarly, the division between the
‘positive’ self-managing practices and the ‘negative’ centralist-bureaucratic forces con-
stitutive of the Yugoslavian imaginary, transformed into national antagonisms because
intellectuals articulated these frontiers for the purpose of realising the interests of their
particular nations. These semantic slippages were possible precisely because the terms did
not contain essential meanings beyond their discursive representations. These slippages
appeared in different forms throughout the period discussed.
4.3.2 The LCC: contesting rules and politicizing the republican working class
identity
The ‘liberals’ in the LCC, Mirko Tripalo, Savka Dabčević-Kučan and Pero Priker became
hegemonic in the SR Croatia and leaders of the Croatian Spring on a platform ‘decentral-
ization, de-etatization and democratization’. Initially, they enjoyed Tito and Bakarić’s
support.32 Although they condemned the Declaration, the ‘liberals’ weaved their political
project around a similar problem, namely the position of SR Croatia within the federal
31Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 225.
32Savka Dabčević-Kučan was the President of the Central Comitte of the LCC elected to the position
in 1969. Mirko Tripalo was the President of the Executive Committee of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia elected in 1966, later he became one of the members of the Presidency of the SFRY. Vladimir
Bakarić was the Chairman of the LCC from 1948-1969 before Dabčević-Kučan took up the position. Pero
Pirker was the major of Zagreb and replaced Tripalo as Secretary of the Executive Committee of LCC
in 1969. For a detailed description of the Croatian leadership and their rise to power after the fall of
Ranković see: Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008], p. 537; and Rusinow, “Facilis Decensus
Averno [September 1972]”, pp. 138-142.
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order.
The central grievance expressed by the liberals was that the Croatian working class was
being exploited in the existing federal order. Contrary to the proclaimed self-managerial
tenet that workers should dispose of the surplus value they produce, they maintained
that the surplus value of the Croatian working class was systematically appropriated by
federal institutions in Belgrade. They problematized the federal redistribution practices
for appropriating the foreign currency earned in SR Croatia, and for investing in SR
Croatia much less than the republic contributed to the federal funds. They also contested
the monopoly that companies in Belgrade held on export and maintained that they were
accumulating capital. Furthermore, the liberals also contested the existing delegation
practices in federal administrative bodies, on the grounds that the majority voting sys-
tem ‘empowered’ the republics with more delegates, thereby putting the interests of their
working class above the interests of others.33
In the light of these grievances, the leadership articulated a set of demands for re-
forming the Yugoslavian order as a whole, on the grounds that their realisation would
suture the dislocated equality between the territorial units and bring about the realisa-
tion of true self-management. On the economic terrain they demanded that the federal
capital be federalised and not centralized and that ‘clear accounts’ be established between
republics. The realisation of these demands would make it possible for each republic to
see exactly what it was contributing and receiving from the federation and to decide on
future contributions. This would, they argued, kick-start Yugoslavia’s stagnating econ-
omy by making economic redistribution more rational and fair and thus bring about the
actual realisation of the objectives behind the economic reform. On the political terrain
the liberals demanded the relaxation of rules of democratic centralism within the LCY
to weaken the power of the federal (party) center and strengthen the republican (party)
centres. They grounded this demand in the contention that the republican (party) centres
were better attuned to the self-managerial interests of their republican working classes.
33See: Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008], p. 539; Rusinow, “Facilis Decensus Averno
[September 1972]”, pp. 145-146; Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 248; and Benson,
Yugoslavia: A Concise History, p. 119.
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By decentralizing power, the republican working class would get involved in political
decision-making more directly and their self-managing capacity would expand. Following
the same rationale, they demanded that ‘sovereignty’ in Yugoslavia be represented as an
attribute of republics and not the federation as a whole, that the principle of republi-
can/provincial parity be deployed in the composition of federal institutions and that the
delegates working in these bodies be accountable to their republican institutions.34
This political project was imbued with a ‘positive’ meaning in reference to the ene-
mies ‘bureaucratic centralism’ and ‘unitarism’, constitutive of the Yugoslavian imaginary
which were reaffirmed as the legitimate front of struggle during the VIII Congress of the
LCY. In line with the rationale for the implementation of the economic reform, they rep-
resented the power of these enemies as rooted in their control of economic re-distributive
instruments at the federal level.35 In a speech delivered in the main square in Zagreb in
front of a mass of supporters, Savka Dabčević Kučan specified the ‘enemies’ that were
blocking the realisation of the Croatian and Yugoslavian political subject:
The etatists, unitarists and great-Serbian chauvinists offer us the kind of Yugoslavia
which we do not wish nor want. The Croatian chauvinists want to crush the Yu-
goslavia which is in our interest and that is in our interest and which we do want.
Neither is able to understand the genuine socialist interests of the working class, the
working people, the nation, independence and socialism. They all hold in reserve
a reliance on something or someone, which does not represent their own people,
working class and responsibility for the future. We do not want something which is
not our own or foreign, we are the creators of our own socialism and future. Under
the leadership of Tito and the LCY we will build our self-managing socialist society
and a community of equals, as our people want it.36
Reiterating the position articulated in the 1958 Programme, the liberals maintained that
the national problem was essentially a class problem and that the ‘enemies’ of the Croatian
34See: Mirko Tripalo. Hrvatsko Proljeće [The Croatian Spring]. Zagreb: Globus, 1990, p. 127; Mirko
Tripalo. “Suvremeni razvitak našeg društva i reforma SK [The contemporary development of our society
and the LC’s Reform]”. In: S Poprišta [From the Struggle]. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij,
1971; Mirko Tripalo. “Novi osnovi i problemi našeg razvitka [The New Bases and Problams of our
Development]”. In: S Poprišta [From the Struggle]. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1971;
and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, pp. 248-249.
35Tripalo, “Novi osnovi i problemi našeg razvitka [The New Bases and Problams of our Development]”,
p. 116.
36An excerpt from Savka Dabčević-Kučan’s speech given in May 1971 at Zagreb’s main square, quoted
in: The Problems of Contemporary Yugoslavia, 1971. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-10625;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:0f6ef817-95f3-4941-a744-879109cdb81d (visited on 02/06/2016).
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nation were potentially as present among Croats as they were among other nations. Mirko
Tripalo explicitly stated this:
The difference between us, the Croatian communists, and Croatian nationalists lays
in our class understanding of the national question [...] We have always maintained
that an independent and federal Yugoslavia, rooted in self-management is the only
possible framework for the prosperity, future and independence of the Croatian na-
tion [...] Those who are against this Yugoslavia, including the Croatian political
emigration which is anti-communist, represent the biggest opponents of the realisa-
tion of our political project [...] That’s why we are not interested in our common
Slavic roots, nor in the common life in ‘old’ Yugoslavia, but in that which unites us
all, our common socialist and class interests.37
From their perspective, resolving the problem of the appropriation of the surplus value
of the Croatian working class and assuring that the Croatian working class participated
directly in federal decision making would thus contribute to the resolution of the national
question. Their class understanding of the nation was further evident in their represen-
tation of the Croatian nation in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina and AP Vojvodina. The
liberals explicitly rejected the possibility of articulating its interests and maintained that,
since the socio-economic interest of all the working people in SR Croatia were essentially
identical, irrespective of their national background, the LCC was responsible for articu-
lating the interests of the Croatian working class as a whole and protecting the equality,
and brotherhood and unity between its nations and nationalities.38
The practical ramifications of their project became apparent in January 1970, on the
‘historic’ Tenth Session of the LCC CC.39 The occasion for the session was a series of
articles that Miloš Žanko – a Croatian communist and the Vice-President of the Federal
Assembly – published in the federal newspaper Borba. Žanko presented an analysis of
the activities of Croatian nationalists with a particular focus on the activities and pub-
lications of the cultural institution Matica hrvatska, which I will discuss in the following
section. Žanko maintained nationalism was on the rise in SR Croatia and that the lib-
eral leadership had failed to take more than verbal action against it, contributing to its
37Mirko Tripalo. “Klasni princip i nacionalno pitanje [The class principle and the national question]”.
In: S Poprišta [From the Struggle]. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1971, p. 181.
38Mirko Tripalo. “Osnovi novog jedinstva [The basis for a new form of unity]”. In: S Poprišta [From
the Struggle]. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1971, pp. 248-249.
39Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest [The Modern History of Croatia], p. 557.
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expansion.40
Savka Dabčević-Kučan, Mirko Tripalo and Vladimir Bakarić attacked the ‘unitarist’
understanding of socialism. They stressed that both ‘nationalism’ and ‘unitarism’ were
two aspects of the same ‘enemy’ but that the communists had focused on fighting ‘na-
tionalism as a particularism’ and neglected the struggle against ‘unitarism’ which was,
according to the LCY’s Programme, the expression of ‘the hegemonic tendency of the
biggest nation’ (Serbian).41 His publications were represented as part of a broader strug-
gle against the leadership of the LCC, driven by ‘unitarists’ in federal state and party
institutions. In the keynote speech, Savka Dabčević-Kučan maintained that, in this strug-
gle, the ‘unitarists’ labelled the Croatian leadership ‘nationalist’ to manufacture party
disunity and ultimately overthrow it. She also accused the ‘unitarists’ of empowering
the ‘nationalists’ by undermining the hegemony of the LCC, the organ responsible for
the struggle against nationalism in SR Croatia.42 Following the logic that the national
question was in essence a class question, the Tenth Session concluded that the continued
struggle for realising socio-economic reform would organically remove the root causes of
both unitarism and nationalism. Žanko was purged from the party for ‘expressing views
contrary to the official policy of the LCC’ and for misinforming communists in other re-
publics about the situation in SR Croatia.43 For the first time in Yugoslavian history, a
session of the Central Committee was televised on a republican TV, triggering a public
debate about the political conjecture and the mobilization of the public behind the ar-
ticulated official platform of the LCC. Retroactively, the Tenth Session has been fixed as
the beginning of the Croatian Spring and the articulation of a Croatian project for the
40Contrary to the decentralizing demands of the LCC Žanko also demanded that the delegates to the
Chamber of Republics and Provinces in the Federal Assembly represent all Yugoslav interests rather
than particular republican interests, during the constitutional debate. For a summary of the debate see:
Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 277; Rusinow, “Facilis Decensus Averno [September
1972]”, pp. 149-151; Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 109; and Bilandžić,
Hrvatska moderna povijest [The Modern History of Croatia], pp. 563-567.
41Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 109; Rusinow, The Yugoslav Exper-
iment 1948-1974, p. 278; Tripalo, Hrvatsko Proljeće [The Croatian Spring], p. 112.
42Savka Dabčević-Kučan. “Bratstvo i jedinstvi na elementima onoga što nas spaja u samouprvnom
socijalizmu”. In: Deseta sjenica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske [Zagreb 15,16 i 17.
siječnja 1970]. Ed. by Milovan Baletić and Zdravko Židović. Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1970, pp. 18-20.
43“Zaključci X sjednice CK SKH [The conclusions from the X Assembly of the CC LCC]”. in: Deseta
sjenica Centralnog komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske [The Tenth Assembly of the CC LCC]. ed. by
Milovan Baletić and Zdravko Židović. Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1970.
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transformation of Yugoslavia.
The following two years saw the expansion of the activities of the Matica hrvatska,
the politicization of the student movement and the adoption of amendments to the 1963
Constitution which granted sovereignty to the republics in all areas except for foreign
policy, national defence, the unified market and monetary and foreign trade policy. Re-
publican and provincial parity were also introduced as procedures for constituting federal
institutions.44 The demand for separate republican foreign currency regimes articulated
by the liberals was left unsatisfied because the Croatian delegates failed to forge alliances
with the leadership of other republican parties on the issue.45
By the Twentieth Session of the CC LCC in May 1971, the clear line of demarca-
tion within the LCC drawn at the Tenth Session was blurred because the LCC failed to
maintain a unified platform regarding the nature of the politicizations external to it and
the demand for foreign currency retention. The liberals repeated their position about
the necessity of reforming the foreign currency system and in this, they enjoyed the sup-
port of the Croatian student movement and the Matica hrvatska. They also maintained
that nationalist positions should be undermined through rational debate, the further de-
velopment of socio-economic reform and not through repressive administrative measures
and the prohibition of publications.46 Others in the LCC’s Executive Committee, includ-
ing Vladimir Bakarić, grew increasingly critical towards what they interpreted to be the
pluralization of the political space, representing it as a threat to LCY’s hegemony.47 Even-
tually, as I will elaborate later in the chapter, the liberals were purged from the ranks of
the LCC.
In sum, the discourse of the liberal leadership was weaved around various demands
that aimed at rearticulating the power relations between the republics and the federation,
for the purpose of realising workers’ self-management. The demands they articulated, and
44For a summary of the constitutional amendments see: Rusinow, “Facilis Decensus Averno [September
1972]”, pp. 156-160.
45Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, pp. 296-297.
46Mirko Tripalo. “Samoupravljanje i avangarda [Self-managemen and the vanguard party]”. In: S
Poprišta [From the Struggle]. Zagreb: Centar za aktualni politički studij, 1971, pp. 156-157.
47Dennison I. Rusinow. “The Road to Karadjordjevo [September 1972]”. In: Yugoslavia: Oblique
Insights and Observations. Ed. by Gale Stokes. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008, pp. 181-
183.
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the strategy of including the masses into politics, were represented as a continuation of
the National Liberation Struggle and the Socialist Revolution. Furthermore, the lines of
exclusion/inclusion articulated in their project remained within the system of divisions
instituted by the imaginary. ‘Belgrade’, in antagonism to which they articulated their
project, signified primarily ‘the federal administrative center’ and denoted ‘outdated’,
‘centralist’, ‘regressive’ tendencies. It also carried the meaning of the capital of former
Yugoslavia, whose bourgeoisie, as discussed in the previous chapter, ‘ruled’ and ‘exploited’
other nations in the past.
The political subject articulated through their project was the republican working
class whose self-managing interests they claimed to represent within the framework of the
socio-economic reform process. Their demands were thus directed against particular rules
conferred through the existing subject positions, without contesting the hegemonic party
they themselves formed part of. Furthermore, their demands can be read as attempts
to increase their own power vis-a-vis the federal party organs and not as attempts to
undermine the socialist order as such.
The embeddedness of their project within the existing system of social divisions was
even more evident in the position they took regarding the articulation of the element
‘sovereignty’ in the context of SR Croatia. Unlike the intellectuals associated with Matica
hrvatska and the student movement, whose discursive practices I analyse in the follow-
ing subsections, the liberal leadership never disputed the inclusion of the Serbian nation
within the scope of ‘state sovereignty’. It unequivocally maintained that, given the class
essence of nations, ‘sovereignty’ in SR Croatia could only be represented as shared on
equal terms between the Croatian nation and the members of the Serbian nation in Croa-
tia.48
48Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest [The Modern History of Croatia], p. 622.
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4.3.3 Matica hrvatska: transgressing boundaries and antagonising national
identities
Matica hrvatska, a 130-year old Croatian cultural organization that played a cardinal role
in constructing Croatian ‘national consciousness’ during the last decades of the Hapsburg
Monarchy, also got involved in the debate about the socio-political reform and the future
form of SR Croatia. At its Annual Assembly in November 1970 it launched a membership
drive and announced that it would expand its publishing activities to include economic
and political issues. In 1971, it launched the political journal Hrvatski tjednik and the
economic journal Hrvatski gospodarski glasnik through which it got involved in the de-
bates about the socio-economic reform. The circulation of Hrvatski tjednik grew to over
100, 000 within six months after publication and the membership of Matica from 2,323
in 30 branches in November 1970 to 41,000 in 50 branches by December 1971.49 Rather
than articulating a coherent political project for Yugoslavia’s transformation, Matica was
more of a platform for floating disparate grievances and demands outside of the LCY. Its
activities reflected a contradictory position vis-a-vis the liberals’ project. Although the
organization supported the platform of the Tenth Session and the rearticulation of the
forces between the republics and the federation at the expense of the latter, the demands
it floated contradicted the LCC’s understanding of the nature of social division.
Characteristics of its articulatory strategy were transgressions of the social divisions
instituted by the Yugoslavian imaginary. Its publishing activities focused on figures from
the Croatian past – such as the leaders of the Croatian Peasant Party active in old Yu-
goslavia, Croatian medieval feudal kings Zrinski and Frankopan and Ban Jelačić– that
were excluded from the Yugoslavian socialist imaginary as ‘bourgeois’, ‘regressive’, and
‘anti-revolutionary’. The practice of revisiting the past in publishing activities was ac-
companied by pompous opening ceremonies of new Matica branches across SR Croatia,
and celebrations of events in Croatian history and births and deaths of ‘Croatian’ heroes.
The following two quotes from the opening ceremonies of new Matica branches capture
this movement towards the excluded past:
49Rusinow, “The Road to Karadjordjevo [September 1972]”, p. 167.
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Stjepan Radić founded his politics in the Croatian statehood right. He claimed that
Croats were the only Slavic people that managed to preserve their statehood, albeit
in a degenerate form, throughout their 1300 history in these territories. That is why
he demanded that this statehood, which we have preserved in a degenerate form we
must transform into full independence of our state.50
The Zrinski and Frankopan’s are the embodiment of heroism, militancy, devotion
and willingness to sacrifice for the purpose of defending the Croatian homeland.
That is the source of the cult [of Zrinski and Frankopan] and there is no other
comparable in our history. They were feudal lords, but they were also fighters and
embodiments of Croatian statehood.51
Similarly, in the spring of 1971, Matica published the demand to re-erect the public statue
of Ban Jelačić, a 19th century military governor condemned by Marx as reactionary, on
Zagreb’s main square. The square was called Ban Jelačić Square before 1947 when the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia, for ideological reasons, changed its name into the Square
of the Republic.52
The rearticulation of these exuded elements into the meaning of ‘Croatian statehood’
formed part of the debate about the inscription of the notion of ‘republican sovereignty’
into the context of bi-national SR Croatia, opened up by the passage of the amendments
to the 1963 Constitution.53 Matica demanded that SR Croatia be constituted as ‘the
sovereign national state of the Croatian nation’ whereby sovereignty signified the ‘right to
national self-determination including the right to secession’.54 Its publications were filled
with arguments about the incoherence and meaninglessness of conceptualising sovereignty
as shared between different nations in a single territorial unit. According to the logic of
Matica’s publications, sovereignty was in essence an attribute of ‘nations’ and not of the
50An excerpt from Franjo Tuđman’s speech hald at the opening of a Matica branch in Drniš 1971;
transcribed from: Miljenko Bukovčan. “Episode 7: MASPOK”. in: Hrvatsko Proljeće. (Documentary).
Hrvatska Radio Televizija, 2010.
51An excerpt from Matica’s president Ljudevit Jonke’s speech held at the opening of the Matica branch
in Sinj 1971; transcribed from: ibid.
52For a summary of the demand and the debate that emerged in the public regarding the name-change
see: Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 110
53The 1963 Croatian Constitution defined SR Croatia as ‘the socialist democratic state community of
the Croatian nation, established by the power of the working people’ with no mention of sovereignty,
since sovereignty was represented as realised by the working class at the level of the federation. See:
ibid., p. 112
54For the positions articulated in the publications of Matica hrvatska see: Rusinow, The Yugoslav




Matica’s position about the nature of sovereignty undermined the system of social divi-
sions instituted by the Yugoslavian imaginary which, as discussed in the previous chapter,
was founded upon the logic that national difference does not translate into political divi-
sion. It also meant that those active in Matica understood the relationship between Serbs
and Croats in SR Croatia as a relation of power, and the Serbs as a minority in a Croatian
socialist state.56 The articulation of the relationship between Serbs and Croats as a power
relation was also manifested in a wave of publications about the national composition in
employment. In these, Croats were found to be systematically under-represented in the
army, factory management and the administrative organs of the federation and those of
‘their own’ republic.57
Furthermore, the publications represented the problem of Croatian economic exploita-
tion as essentially a matter of national exploitation, as opposed to class. The publications
suggested that the matter could only be adequately resolved by transforming SR Croa-
tia into a ‘socialist nation-state’. Beyond the demand for the retention of the foreign
currency earned in SR Croatia and clear accounts between republics, Matica’s authors
also demanded a separate Croatian currency, a separate National Bank with a governor
appointed by the republican leadership and the independent republican negotiation of for-
eign loans. Beyond the demand of giving more autonomy to republics in decision-making,
the authors demanded that a Croatian National Assembly of Socialist Forces be consti-
tuted as the highest organ of power in SR Croatia, that Croatia be represented in the UN
independently, and that Croatian frontiers be revised at the expense of Herzegovina and
Montenegro.58 These demands suggested that the solution to the existing problems lay
in transforming republics from territorial units into units expressing national power and
thus, political division.
55This is well documented in Perić, Ideje "masovnog pokreta" u Hrvatskoj.
56The debate was resolved with the inclusion of the ‘Serbian nation’ into the notion of ‘sovereignty’.
The SR Croatia was defined as ‘the Socialist Republic of Croatia is the national state of the Croatian
nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, and the State of the nationalities inhabiting it, until
1990. I will come back to this point in the the last chapter.
57Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 124.
58For a summary of demands see: ibid., pp. 125-127; and Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-
1974, p. 305.
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Despite the fact that the floated demands undermined the liberal leadership’s premises
about the nature of social division and unity, they were imbued with positive meaning
in reference to the Tenth Session of the LCC, in opposition to ‘unitarism’ and ‘bureau-
cratic centralism’ and with the aim of realising socialist self-management. However, self-
management was represented more as an instrument for empowering the nation through
decentralization than as an end in itself.59
In sum, by drawing out the figures from the past and infusing the notion statehood
with their national struggles within the context of the debate about the representation of
sovereignty, Matica hrvatska undermined the central position of the National Liberation
Struggle and the Socialist Revolution in the historical foundations of the present. The
floated demands, situated within the context of the rearticulated past, were traces of the
emergence of a new conception of social unity rooted in national divisions and expressed
through territorial units. Within this constellation, ‘Belgrade’, ‘unitarism’ and ‘bureau-
cratic centralism’ took on the meaning of a threat to the Croatian nation in SR Croatia.
Furthermore, the over-representation of the Serbian nation in employment in SR Croatia
was read as an integral component of a ‘Serbian’ ‘centralist’ ‘unitarist’ project against the
‘Croatian nation in SR Croatia’. Although it echoed the position of the liberal leadership
about the necessity of the rearticulation of the relationship between the republics and the
federation at the expense of the latter, unlike the leadership, Matica was thus articulating
an alternative space of representation based on a socialist-nation-centred representation
of social unity and division. The organization however, never mobilized politically to
the extent that it linked up all these demands into an actual political project, nor did it
explicitly contest the socialist order as such. The student movement, which I will discuss
in the following section, did mobilize politically to exert pressure on the LCY.
59This is well documented in: Perić, Ideje "masovnog pokreta" u Hrvatskoj, pp. 98-102.
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4.3.4 The Student movement: linking demands to action and transgressing
the boundaries of politics
In April 1971, for the first time in Yugoslavian history, students that were not members
of the LCY were elected as leaders of the Student Union at the University of Zagreb.60
They organized a student movement which brought together the demands of the liberal
leadership and themes from Matica hrvatska’s publications.
In the debate about the constitutional definition of the republic, the Student Union
was in agreement with Matica and it opposed the constitution of sovereignty in SR Croa-
tia as shared. Furthermore, the students demanded that Croatia be constituted as a
sovereign socialist state of the Croatian nation, that its statehood be represented contin-
uous with historical traditions from the 10th century, a reform of the export and foreign
currency system in Yugoslavia so that the money earned in SR Croatia stays in SR Croa-
tia, changes in the composition of employment in the military apparatus in SR Croatia so
that it was representative of SR Croatia’s national composition, the usage of the Croatian
language in the army administration in Croatia, and serving military service in one’s own
republic.61 Echoing the opening ceremonies of Matica branches, in the summer of 1971
the student body commemorated the 100th anniversary of Stjepan Radić’s death. After
speeches delivered at the Student Centre in Zagreb, 1, 500 people marched across Zagreb
to bring flowers to Radić’s grave, carrying ‘old’ pre-socialist Croatian flags.62
Most importantly, on November 1971, the Student Union organized a strike claiming
to be the most revolutionary segment of the working class, without consulting the hege-
monic LCC/LCY. The strike was organized in the context of a growing disunity within
the LCC about the foreign currency issue and the nature of the politicizations external
to the party. The cardinal demand behind the student strike was the decentralization of
60The leadership included Dražen Budiša, Goran Dodig, Ante Padžak, Zvonimir Čičak. Zvonimir Čičak
even told students accepting his nomination for the student pro-rector, that they should not vote for him
because he was not a party member, but a Croatian patriot and a practising Catholic. See: Rusinow,
“The Road to Karadjordjevo [September 1972]”, p. 167.
61The students also articulated demands for the improvement of student living conditions. For a sum-
mary of student demands see: Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008], p. 547; and Tihomir
Ponoš. Na rubu revolucije: studenti ’71 [On the Verge of a Revolution: the Students ’71]. Zagreb: Profil,
2007, pp. 123, 168-169.
62Ibid., pp. 135-137.
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the foreign currency system for the purpose of realising self-management.63 The student
leaders represented their movement as ‘an authentic movement, stemming from the prob-
lems of our homeland and our people, which [...] aims to contribute, in terms of content,
to the struggle for a socialist, self-managerial Croatia’.64
Following the antagonistic frontiers set by the liberal leadership on the Tenth Session,
the students imbued the strike with a ‘positive’ meaning by representing it as antagonis-
tic to ‘unitarists’ and ‘bureaucratic centralists’. They voiced their support for the liberal
leadership’s demand and declared that they expected the student strike to expand into a
general one that would paralyze SR Croatia until the foreign currency demand was met.65
The aim of the students was to bring a single demand to the fore and unite Matica, the
liberals in the LCC, the students and the workers in SR Croatia into a common political
project. However, the attempt to broaden the scope of the strike failed because only a few
factories joined in. Furthermore, the liberal leadership condemned their strategy. They
called for the resolution of the foreign currency issue through existing federal/republican
institutions because the strike undermined their position in the LCC and in the debate
about the foreign currency issue at the federal level.66 The 12 day long strike was a break-
ing point in the progression of the Croatian Spring, as it meant that the ‘liberal’ leadership
of the LCC was unable to maintain order in its own republic.
In sum, the student movement mobilized into a strike demanding the transformation
of the rules about the distribution of foreign currency within the federation. Its objective
was to expand to include the whole of the working class in SR Croatia and strengthen the
position of the liberal fraction within the LCC. However, by striking, the students chal-
lenged the LCY’s hegemonic position in organizing the working class in Yugoslavia, one of
the central tenets of the Yugoslavian imaginary. Furthermore, the resemblance between
Matica’s publications and the debates in student meetings and publications, rendered
visible that the students understood the working class which they mobilized in national
63For a collection of student banners and slogans see: Ponoš, Na rubu revolucije: studenti ’71 [On the
Verge of a Revolution: the Students ’71], pp. 179-180.
64Dražen Budiša quoted in: ibid., p. 157.
65Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest [The Modern History of Croatia], pp. 626-627.
66Ponoš, Na rubu revolucije: studenti ’71 [On the Verge of a Revolution: the Students ’71], pp. 185-186.
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terms. They failed to articulate a political project that would draw together Matica, the
liberals in the LCC and the national working class. Their transgressions within the con-
text of a disunified LCC and the expansion of the activities of Matica hrvatska, were read
as the expression and expansion of disorder by the central party and state institutions.
In response, the central party organs applied so-called ‘administrative measures’.
4.4 The Hegemonic Response: Excluding the Movement and In-
cluding the Logic
Although the strike failed to unify the actors into a common project and mobilize the
Croatian working class, the Yugoslavian leadership represented it as the expression of the
homogenization of the ‘Croatian nation’ and the co-optation of ‘nationalist positions’ by
the ‘liberals’ in the LCC. The politicization of the student body under a non-communist
leadership was also read as a sign that the liberalization of the political space went so
far as to endanger LCY’s hegemonic position in representing the interests of the working
class.
On December 1st 1971, two days before the students halted the strike, at the Eleventh
Session of the LCY Presidency in Karađorđevo, Tito distanced himself from the Croa-
tian leadership because of their ‘rotten liberalism’ in the face of a developing ‘counter-
revolution’.67 Aware that all actors imbued their demands with a ‘positive’ meaning by
articulating them in opposition to the enemy ‘unitarism’, Tito claimed that they misrep-
resented and twisted the notion, to advance demands against the unity of Yugoslavia. In
his own words:
I disagree with speaking constantly about unitarism and have asked to determine
once and for all what exactly is meant by unitarianism. If it means ‘the unitarianism
of the Yugoslavian Monarchy’, then I oppose it. If it means ‘the residues of dogmatic
thought’ I am also against it. But if it means ‘the unity of our country’ as an
indivisible whole, then I stand for it. I am for a unified Yugoslavia. Then it does
67Ponoš, Na rubu revolucije: studenti ’71 [On the Verge of a Revolution: the Students ’71], pp. 195-197;
Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, pp. 129-130; andRusinow, The Yugoslav
Experiment 1948-1974, p. 308.
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not mean unitarism but simply our unity. [. . . ]68
Furthermore, he maintained that the constitutional amendments, which were passed to
enhance the self-managing capacity of the republics, had already diminished the threat of
‘unitarism’ in Yugoslavia. In the post-amendment period, communists had to shift their
forces to the struggle against ‘nationalists’ and ‘chauvinists’ who ‘enjoyed a broad base of
support in SR Croatia’.69 The student strike was represented as ‘counter-revolutionary’
and Matica hrvatska as a ‘very strong parallel party [...] which is against the Yugoslavian
order’ that ‘advocates a Pavelić [fascist] type of state’.70 Tito claimed that the condition of
possibility for their emergence was the ideological crisis in the LCY. The events rendered
visible that communists themselves failed to grasp the ‘true’ nature of anti-socialist phe-
nomena.71 The counter-revolution was possible because of LCY’s disunity and the ‘false’
belief that the LCY is a ‘federation of different Leagues of Communists’ and that the
federal party organs do not have the right to intervene in republican matters.72 Further-
more, he criticised ‘some communists’ for dividing up the working class by republic, and
reaffirmed the position that the working class is essentially indivisible and Yugoslavian.73
Although Tito never named the liberals in the LCC explicitly, he was clearly referring to
them when discussing the ideological crisis.
To resolve the problem of ideological confusion, Tito called for the re-affirmation of
democratic centralism and the intensification of Marxist education in schools, workers
organizations and in the party itself.74 Furthermore, he maintained the deployment of
‘administrative measures’ was necessary because the events in Croatia rendered visible
that ‘Yugoslavian democracy was abused excessively by the enemies of the Yugoslavian
68Tito’s keynote speech to the 21th Session of LCY Presidency in Karađorđevo, published in: Josip Broz
Tito. “Korijeni, uzroci i klasna suština nacionalizma [The roots, cases, and class essence of nationalism]”.
In: Nacionalno pitanje u djelima klasika marksizma u dokumentima i praksi KPJ-SKJ [The National
Question in Marxists Classi and in LCY’s Theory and Practice]. Ed. by Leopold Kobsa, Ines Šaškor, and
Vjekoslav Koprivnjak. Zagreb: Centar društvenih djelatnosti Saveza socijalističke omladine Hrvatske,
1978, p. 527.
69Ibid., p. 527.
70Josip Broz Tito. “Closing statement at the 21st LCY Presidency Session”. In: The National Question.






community’.75 Tito’s position became the legitimate representation of the events in SR
Croatia. To re-establish order and suture the dislocated political space on the 28th Ses-
sion of the LCC the liberals were forced to resign from the LCY; the leaders of the stu-
dent strike were arrested and many imprisoned for counter-revolutionary activity. Matica
hrvatska was shut down and its publications put out of commission for anti-constitutional
behaviour. The purge continued throughout 1973 and included writers, film-makers, uni-
versity professors in SR Croatia as well as the liberal leaderships of other republics.76
In sum, the regime responded to the events in Croatia by reducing them as a whole
to a single ‘nationalist’ denominator and attributing the politicizations with a unity that
they did not posses in themselves. All the actors were reduced to the expression of the en-
emy of the ‘brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities’ and treated
as expressions of a counter-revolution. Furthermore, the regime retroactively forged an
alleged secret ‘Counter-revolutionary Committee of the Fifty’ which supposedly consisted
of students, ‘liberals’ in the LCC, and Matica members, and coordinated the alleged
nationalist counter-revolution.77
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have examined the politicization of the Croatian nation during the Croa-
tian Spring at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s. I have argued that a series
of changes in the emerging conditions of the 1960s formed the conditions of possibility for
the emergence of the movement. I showed that, in terms of demands and strategies, the
movement was neither coherent nor unified. Rather, it consisted of a variety of demands
that, in a very general sense, drew on the logic that republics in Yugoslavia should become
sources of sovereignty and power. However, the different actors represented sovereignty
and the nature of social divisions in conflicting and incompatible ways. While, the ‘liberal’
leadership remained within the boundaries of the Yugoslavian imaginary and its consti-
75Tito, “Closing statement at the 21st LCY Presidency Session”, p. 173.
76For details about the purge see: Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 131
77Tito, “Korijeni, uzroci i klasna suština nacionalizma [The roots, cases, and class essence of national-
ism]”, p. 525.
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tutive system of social divisions, Matica hrvatska and the student body transgressed the
boundaries of the ‘sayable’ by floating and articulating demands that translated national
difference into social division. These demands were situated within spaces of representa-
tion that contested the representation of history the Yugoslavian imaginary was founded
upon. Furthermore, the student movement challenged the rules of the existing order by
calling for a general strike in SR Croatia and by attempting to forge an alliance between
the working class, the ‘liberals’ and the Matica. I have also argued that the regime’s read-
ing of events gave the movement a unity that could not be read off from the articulated
demands and deployed strategies.
Lastly, it is important to note that both the emergence of the Croatian Spring and the
hegemonic act that reckoned with it and gave it meaning, were possible precisely because
of the indeterminacy of the notion of Yugoslavian identity and the constitutive tension
between self-management and brotherhood and unity. The advancement of demands for
the realisation of the former and the decentralization of power, could easily be represented
as endangering Yugoslavian unity. Furthermore, despite the exclusion of all of the actors
the logic that they, shared in a general sense became part of the Yugoslavian imaginary
horizon through the 1974 Constitution. Yugoslavian sovereignty was pluralized and con-
stituted as derivative of the sovereignty of Yugoslavia’s republics. In the following chapter,
I will examine the manner in which the Yugoslavian identity, as a subject position, was
sedimented through the 1974 Constitution and how the links between ‘nation’, ‘republic’,
‘working class’ were articulated into a coherent whole.
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CHAPTER V
Decontesting Yugoslavian Identity: Unity, Hierarchy
and Self-Management
5.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter 2, in this chapter I trace the
identitary logic through which a unified representation of Yugoslavian society was consti-
tuted and sedimented into institutional forms. I focus on Yugoslavia’s last Constitution,
which was promulgated three years after the political exclusions of the actors of the Croat-
ian Spring discussed in the previous chapter. At the time, Yugoslavia’s 1974 Constitution
was the world’s longest. It consisted of a long list of Basic Principles and 406 articles.1
As I have discussed in Chapter 1, the constitution has been identified as a weakness
that caused Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the emergence of nationalism. The existing
literature criticizes it for sending out contradictory messages, being incomprehensible to
ordinary citizens and failing to adequately represent the members of the Yugoslavian com-
munity.2 Some authors saw in it an attempt ‘kill nationalism’3, while others blame it for
being the root of later problems in Yugoslavia.4 However, at the time of its promulga-
tion, the Constitution was represented by Tito as embodying a ‘more consistent solution
1Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, p. 326.
2John R. Lampe. Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country. Cambrdige: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2000, p. 306.
3Lydall, Yugoslavia in Crisis, p. 238.
4Kate Hudson. Breaking the South Slav Dream: the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia. London: Pluto Press,
2003, p. 5.
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to the national question’.5 The president of the Federal Assembly claimed that it had
(re)arranged the relations within the federation in a unique way which ‘had no precedent
in the history of federal structures’ and that it created the conditions of possibility for
‘the working class to attain a dominant role in all spheres of social life’.6 In this sense, the
importance of Yugoslavia’s constitutional arrangement lay primarily in its sedimentation,
through institutional forms, of a specific conception of Yugoslavian unity/identity. Since
its failures to forge unity in the long run were also the very cracks out of which new
democratic and/or national identities emerged in the 1980s, understanding the CDU’s
emergence necessitates fleshing out the identitary logic that underpinned the order out of
which the party emerged.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the manner in which Yugoslavian identity,
understood here as a subject position through which individuals are produced as social
actors, was decontested through this constitutional arrangement. I argue that decontesta-
tion operated in a hierarchical way, whereby an overarching working class subject position
was designated as the primary site of legitimate politics and as containing, limiting and
structuring different yet equal national subject positions. These positions were considered
to be concomitant with the federal territorial units, but not politically identical to them.
In this sense, I argue, the working class subject position determined the political essence
of national and/or republican and provincial subjectivities. Furthermore, I argue that the
hierarchical articulation between national/territorial subjectivities and the working class
subject was cemented through the element ‘self-management’ and made possible by the
multiple meanings it attained within the order. In this sense, ‘self-management’ can be
understood as an empty signifier that embodied the impossible fullness of the Yugoslavian
community.
Drawing on James Tully’s conceptualization of constitutional identity as a four dimen-
sional phenomenon, I advance this argument by first examining the prevailing system of
5Josip Broz Tito. “Yugoslav Sovereignty-the Sovereignty of all Republics”. In: The National Question.
Beograd: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1983, p. 177.
6Mijalko Todorivić. “Report on the Final Draft of the S.F.R.Y. Constitution by Mijalko Todorović”. In:
The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Ljubljana: Dopisna Delavska Univerza,
1974, pp. 41, 48.
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rules (rights, duties and powers) through which the identities of political actors and their
mutual relations was constituted. Thereafter, in the second section, I examine the basic
principles, values and goods that were brought to bear on those identities. In the third
section, I examine the systems of governance and procedures that were to guide their
conduct as members of the Yugoslavian community. In the fourth section, I examine the
institutions through which the unity of the community was both sedimented/reproduced
and through which the terms of unity could be changed or amended.7 In the conclusion,
after rehearsing my main points, I reflect on the role that the element ‘self-management’
played in the hierarchical identitary logic, and the introduce the following chapter.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important that the limits of my discussion are
clearly specified. The point of this chapter is not to assess the ability of the constitutional
rules to forge unity in practice, but simply to flesh out the identitary logic that grounded
the order. In this chapter, I look at the 1974 Constitution as a hegemonic system of rules
that sediment, in institutional form, assumptions about the essence, form, direction and
unity of a community and draw out these dimensions. In the following chapters, I look
into the effects that the hegemonic system of rules had in practice. In Chapter 6, I will
look into the (in)ability of its institutional forms to forge unity within the context of the
protracted economic turned political crisis in the 1980s. In Chapter 7, I will address the
effects that the rules had on the position of SR Serbia in the Yugoslavian order, within
the context of a broader argument about the politicization of national identities and the
emergence of Slobodan Milošević. In Chapter 8, I will look into the manner in which
elements from this Constitution became moments of new political myths, including the
nationalist discourse of the CDU, which emerged during the first democratic elections in
SR Croatia.
5.2 The System of Rules of Mutual Constitution of the Identities
According to the 1974 Constitution, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was:
7For Tully’s conceptualization of constitutional identity see: Tully, Public Philosophy in a New Key,
pp. 194-197
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[...]a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntary united nations
and their Socialist Republics and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvo-
dina and Kosovo, which are constituent parts of the Socialist Republic of Serbia,
based on the power of self-management by the working class and all working people.
It is at the same time a socialist, self-management democratic community of working
people and citizens and of nations and nationalities having equal rights.8
The nations, the nationalities, the citizens, the working class and working people were
represented as subject positions constituting a unified Yugoslavian identity. These sub-
ject positions were not constituted along the same axis. By being attributed with power,
the working class and the working people were represented as superior vis-a-vis all other
subject positions within the order. The working class was constituted as the primary
subject of legitimate politics while the legitimate terrain of politics was constituted as
determined by its demands.
Since they were not attributed with power in themselves, national subjectivities were
constituted along a subordinate axis and ‘fixed’ as mutually equal. By constituting ‘equal-
ity’ as their very essence, demands for realising national equality were decontested into
the legitimate political terrain for the expression of national subjectivities. However, since
national equality was essentially a relational and binding attribute, this decontestation
limited the content that the demands for realising equality could take on; they were le-
gitimate within the existing order to the extent that they contributed to the creation of
a level playing field for all national subjects.
The rights and duties attributed to Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities reflected
the hierarchical relationship between the nation and the working class constitutive of Yu-
goslavism. National subjectivities were constituted as ‘equal’ through a set of rules on
the cultural terrain. Citizens were given the right to opt for a nation or nationality, to
express their culture and use their language and alphabet freely. Propagating and practis-
ing national inequality and inciting national, racial or religious hatred was represented as
unconstitutional. The right of citizens not to identify with the national subject positions
was also protected. In this sense, national identification was constituted as a choice, not
8The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Ljubljana: Dopisna Delavska Univerza,
1974, Article 1.
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as an essential attribute that political subjects a priori possess.9 Nations and nationalities
were decontested as subjects entitled to instruction in their own language on the terri-
tory of each republic and autonomous province.10 However, the particular languages and
the particular nations/nationalities they corresponded to were omitted from the federal
constitution.11
The articulation of ‘nations’ with ‘self-determination’ and the ‘right to secession’, in
the Basic Principles of the constitutional order, signalled that they possessed a degree
of subjectivity that transgressed the cultural terrain. However, these attributes were
represented as somewhat redundant in the post-National Liberation/Socialist Revolution
period, since nations had, according to the constitution, already ‘willingly’ and ‘freely’
expressed the desire to unite into a socialist federation. Self-determination and the right
to succession were not constituted as formal rights that define national subjects but as
abstract attributes that did not translate into political power.12 Furthermore, secession
itself was deemed unconstitutional and all of the members of the community, including
the nations and nationalities, attributed with powers to struggle against it:
It shall be the inviolable and inalienable right and duty of the nations and national-
ities of Yugoslavia, working people and citizens to protect and defend the indepen-
dence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and the social system of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia[...]13
By constituting ‘equality’ as the essence of national subjectivities and substantiating it
in terms of cultural rights, the nations and nationalities were decontested as cultural at-
tributes ascribed to an empowered overarching working class subject position.
The hierarchical relationship between the working class and the nations and nation-
alities was sedimented through the manner in which Yugoslavia’s territorial units were
constituted. Republics and autonomous regions were represented as sites for exercising
‘the sovereignty of the people and the working class’,14 whereby ‘the people’ translated into
particular national subjects in republican constitutions. ‘The federation’ was constituted
9The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 170.
10Ibid., Article 171.
11They were constituted as particulars in the republican constitutions.




as a site for exercising sovereignty on the (limited) terrain of ‘common interests’, that
included security, independence, territorial integrity and the common market.15 Unlike
nations and nationalities, the republics were named in their particularity in the Con-
stitution, signalling that they were more important elements of the federal order than
the national subjects. The sovereignty attributed to republics within the federation was
derivative of national and working class sovereignty. However, following the logic of the
constitutional order which assigned power to the working class as a group and not to na-
tions, the sovereignty of nations in republics was derivative of the working class subject,
and not vice-versa. Although the republics ‘belonged’ to nations according to Article
1, their political character was thus grounded in the working class subject. The dis-
articulation of the link between ‘territorial unit’ and (particular) ‘national subject’ was
further reflected in the decontestation of ‘sovereignty’ as shared between different na-
tions/nationalities in republics. The SR Croatia, for example, was decontested as ‘the
national state of the Croatian nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia and the
state of all nationalities inhabiting it’, and also as founded upon the sovereignty of the
working people.16 Paradoxically, as I will show when discussing the federal institutions,
the rules for the constitution of federal bodies implied that there was a political congru-
ence between nation/territorial unit.
The hierarchical relationship between class and nation was reflected in the constitu-
tive role that the self-managing producer played in forging a sense of overall unity and
coherence. The practice of self-management was constituted as the very essence of the
working class subject and a channel to exercise his/her power within the existing order.
Self-management was constituted as the right:
[...] on the basis of which every working man, on equal footing with other working
15According to Article 244 this included sovereignty, equality, national freedom, independence, terri-
torial integrity, security, social self-defence, the defence of the country, the international position of the
country and its relations with other states and international organizations, the system of socialist socio-
economic relations based on self-management, the unity of the political system, the basic democratic
freedoms and rights of man and citizen, the solidarity and social security of working people and citizens,
and the unity of the Yugoslavian market.
16Ustav Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske [The Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Croatia]. Nar-
dodne Novine, 08/1974. [Electronic record]. url: https : / / www . pravo . unizg . hr / _download /
repository/Ustav_Socijalisticke_RH_1974.pdf (visited on 05/12/2016), Article 1. and Article
2.
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people, shall decide on his own labour and on the conditions and results of labour,
on his own and common interests [...] and shall exercise power and manage social
affairs;17
The centrality of the working class subject was reflected in the extensive list of workers’
rights and duties, as well as those of labour organizations in the Constitution. Approxi-
mately 140 Articles served exclusively to delimit the working class subject and substan-
tiate the channels for realising his/her self-managerial rights and duties. Since, as I will
discuss in the following subsections, all institutions were understood as self-managing or-
gans, the power of the working class was also embodied in the systems of governance and
institutions for cooperation and discussion.
In the material sense, the practice of self-management was rooted in social ownership,
constituted as the name of the objects that the workers manage, the basis of the pro-
duction system and material foundation for various Associations of Labour. The latter
were constituted as institutional forms wherein workers exercised self-management and
enter into agreements about their economic interests and relations, thereby giving rise to
an economic system based on deliberation in place of market mechanisms.18 The Asso-
ciations of Labour, as I will argue in the following subsections, fed into the systems of
governance and institutions for discussion, as they were the sites out of which working
class subjectivities were delegated from the work place upwards to higher instances of
power.
Furthermore, self-management was constituted as the very basis, limit and direction
for the realization of republican, provincial and communal rights and duties.19 In this
sense, the territorial units resembled the Associations of Labour and were decontested as
channels for the self-management of the Yugoslavian working class. Territorial boundaries
were thus constituted as administrative units and not as expressions of different national
political subjects. As I will show in the following sections, the self-managing character
of republics was central to the decontestation of Yugoslavian identity into a hierarchy
between class and nation.
17The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles II.
18Ibid., Basic Principles III.
19Ibid., Basic Principles III.
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Reflecting the reality of a single party socialist regime, the LCY was constituted as
the only organized political actor empowered to substantiate the interests of the working
class subject and maintain order. Its role was defined as:
[...] the organized leading ideological and political force of the working class, working
people in building socialism, realizing the solidarity of the working people and the
brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia’s people.
and:
[...] a primary initiator and exponent of political activity aimed at safeguard-
ing and further developing the socialist revolution and socialist relations of self-
management.20
In this regard, the LCY’s role was transcendental because it aimed to reconcile, from
within itself, existing and/or potential political differences, into a unified political body
and securing its own hegemonic position. To broaden its platform of action, other socio-
political organizations (the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia, the
Federation of Trade Unions, the War Veterans Federation, and the Youth League) were
also constituted as legitimate political forces but were placed under its strict tutelage.
The role of the LCY and other socio-political organizations was:
[...] to discuss social questions and take political initiative in all fields of social
life, adjust views; take political positions regarding the solution of these questions,
the guidance of social development, the realization of the rights and interests of
the working people and citizens, the realization of the equality of the nations and
nationalities, and the promotion of socialist self-management democratic relations,
submit proposals for the solution of social questions, and issue guidelines to their
delegates to the assemblies of socio political communities.21
In other words, the LCY and its affiliated organizations, were constituted as the very
space of legitimate politics wherein the hierarchically decontested Yugoslavian identity
was to be realised on a day-to-day basis. Furthermore, as I will argue in the following
sections, these organizations also served as the pool for recruiting delegates for the gov-
erning institutions.
20The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles VIII.
21Ibid., Basic Principles VIII.
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In sum, nations, nationalities, the working class, and the working people were all con-
stituted as the members of the Yugoslavian community. Their relationship was fixed in
hierarchical terms; the working class was constituted as the locus of power in the order
and the primary subject of legitimate politics. National subjectivities were decontested as
expressions of different cultural attributes accommodated within and determined by the
working class subject. Within this constellation, their political essence was rooted in their
mutual equality. The hierarchical relationship between class and nation, constitutive of
Yugoslavian unity, was also reflected in definition of the territorial units as self-managing
bodies founded upon the power of the working class and ‘belonging’ to nations. The LCY
and its affiliated institutions were constituted as the space for realising the hierarchical
logic in practice, articulating the meaning of ‘self-management’ and safeguarding ‘broth-
erhood and unity’.
5.3 The Principles, Values and Goods Constituting Yugoslavian
Identity
The system of values brought to bear on the identification of the members of the commu-
nity further reproduced the hierarchical relationship between class and nation constitutive
of the Yugoslavian identity. The system of values infusing the order with a ‘positive’ char-
acter, derived from the working class subject and the self-managing project constitutive
of his/her identity. The principle basing the entire socio-political landscape was consti-
tuted as the tenet ‘from each according to his abilities; to each according to his labour’.22
Self-managing bodies and communities, state agencies, the working people and citizens
were to structure their practices and cooperation in accordance with it.23
The realisation of this principle in practice, through existing institutional forms, was
equated with the emancipation of the Yugoslavian working class subject. By practising
self-management, s/he transcended historically conditioned socio-economic inequalities,
22The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles II.
23Ibid., Basic Principles IX.
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eliminated the antagonism between labour and capital and precluded the return to a
socio-economic system based on the exploitation and alienation of man.24 The very raison
d’état of the Yugoslavian order was constituted as the realisation of this emancipatory
principle:
The freedoms, rights and duties of the man and citizen, as spelled out by the present
Constitution, are an inseparable part and expression of democratic socialist self-
management relations in which man is becoming liberated from [...] exploitation
and arbitrariness and with his labour creating the conditions for the all-round and
free expression and protection of his personality and respect for human dignity.25
The values brought to bear on identification – freedom, equality and unity – derived from
the principle underpinning the order and served the purpose of bringing it into being. To
bring these values into being, cooperation between political subjects was to be conducted
on the basis of reciprocity and solidarity. Working class unity was constituted as ‘the
awareness that the working people can only realise their lasting interests on the basis of
these [reciprocity and solidarity] principles’.26
The institutional landscape delimiting the terrain of legitimate politics was constituted
as stemming from this position of man and serving him/her and his/her role in society.27
In this sense, the socio-economic system was constituted as a place for realizing‘the eco-
nomic and social security of working man’, on the basis of ‘solidarity, reciprocity and
socialist humanism’ and for equalizing ‘the conditions of life and work’ and transcending
‘differences stemming from economic underdevelopment and other unequal conditions’.28
Within this constellation, self-management was constituted as a means for emancipat-
ing the working class subject and as the state of the full realisation of his/her freedom,
equality, unity, reciprocity and solidarity. The whole constitutional order was weaved
around a utopian future projection of a ‘society of free producers’ and the institutional
forms structuring the terrain of legitimate politics were designed for the purpose of bring-
ing that society into being. Consequently, the values brought to bear on the identification
of national subjects, both derived from this emancipatory project and served the purpose
24The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles II.
25Ibid., Basic Principles II.
26Ibid., Basic Principles II.
27Ibid., Basic Principles II.
28Ibid., Basic Principles V.
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of bringing it into being. The political interests of each nation and nationality separately
as well as all together were constituted as:
[...] socialist social relations based on self management by working people and the
protection of the socialist self-management system; [...] the brotherhood and unity of
the nations and nationalities; the uniform interests of the working class and solidarity
among workers and all working people; freedoms for the all around development of
the human personality and for the rapprochement of nations and nationalities [...];
the unification and adjustment of efforts to develop the economic foundations of a
socialist society [...];a system of socio-economic relations and uniform foundations
for a political system which will ensure the common interests of the working class
[...] and the equality of nations and nationalities [...]29
By defining the political terrain of national subjectivities in terms of the working class
emancipatory project, all national subjects were decontested as forming part of a tran-
scendental working class and participating in its emancipation on equal terms. In the
process of resolving the labour/capital antagonism and bringing about the society of free
producers into being, nations/nationalities were constituted as liberating themselves. The
realisation of national equality was constituted as contingent upon the realisation of the
emancipatory project and possible, in its fullness, only if the economic conditions of social
life and work of the working people equalize across the federation. For the purpose of
equalizing economic conditions, special attention to, and resources for, the development
of underdeveloped republics and autonomous provinces were constituted as part and par-
cel of the common Yugoslavian interest.30 In this sense, economic redistribution practices
were constituted as the legitimate channel for resolving (potential) national antagonisms,
together with the cultural rights and duties, discussed in the previous section.
The values constitutive of the emancipatory project were also brought to bear on the
cooperation between republics and autonomous regions at the federal level. The basic
principles structuring decision-making in federal agencies were agreement, solidarity, reci-
procity and equal participation by territorial units and responsibility for the their own
development as well as the development of the whole socialist community.31 As discussed
in the previous section, the territorial units were decontested as sites for realising workers’
29The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles I.
30Ibid., Basic Principles III.
31Ibid., Basic Principles I.
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self-management. In this sense, both the values brought to bear on cooperation and the
political content of that cooperation, were determined by the working class emancipatory
project. However, although the content of cooperation aimed at realizing, in its last con-
sequence, a society of free producers, the decision-making process also aimed at realising
national equality. As I will show in in the following subsections, different institutional
mechanisms at the federal level were put in place as channels for realising the mutual
equality of nations and nationalities.
The education system was constituted as a channel for fostering and reproducing the
values underpinning the order:
The system of upbringing and education shall be based on the achievements of mod-
ern science, especially Marxism as the foundation of scientific socialism, and shall
be instrumental in training young people for work and self-management, educating
them in the spirits and achievements of Socialist Revolution, socialist code of ethics,
self-managing democracy, socialist patriotism, brotherhood and unity, the equality
of nations and nationalities and socialist internationalism.32
The constitutive role of self-management within the Yugoslavian system of values and
principles was reflected in the representation of all practices distorting it as ‘anti-constitutional’.
These included:
[...] any form of production management or other social activities, or any form of
distribution that distorts social-relationships based on the above defined position of
man[...]through bureaucratic arbitrariness, technocratic usurpation, privileges based
on the monopoly of management of the means of production, the appropriation of
social resources on a group property basis, any other mode of privatization of these
resources, in the form of private property or particularistic selfishness, or through any
form of restricting the working class in playing its historical role in socio-economic
and political relations, in organizing power for itself and for all working people [...]33
In other words, self-management embodied the very essence of the values and principles
delimiting the Yugoslavian subject position.
In sum, the basic principles and values brought to bear on the members of the Yu-
goslavian community reproduced the hierarchical identitary logic, since they derived from
the working class subject and its emancipatory project. The values brought to bear on
32The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Basic Principles V.
33Ibid., Basic Principles II.
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national subjectivities originated in the ideal of working class emancipation which, as a
consequence, constituted also ‘true’ national emancipation. The centrality of the work-
ing class subject, apparent at the level of principles and values, was in stark contrast to
the constitution of national identities as categories one can opt in and out of. National
difference was not constituted as a value in itself, but as something to be contained and
decontested within a broader working class emancipatory project.
5.4 The Relations of Governance, Rules and Procedures for Prac-
tices
The relations of governance constituting the Yugoslavian political landscape were a sedi-
mentation of the hierarchical identitary logic of Yugoslavism. Two mutually constitutive
systems of governance were introduced for the purposes of exercising power of the working
class over itself and decontest national subjectivities as mutually equal.
The delegate system was founded upon the emancipatory project discussed in the
previous subsection. It was constituted as a system of governance that would realise the
‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ in institutional form, ‘an institutionally new and special
kind of link between self-management and government’ and as ‘the universal principle un-
derlying the entire socio-political system of Yugoslavia’.34 The delegate system was basi-
cally a channel for transmitting workers’ self-management from lower labour centred units
(self-managing organizations and communities,35 local communities,36 and socio-political
organizations37), to higher to socio-political territorial units (communes, provinces, re-
34The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Appendix.
35These included: the Organizations of Associated Labour; the organizations of business associations;
the banks; the insurance communities; agricultural and other cooperatives; the contractual organizations
of associated labour; the self-managing communities of interests; the local communities and the work
communities that performed affairs for state and other agencies and organizations. See:ibid., Appendix.
36Self-managing territorial units concerned with local issues. In rural areas, such communities were
established for one or several villages and in urban areas for individual sections of a city. They did not
perform any function of public power and in this sense differed from socio-political communities such as
communes, provinces, republics and the federation. See: ibid., Appendix.
37Political bodies of working people organized on a programmatic socialist oriented platform. These
include the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yu-
goslavia, the Federation of Trade Unions, the War Veterans Federations and The Youth League. See:
ibid., Appendix.
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publics and the Federation). Through it, workers were directly exercising ‘their rights,
duties and responsibilities of organized participation in the performance of the assemblies
of socio-political communities’.38
The delegate system sedimented a relation of governance whereby, in theory, workers
were exercising power over themselves. Delegation, represented in contrast to represen-
tation, assured that the interests of the lower units were not (mis)represented by inter-
mediaries, but delegated upward in their literal form. According to the constitution, the
delegates were to take positions in accordance with what was previously decided in the
bodies that had elected them to higher instances of power, thus, reflecting the lower levels
without any alternations/modifications.39
The delegate system served as a mechanism for constituting a network of assemblies
which formed the very backbone of the Yugoslavian institutional landscape. An assembly
was constituted as ‘a social, self-managing body and the supreme organ of power within
the framework of the rights and duties of its socio-political community’.40 In this sense,
it was the very terrain for the working class subject to exercise power over him/herself.
The members of delegations were to be elected by workers in basic self-managing organi-
zations and communities from among their members, and the composition to be such as
to ensure the delegation of the interests of workers in all phases of the working process.41
The candidates for the members of delegations of basic self-managing organizations were
appointed by the Socialist Alliance of the Working People or trade union organizations,
which were extensions of the LCY.42
The assembly system was constituted as a channel for transforming self-management
by the working people in various labour associations into ‘a unified system of self-management
by and for the power of the working class and all working people’.43 The system expanded
from the communal assemblies, which were constituted as the basic socio-political unit in
the system, all the way up to the bicameral Federal Assembly. A list of candidates for
38The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 133.




43Ibid., Basic Principles IV.
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the assemblies of the communes would be drawn up within the Socialist Alliance of the
Working People, including delegates from organizations of associated labour, local com-
munities and socio-political organizations. The delegates in communal assemblies would,
on the one hand, elect delegates for the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslavian Assembly
directly while also electing the delegates to the assemblies of republics and autonomous
provinces. These assemblies, in turn, delegated members to the Chamber of Republics
and Provinces at the federal level.44 I will discuss the differences in the constitution and
operation of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly in the following subsection. For
now, it is important to note that both chambers formed part of an extensive delegate
chain, rooted in the self-management of the working class subject at the work place.
Since all of the delegates to the assemblies were members of the socialist organizations
under the competency of the LCY, the party was both the ideological hegemon and the
‘source’ for recruiting delegates at all levels of governance. In this regard, the systems of
governance further sedimented LCY’s hegemonic position within the Yugoslavian order.
In sum, the system of governance reproduced the hierarchical identitary logic constitu-
tive of Yugoslavism, whereby a working class identity was designated as the primary site
of legitimate politics and different national subjectivities decontested as mutually equal
and included within the framework of the working class emancipatory project. Through
the system of governance self-management transformed from a principle of organizing eco-
nomic relations into a universal principle organizing the entire Yugoslavian institutional
landscape. At the level of federal institutions, the delegate system also served as a chan-
nel for realising the mutually equality of national subjects, which, as I will show in the
following subsection, were constituted as congruent with the territorial divisions of the
SFRY.
44The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 139.
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5.5 Institutions for Discussion and Alternation of Rules and Re-
lations
The institutional framework which delimited and defined the landscape of legitimate pol-
itics and organized it through fixed procedures of discussion, negotiation and decision-
making, sedimented the hierarchical identity logic, albeit through different forms. As
discussed in previous sections, the institutions and territorial units were decontested into
self-managing sites founded upon a working class emancipatory project, and were to serve
as catalysts for bringing the society of free producers into being and realising the mutual
equality of nations and nationalities. Cooperation at the federal level followed the same
logic. To decontest nations as equal, the federal institutional forms were constituted as
self-managerial in content and plural in form. The plurality was sedimented primarily in
territorial terms and, as a consequence, implicitly national. However, the political link
between the ‘nation’ and ‘territorial unit’ was not fully substantiated within the frame-
work of the constitutional order.
The Federal Assembly was constituted as a bicameral ‘body of self-management and
the supreme organ of power within the framework of federal rights’.45 It was the site for
electing delegates for the Federal Executive Council and the Federal and Constitutional
Courts. Its rights and duties were split between two chambers which were constituted
and operated acceding to different procedural logics.46
The Federal Chamber was composed of thirty delegates from self-managing organiza-
tions, communities and socio-political organizations from each republic, and twenty from
45The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 282.
46The Article 283 constituted the competencies of the Assembly of SFRY as 1) to decide on amendments
to the Constitution of the SFRY 2) discuss and lay down the fundamentals od the domestic and foreign
policy of SFRY 3) adopt Social Plan of Yugoslavia, the Federal budget and the Federal Annual Balance
Sheet 4) decide on the alternations of the boundaries of the SFRY 5) deciding on war and peace; ratify
international treaties pertaining to political and military cooperation and those entailing the passage of
new statues or amendments of existing ones 6) formulate the enforcement policy if federal statues and
other regulations and enactments and lay down obligations for federal agencies 7) electing the President
of the Republic and proclaim the election of the Presidency of the SFRY 8) elect and relieve of office of
President and members of the Federal Executive Council 9) elect and relieve of office the President and
the judges of the Constitutional court of Yugoslavia and Federal Court; nominating and relieving of office
the Federal Social Attorney of Self-Management; nominate and relieve of office Federal Secretaries, the
Federal Public Prosecutor, other officials of federal agencies, and members of collective bodies specified
by present constitution 10) exercise political supervision over the work of the Federal executive council
and federal administrative agencies (...)
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each autonomous province. The list of candidates was drawn up by the SAWP and the
delegates elected by the members of communal assemblies, the lowest level of the delegate
system.47 Due to a high level of decentralization in internal politics and foreign relations,
which were under its competency, the Federal Chamber’s cardinal political role was decid-
ing on amendments to the constitutional order through a two-thirds majority vote and in
agreement with the assemblies of all republics and autonomous provinces.48 A minimum
of thirty delegates in the Federal Chamber, the Presidency, the Federal Executive Council
as well as any republican and provincial assembly, had the right to initiate amendments.49
The constitution of the Chamber sedimented the hierarchical identitary logic, although
its decision-making process resulted in forging a single self-managing position and ‘col-
lapsing’ difference. A variety of self-managing working class interests were delegated from
the basic governing units up to the federal institutions following the logic of republican
and provincial parity. The republics were decontested as mutually equal through the
number of delegates to the Chamber, but relatively speaking more powerful than the
provinces. In this sense, although constituted on the basis of plurality, the Chamber
sedimented the power relation between republics and provinces. Furthermore, the parity
rules were constituted as channels for realising the equality of nations and nationalities
and decontesting national subjectivities but, in practice, this was not necessary realised,
given the heterogeneity of the territorial units, which I’ve mapped out in Chapter 3. For
instance, it could be that the delegates from Croatia were Serbs from Croatia and that
the delegates from Vojvodina were Croats from Vojvodina. Equally so, the national dis-
tribution could be skewed within the body, as there could be an overrepresentation of
a single nation through the system of parity territorial representation. However, given
the identitary logic, which constituted delegates as workers not nationals in the political
sense, this was not necessarily a contradiction. Furthermore, the decision-making rule
within the Federal Chamber worked towards dissolving their differences and particulari-
ties into a majority-based decision, with no veto power granted to any of the delegations,
47The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 291.
48Ibid., Article 401. and Article 402.
49Ibid., Article 399.
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with the possibility of one delegation out-voting the other. In this sense, although the
constitution of the body included elements of territorial delegation, the decision-making
worked towards forging unity at the expense of plurality. The importance of this institu-
tional logic within the order was reflected in its competency to amend the terms under
which the Yugoslavian order was constituted. If the majority of the delegates chose to
transform the constitutional rules and the minority had to accept it despite disagreeing.
The Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Federal Assembly, was constituted as
the site for ‘the adjustment of positions’ of the assemblies of republics and autonomous
provinces on the terrain of its competencies.50 In contrast to the Federal Chamber, the
Chamber of Republics and Provinces played a cardinal role in the formation of legislation
and policy, both independently and in agreement with the assemblies of republics and
provinces.51 It was composed of twelve elected delegates from each republican assembly
and eight delegates from each provincial assembly. They were to retain their tenure in
the assemblies that had elected them and articulate the positions of these respective as-
semblies.52 The Chamber was to adjust the positions of the assemblies by deciding on
matters unanimously, with the assent of all of its constitutive delegations.53
The Chamber was the site for delegating particular republican and provincial self-
managerial interest that, due to the unanimous voting procedure, were to translate into
50The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 286.
51According to Article 286, the assemblies of the republics and provinces, in agreement with the Cham-
ber of Republics and Provinces, were responsible for: 1) adopting the Yugoslavian Social Plan 2) for-
mulating policy and passing legislation in areas of the monetary system and currency issue, the foreign
exchange system, external trade, credit and other economic relations with foreign countries;formation of
money and foreign exchange reserves and their use; tariff and non-tariff protection; social price control
for products and services; crediting accelerated development in economically underdeveloped republics
and provinces; taxation of sale of goods and products; the system and sources of funds for financing
the federation; determining the measures for the restriction of the market and the freedom of sale of
goods and services and measures providing a basis for compensation; 3) determining the total volume
of expenditure of the Federal Budget every year; 4) deciding on the establishment of federal funds and
the incurring of federal obligations except for in the cases when federal agencies are authorized to do so
independently; 5) ratifying international treaties that require alternations in legislation in areas within its
jurisdiction. Independently, the Chamber was responsible for: 1) passing laws and temporary measures
2) determining on the proposal by the Presidency of the SFRY the sources and volume of finance and
decide on the contraction of credits and other obligations for the needs of national defence and state
security arising out of extraordinary circumstances 3) reviewing reports by the Federal Executive Council
and federal administrative agencies, exercising supervision over them and through provision of guide-
lines direct their work 4) formulating the policy of enforcement of federal statutes, other regulations and
enactments passed by it.
52The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 292. and Article 296.
53Ibid., Article 295.
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a decision that all delegations converge upon. Despite the difference in the number of
delegates between republics and provinces, this Chamber was also an institutional site
wherein their powers levelled out, since provinces were attributed with veto power just
like republics. While the Federal Chamber of the Assembly was constituted as a site
for the expression of different self-managerial interests, the Chamber of the Republics
and Provinces was thus primarily the site for the expression of different territorial in-
terests which were, in their last consequence, essentially self-managerial. Furthermore,
since these territorial units were constituted as ‘belonging’ to nations and nationalities,
the manner of the Chamber’s constitution and decision-making were represented as insti-
tutional channels for realising the mutual equality of nations and nationalities. Just like
within the Federal Chamber, the fact that nations and territorial units did not overlap was
rendered irrelevant by the constitution of the working class as the locus of power within
the territorial units. Despite being the main Chamber for discussion and decision-making
within the Assembly, the decision-making rule made it more difficult and time consuming
to forge a decision.
Similarly, the Federal Executive Council, the executive body of the Federal Assem-
bly which was elected among its delegates, was also to be constituted in ‘conformity
with the principle of equal representation of republics and corresponding representation
of provinces’ while in the ‘nomination of federal secretaries and other officials in charge of
federal administrative agencies, national composition was to be taken into account’.54 The
judges of the Federal Court, the body responsible for eliminating inequalities in the com-
mon market by resolving economic disputes between individuals, organizations, republics
and provinces, were also to be elected by the Federal Assembly ‘according to the principle
of parity representation of all republics and corresponding representation of provinces.55
The judges of the Constitutional Court, responsible for preserving constitutionality and
order by resolving disputes between republics, provinces and the federation, were elected
by the Federal Assembly following the formula of two judges from each republic and one
54The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 348.
55Ibid., Article 370.
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from each autonomous province.56 The parity mechanisms for the constitution of these
self-managing federal institutions were put in place to decontest nations and nationalities
as mutually equal within a socio-political order founded upon the power of the working
class.
Lastly, the Presidency of the SFRY was constituted as the representative of Yugoslavia
home and abroad, the protector of the constitutional order, the protector of equality of
nations and nationalities, and the commander of the Armed Forces.57 It was designed to
be a collective head of state, composed from one member from each republic and province,
delegated by his/her republican or provincial assembly.58 Just like the Chamber of Re-
publics and Provinces, the Presidency was to ‘work on the basis of adjustment of views of
its members’, with veto powers given to all of its members.59 The Presidency was thus the
terrain upon which republics and provinces were positioned on a completely equal footing,
both in terms of voting power and number of delegates. Furthermore, the Presidency was
the only institutional site constituted explicitly as responsible for realizing the equality
of nations and nationalities. For the purpose of its operational unity, the function of the
President of Presidency was to be fulfilled through the yearly rotation of its constitutive
delegates. This rotation mechanism was meant to assure the equal participation of terri-
torial units and thus also of nations and nationalities.60
In practice, however, both the institution of the President of Presidency and the col-
lective head of state were suspended, and Josip Broz Tito was constituted as the President
of the Republic for life. According to the constitution, Tito occupied a special position
within the order due to his:
[...] historic role in the National Liberation War and the Socialist Revolution, in the
creation and development of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the devel-
opment of Yugoslavian socialist self-managing society, the achievement of the broth-
erhood and unity of the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the consolidation
of the independence of the country and its position in international relations[...]61







As President of the SFRY, Tito exercised the powers of the Collective Presidency until
1980 as well as that of the head of the hegemonic LCY. As a representative of Yugoslavia
home and abroad, the head of the armed forces and the hegemonic party, Tito was the
embodiment of Yugoslavism as such and the ideological arbiter in conflicting national,
republican, and ideological demands emerging from within the ranks of the hegemonic
LCY. After his death, his role was to be replaced by the Presidency and the institution
of the President of the Presidency, following a yearly rotation mechanism. Furthermore,
the decisions Tito was making, as an individual, were meant to be replaced by a decision-
making procedure which granted veto powers to each delegate in the institution. Due to
the unique position that Tito, as an individual, occupied in the foundation and the oper-
ation of the Yugoslavian order, it was difficult to replace him with a body of ‘anonymous’
delegates from territorial assemblies.
On assuming office, the President of the Republic (Tito), the members of the (collec-
tive) Presidency of the SFRY and its President, and the members of the Constitutional
Court made a formal declaration which summarized the essence of the institutional posi-
tion they occupied and captured the very terms of Yugoslavian unity:
I hereby declare that I will fight for the protection of the sovereignty, independence
and integrity of the country and the achievement of power by the working class and
all working people, that I shall strive for the achievement of brotherhood and unity
and the equality of nations and nationalities, for the development of socialist self-
management society and for the realization of the common interests of the working
people and citizens of the socialist Federal republic of Yugoslavia, and that I will
abide by the Constitution of S.F.R.Y [...]62
In other words, they were occupying positions of power to exercise the power of the work-
ing class and realise the equality of nations of nationalities and bring the society of free
producers into being.
To sum up, the institutions for discussion and alternation of rules defining the Yu-
goslav community sedimented the hierarchical identitary logic constitutive of Yugoslavian
identity, albeit through different procedural forms. The Federal Chamber of the Federal
Assembly was the institutional site for forging a unified self-managing position out of a va-
riety of self-managing interests expressed in the communes, and attributed primarily with
62The Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Article 397.
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the power to amend the constitutional rules. The Chamber of Republics and Provinces,
which played the central role in the formation of legislation, was the site for ‘adjusting’
the potentially conflicting positions of Yugoslavia’s constitutive territorial units and, in
doing so, realising the mutual equality of nations and nationalities. The Federal Executive
Council and the Federal Court were to be constituted following the principle of the equal
representation of republics and the corresponding representation of provinces. While the
Presidency, which was effectively suspended until 1980, was to operate on the principle
of completely equal republican and provincial power. The most striking aspect of Yu-
goslavia’s federal institutional forms was its overall-constitution following the assumption
that republics and provinces reflected national identities although they were not decon-
tested as (particularly) national in the political sense. This potential inconsistency was
rendered coherent through the nodal point self-management, which linked the elements
‘nation’, ‘class’ and ‘territorial unit’, infusing them with a sense of sameness they did not
necessary possess, given the national heterogeneity of each territorial unit.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the identitary logics underpinning the Yugoslavian
order was based upon a hierarchical relationship between an empowered working class
subject and mutually equal national subjectivities, which were embodied in territorial
delegation via the mechanisms for the constitution and operation of federal bodies. Fur-
thermore, I have maintained that particular nations were decontested as not congruent
with particular territorial units, yet assumed to be congruent in the federal mechanisms
for realising their equal participation. My analysis also shows that this (potential) con-
tradiction was rendered coherent within the Yugoslavian order through the nodal point
‘self-management’.
First, as I have argued, ‘self-management’ fixed the hierarchical relationship between
national and working class subjectivities by determining the political essence of the ‘na-
tion’ in a class based emancipatory project. Second, my analysis shows that, this con-
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stitutive role was not contained to the relationship between ‘class’ and ‘nation’. The
meaning of the nodal point ‘self-management’ expanded to include: the essential rights
of every human being; the basis of the economic system; the basis, limit and direction
for the power of the territorial units; the basis of the LCY’s hegemony; the basis of the
system of values brought to bear on the identification of the members of the community;
the essence of the society Yugoslavia was becoming towards; the reasons for the existence
of the entire political landscape; the essence of the delegate and the assembly system; the
different institutional forms and decision-making rules of Federal institutions; and the very
state that was to be brought into being by the institutional forms sedimented through the
1974 Constitutional order. In other words, ‘self-management’ became the empty signifier
defining and delimiting the terrain on which political relations in Yugoslavia were consti-
tuted through the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution. The emptiness of its meaning,
which resulted from the variety of different meanings it could take in practice, founded
the entire institutional landscape and its attributed subject positions. Elements such as
‘nation’, ‘territorial unity’, ‘freedom’ ,‘working class’, etc. were articulated together into a
meaningful whole through ‘self-management’ and were further sedimented in institutional
forms and subject positions.
Following a series of dislocations that culminated in a full-fledged hegemonic crisis of
the LCY by the end of the 1980s, the hierarchical decontestation of Yugoslavian identity
and the presupposition that territorial parity translates into national equality were con-
tested. Gradually, elements derived from the 1974 Constitution became part of a broader
set of political antagonisms that subverted the system of social division, discussed in
Chapter 3, upon which the Yugoslavian order was premised. These processes of contesta-
tion, which I will discuss in detail Chapters 7 and 8, went hand in hand with the failure
of ‘self-management’ to fulfil the function of an empty signifier and serve as a source of




Hegemonic Crisis: the ‘Floating’ of Self-management
6.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, and the terms of constituting the
Yugoslavian subject discussed in Chapter 5, in this chapter I examine the 1980-1986
period as one characterised by a deepening crisis of LCY’s hegemony. I focus on the
interplay of institutional and economic practices that undermined the unity of the LCY
and formed the context within which the ‘national problem’, which I discuss in detail
in the following chapters, was situated. In this sense, in the present chapter I look at
the economic and institutional dimensions of the 1980s crisis and in the next chapter I
focus on the politicization of Serbian national identity in the same period. In Chapter
8, I look into the developments in SR Croatia prior to and during the first democratic
elections in 1990, which were shaped by the broader processes that I discuss in this
chapter and the following. Although SR Croatia had been characterized as the ‘silent
republic’1 after the repression of the Croatian Spring movement and the purges within
the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), the failures of the self-managing order, and
the contestations that emerged out of its cracks, impacted both the ability of the LCC to
maintain order in its ‘own republic’ and the new forms of social divisions that competed
for hegemony in the 1990 elections.
1Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 26 May 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-219-7; Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
f6e36c90-37bd-4365-ad57-3ce8294862c5 (visited on 02/15/2016).
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Some authors claim the 1980s were characterised by a rivalry among republican parties
that ‘turned into a full blown ethnic politics’2 and the ‘simmering’ of nationalism in all
parts of Yugoslavia.3 In contrast, in 1988 Dennison Rusinow maintained that Yugoslavia’s
economic crisis had expanded into a political and social crisis, but also that:
[...] it remains possible that Yugoslavia, a country historically improbable in many
ways, is taking a unique, if extremely difficult, path toward economic development
and democratization.4
The differences between these interpretations of the period are exemplary of the trend of
‘reading history backwards’ and focusing on what points to the dissolution of the country
at the expense of possibilities that suggested otherwise, something characteristic of the
post-1990 literature on Yugoslavia.5 As Rusinow’s assessment renders visible, and as I
have observed while examining sources, evaluations and debates written in the period, as
late as 1988 it was still unclear how the Yugoslavian crisis would play itself out and which
political forms would emerge out of it. The very fact that nation-states became solutions
to the crisis after the first elections, has led researchers to focus on the national dimension
of the 1980s crisis and overlook the indeterminacy that marked the period.
In this chapter I argue that the period was characterised by the floating of the sig-
nifier ‘self-management’ which organized the economic, political and social terrains, em-
bodied the fullness of Yugoslavian society and secured LCY’s hegemony. My contention
is that this process was gradual and uneven and that it came about as a consequence
of the regime’s inability to articulate a coherent self-managerial response to suture the
dislocatroy effects of the deepening debt crisis. These dislocations led to various prob-
lematizations of the constitutional order discussed in the previous chapter, both within
the hegemonic LCY and outside of it. Eventually, as I discuss in detail in the following
chapter, the crisis grew to include wider social groupings which contested the subject
positions constitutive of the imaginary.
2Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a Country, p. 325.
3Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States, p. 133.
4Dennison I. Rusinow. “Introduction”. In: Yugoslavia: a Fractured Federalism. Ed. by Dennison I.
Rusinow. Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1988, p. 7.
5For an account of this problem in the context of researching former Yugoslavia see: Bieber, Galijaš,
and Archer, Debating the End of Yugoslavia, pp. 1-2.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, a hegemonic crisis entails a crisis of a hegemonic system
of representation, whereby its representational failures become visible and political strug-
gles emerge in an attempt to suture meaning. It is related to the incurable structural
contradictions upon which forces of opposition organize. These contradictions entail the
entire imaginary horizon and, thus, include both the institutional and economic terrains.
A hegemonic crisis is marked by the regime’s inability to maintain and control social
divisions and gives rise to a broad socio-historical critique. It differs from a conjunctural
crisis which only gives rise to political criticism of a minor character. In other words, the
difference between a hegemonic and conjunctural crisis is located in the different effects
that discourses of reform and/or resistance have on the imaginary horizon.6 Retrospec-
tively, the events of the Croatian Spring discussed in Chapter 4, can be characterised as
a conjunctural crisis because the hegemonic LCY was able to suture it within the frame-
work of the existing imaginary by representing the events and demands into expressions
of ‘counter revolution’ and ‘nationalism’ and situating them within the hegemonic system
of social divisions. In contrast, as I will show in this and the following chapter, the 1980s
were marked by the inability of the hegemonic LCY to control social divisions as differ-
ent positions within it, regarding both the nature of and potential solution to the crisis,
gradually divided the party from within.
In the present chapter I map out the structural contradictions that marked the 1980s
and resulted in the weakening of the dominant imaginary. I advance my argument by
firstly highlighting the impact that Josip Broz Tito and Edvard Kardelj’s deaths had on
the rules structuring the imaginary horizon and the (in)ability to forge a consensus re-
garding ideological, political and economic matters. Thereafter, in the second section, I
examine the economic crisis of the 1980s and the attempts of the Federal Executive Coun-
cil (FEC), the institution constituted as responsible for the unified Yugoslavian market,
to stabilize the economic terrain through ‘radical measures’. In the third section, I look
into the (in)ability of the institutional order to translate these measures into political
practices and the gradual visibility of the failures of the self-managing order to contain
6On the distinction between a ‘conjunctural’ and ‘hegemonic’ crisis and a post-Marxist account of the
Gramscian conception of a hegemonic crisis see: Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, pp. 119-221.
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the crisis. I show that the visibility of this failure operated by dislocating more elements
of the system, and opened up the question of the viability of the existing institutional
landscape. In the third section, I look at the debates within the LCY in light of these de-
velopments and its (in)ability to articulate a coherent and unified reading of the causes of
and solutions to the deepening crisis. In the concluding section, after rehearsing my main
points, I situate the rise of Slobodan Milošević in LC Serbia (1987) within the context
of the deepening crisis at the federal level and the LCY’s disunity, while also introducing
the following chapter.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important that the limits of my discussion are
clearly specified. The point of this chapter is not to assess the extent to which economic
and/or institutional factors caused the crisis and the break-up of Yugoslavia. Rather, I
take the division between these terrains as an analytic device for mapping out, in broad
strokes, the discursive terrain within which the national problem was situated and evolved
in the same period. I believe that this chapter will render visible that the economic and
institutional terrains mutually implicated one another to such an extent that neither can
be isolated into a self-contained factor that determined the trajectory of the Yugoslavian
crisis.
6.2 Subtracting Tito and Kardelj: ‘Rotating’ the Hegemonic Cen-
tre
On May 4th 1980, the President of Yugoslavia, the head of the LCY and the commander-
in-chief of the Yugoslavian Army, Josip Broz Tito passed away. In 1978, two years prior
to his death, Tito established a rotating collective leadership of the Central Committee
based on quotas from territorial units, akin to the Collective Presidency discussed in the
previous chapter.7 While Tito was alive, the collective leadership at both levels functioned
smoothly as, according to observers at the time, his authority ‘spread over them like the
7Steven L. Burg. “Political Structures”. In: Yugoslavia: a Fractured Federalism. Ed. by Dennison I.
Rusinow. Washington: The Wilson Center Press, 1988, pp. 13-14.
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wings of a guardian angel’.8 Within the context of this thesis, the importance of Tito’s
subtraction from the order lay in its effect on the ability of the constitutional rules to pro-
duce a consensus. Tito’s hegemonic position enabled him to be the last arbiter in disputes
within the ranks of the LCY and to prevent the escalation of a conjectural crisis into a
fully-fledged crisis of hegemony. With his death, decision-making power was decentered
into collective rotational systems which, in the words of a commentator at the time, made
it ‘difficult for his successors (the collective leaderships) to rule as easily as when he was
alive’ and ‘equally difficult for any single person to proclaim himself to be the new Tito’.9
One year before Tito’s death, in February 1979, the ‘father of self-management’10
and ‘Yugoslavia’s number two leader’11 Edvard Kardelj passed away. As much as Tito
was central to the decision-making process, Kardelj was central to theoretical and ideo-
logical matters. Since he was the father of the Yugoslavian theory of self-management,
Kardelj had the power to inscribe and/or exclude emerging demands from the signifier
‘self-management’ and substantiate the ‘real’ meaning of the path towards its realisation.
In this sense, his absence impacted the degree of fixity and ambiguity that the notion
could attain in the 1980s context. Furthermore, in his last theoretical work, Kardelj ar-
gued that the precondition for the realisation of a self-managing society was the reflection
of the plurality of working class interests in the political system:
The starting point for the future development of our democratic political system has
to be the gradual overcoming of the [existing] pluralism of political monopolies and
the realisation of true self-managing political pluralism, in other words, a pluralism
of authentic self-managing subjects [. . . ]. Even the working class is multi-layered,
so its interests cannot be reduced to one political formula.12
Kardelj’s representation of self-management as a plural political system that should, albeit
8The Tito Era in Yugoslavia, 5 May 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11669; Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/
10891/osa:2b11a530-9551-48e8-a307-b4d2b8d05b3c (visited on 02/20/2016).
9Ibid.
10Ibid.
11Kardelj’s Death and the Consequences, 14 February 1979. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
3-11517; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:59a9265e-4af5-4e28-97f7-92f8c158ebca (visited on 02/20/2016).
12Edvard Kardelj. Pravci razvoja političkog sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja [Self-management
and the Political System]. 3rd ed. Beograd: Komunist, 1980, p. 113.
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at some unspecified future point, undermine the existing pluralism of political monopolies
created theoretical confusion. Although the idea was not fully worked out, it could be
interpreted as a critique of the notion that party unity was a necessary precondition for
bringing self-management into being.
In the Croatian context, as I will discuss briefly in Chapter 8, the notion of ‘self-
managing political pluralism’ was deployed to justify the pluralization of the political
landscape in 1989. However, the impact of Kadrelj’s concept was already evident in 1981,
when a debate about how different positions within the party should be treated emerged,
in response to the economic crisis. Some members demanded ‘the necessary differentiation
within the League of Communist’, in the light of the economic problems the country was
facing, so that ‘every party member who has lost the essential characteristic of a commu-
nist is held accountable and expelled’.13 Others, in contrast, called for a broad dialogue
within the party and between the party and other socialist forces, citing the necessity of
coordinating the plural interests existing in the system and thus defending a degree of
pluralism.14 The debate was never fully settled and it marked a point of constant division
within the ranks of the hegemonic LCY. Furthermore, the notion that a degree of politi-
cal pluralism is necessary for the realisation of self-management further complicated the
decision-making process. It opened up the possibility for delegates and party members
to legitimately disagree with policies and/or party directives on the grounds of exercising
their self-managerial rights and reflecting Kardelj’s pluralism of authentic self-managing
subjects.
Kardelj’s and Tito’s deaths were a particular manifestation of a general trend that
marked the 1980s. The old guard that had first-hand experience of the National Liber-
13This was the position taken by the Montenegrin party theorist Radovan Radonjić, and some Army
generals. See:Discussion of Internal Situation in Yugoslavia Continues, 5 February 1981. [Electronic
record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11836; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Pub-
lications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University,
Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:631f973a-feca-4d69-ad7b-26f9adb18ac9
(visited on 02/20/2016).
14This was the position of Milojko Drulović, Aleksandar Grlickov and Mitja Ribičić. See: Two Groups
in Yugoslav Party Fighting over "Ideological Purity", 13 February 1981. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-11832; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:bf3eb554-ce05-4703-9cdb-926cd201585f (visited on 02/20/2016).
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ation Struggle was gradually being replaced by a younger generation for whom the war
was a memory of parental struggle and not an experienced event. As discussed in Chap-
ter 3, the National Liberation Struggle/Socialist Revolution, played a central role in the
Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. It was represented as the origin of the ‘brotherhood and
unity’ discourse and the historical foundation of the order as such. In this sense, it was
a myth that both legitimized the party’s hegemonic position and normalized the social
divisions instituted by the imaginary horizon. According to an academic in 1985, ‘the
legitimating effect of the wartime liberation was less effective for those for whom the
war [was] no more than a memory of their parents’ generation’ and ‘the relevance of the
liberation [had] decreased in effectiveness over time’.15 The 1980s were also marked by a
proliferation of literary and academic works that questioned the hegemonic representation
of the National Liberation Struggle and the moral infallibility of the Communist Party.16
During the course of the 1980s, as the debate about the economic crisis turned into a de-
bate about the political order as such, the question of responsibility for the crisis brought
about the re-thinking of Tito’s persona and the historical role of the LCY.17 As early
as 1986, for instance, at a symposium organized by the CC LCY, Yugoslavian Marxists
maintained that the victory of socialism was a possibility but not a historical necessity
15George Schöpflin. “Political Decay in One-Party Systems in Eastern Europe: Yugoslav Patterns”. In:
Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 312-313.
16This is well documented in: Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia 1918-2008] ; Jović, Yugoslavia:
a State that Withered Away ; and Jasna Dragović-Soso. Saviours of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual
Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2002. For an account from
the time, see: Sabrina P. Ramet. “Apocalypse Culture and Social Change in Yugoslavia”. In: Yugoslavia
in the 1980s. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
17As reported in: Yugoslav Dissidents Accused of Demeaning Tito’s Memory, 22 June 1984. [Elec-
tronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12246; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute:
Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University,
Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:1ff4e326-1182-4d1c-acce-f70bdf5ff6c4
(visited on 02/21/2016); The Fourth Anniversary of Tito’s Death, 17 May 1984. [Electronic record].
HU OSA 300-8-3-12254; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:690f2697- a163- 4f29- abb9- df47aae027e3 (visited
on 02/21/2016); and Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 10 December 1985. [Electronic record]. HU OSA
300-8-47-215-10; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Depart-
ment: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:54b0debe-2689-4acd-9351-6eb896d98764 (visited on 02/21/2016).
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and that a number of communist dogmas had failed to measure up to expectations.18 Al-
though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the way in which the re-articulation
of the founding myths of the Yugoslavian imaginary were inscribed into the particular
contexts of Yugoslavia’s constitutive republics, I will briefly discuss this process in the
context of SR Serbia in the following chapter.
In sum, in the words of a member of the rotating CC Presidium, the 1980s were ‘a
historically new situation’, since ‘Tito and Kardelj, the great creators and authorities’
were no longer present.19 Their deaths were an anticipated yet contingent development,
since the broader context in which they occurred and the impacts of their absence were
not predetermined by the fact that they passed away. In the immediate sense, their sub-
traction from the Yugoslavian system changed the institutional functioning of the political
landscape and increased the degree of contingency within the self-managing ideology.
6.3 The Economic Crisis: the Failures of the Emancipatory Project
In Chapters 2 and 5 I discussed the centrality of the utopian image of the society of
self-managing producers for forging unity and including different national identities into
a single working class emancipatory project. The entire constitutional order was repre-
sented as a means for realising the principle of ‘from each according to his abilities, to
each according to his needs’. In this sense, I have argued, the terrain of legitimate politics
was circumscribed by the signifier self-management and the legitimacy of the order based
on a society that the present order was expected to realise in the future. The economic
crisis that shook Yugoslavia in the 1980s gradually rendered the limits and failures of the
self-managing project visible, both in material and ideological terms.
In July 1980, immediately after Tito’s death, the President of the Federal Executive
Council Veselin Djuranović made public that a number of serious economic problems
were threatening Yugoslavia politically and socially. He demanded the immediate imple-
18Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-216-4; Records
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/
10891/osa:786a52b0-4ad4-48f4-bc11-7e99562e9ff5 (visited on 02/06/2016).
19Two Groups in Yugoslav Party Fighting over "Ideological Purity", 13 February 1981.
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mentation of a number of radical macroeconomic measures to counteract these economic
problems. He maintained that these problems were caused by:
[...] insufficient market motivation and a highly buoyant domestic market which has
discouraged exports while stimulating imports; unrealistic development ambitions,
which could only be satisfied by raising indebtedness abroad; and inconsistent and
inadequate application of systemic solutions in this sphere.20
The solution, he argued, was to be found in a ‘greater influence of market laws with full
respect for self-management’.21 The manner in which the expansion of market laws was
to be combined with the full respect of self-management was not substantiated. The
economic problems that were made public in 1980 were not new, although they were re-
ceived with great surprise after a decade of economic expansion. In the second half of
the 1970s, economists had already been warning party officials about the low efficiency
of Yugoslavian industry, its dependence of foreign technology, high rates of inflation, and
the growth of foreign debt. While Tito was still alive, capital was created artificially by
printing dinars to return loans and generate investments for future economic projects. In
May 1979, the FEC had introduced restrictions on car use and increased gasoline prices
and the late 1970s also saw a reduction in imported goods (tropical fruits, coffee, washing
powder and the electrical supply to households).22
According to the existing literature, the economic crisis had both an internal and ex-
ternal dimension. On the one hand, the world economic situation was worse than it had
been since the country’s foundation. The 1970s oil crisis and the increase in the price of
oil caused a sharp deterioration of Yugoslavia’s terms of trade, while the ensuing world
recessions in 1974-1975 and 1980-1983 reduced demand for Yugoslavian exports. Eco-
nomic conditions worsened further with the increase in real interest rates and tightening
of global lending conditions.23 In 1973-1981 Yugoslavia borrowed approximately US$16,5
20Yugoslavia’s Economic Situation Discussed, 7 July 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11737;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:da44302f-190a-4941-831a-6361e80d7eee (visited on 02/12/2016).
21Ibid.
22Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 150-151.
23Chris Martin and Laura D’Andrea Tyson. “Can Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and
Policy Choices Confronting Tito’s Successors”. In: Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet.
Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 184-185.
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billion dollars from foreign banks and institutions, and its foreign debt increased from
US$4,663 billion to US$21,096 billion. Furthermore, many short-term loans were taken
out in 1977-1980, precisely when interest rates on global markets rose from 5.5% to 16.8%,
and these were due to be repaid in the 1982-1985 period. The explosion of interest rates
in the global market increased Yugoslavia’s debt, relatively speaking, and necessitated a
dramatic reduction in the amount of money borrowed on global markets to cater for its
economic activity.24
On the other hand, the 1974 Constitution transformed both the political and eco-
nomic terrains into decentralized units that bargained and entered into ‘social compacts’
thereby directing economic activity. Although these rules were in line with a particular
representation of social unity, they fragmented the Yugoslavian market, giving rise to
factory duplications and inefficiencies. First, as a result of the changes in the investment
systems, banks and small enterprises lost control over decisions to regional authorities
and managers of the largest enterprises. These in turn focused on the objectives defined
within the parameters of their respective subunits, without taking the structure of the
Yugoslavian economy into account, thus leading to an increase in import substitution
and the duplication of factories across the federation. Furthermore, since existing eco-
nomic relations were based on contractual agreements and economic plans, there were
no constraints on enterprise budgets and investment decision-makers were not exposed to
risk. This economic constellation led to ‘investomania’ in 1976-1980, inflationary credit
creation and an explosion of foreign debt.25 Second, as a result of economic decentraliza-
tion, federal institutions lost control over the amount and structure of foreign loans taken
out by various economic subjects as well as the economic plans of Yugoslavia’s territorial
units. The FEC had issued a warning to the republics in 1975 to be cautious with their
foreign debt, but its warnings fell on deaf ears.26
The failure of the existing decentralized structures to give rise to a stable and efficient
economy rendered visible that the articulation of powers between the territorial units,
24Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 147-148.
25Martin and Tyson, “Can Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting
Tito’s Successors”, p. 187.
26Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 148.
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self-managing subjects and the federal institutions was in need of transformation. How-
ever, the exact form of this re-articulation could not be read from the economic conditions
themselves. For instance, the change could have involved the expansion of the existing
constitutional rules about the duties of republics, provinces and self-managing subjects
towards the Yugoslavian market as a whole. They could have included extensively de-
creasing their rights and expending the economic rights and duties of federal bodies. In
addition, and this was how the problem was eventually resolved in 1989, the solution could
have been the liberalization of the market and the abolition of self-managing economic
relations in the economy.
The changing economic conditions in the first half of the 1980s suggested that the
economy was fragmented and that dealing with the existing economic problems neces-
sitated some form of economic centralization at the all-Yugoslavian level for the pur-
pose of synchronizing the market’s constitutive elements. However, given the system
of divisions instituted by the imaginary and the centrality of the self-managing capac-
ity of the Yugoslavian working class, any call for centralisation could be represented as
anti-constitutional and anti-Yugoslavian. In addition, given that the economically de-
centralised system was represented as the channel for realising the self-managing rights of
nations and nationalities, demands for expanding the powers of federal bodies on the eco-
nomic terrain could be represented as a centralist hegemonic tendency that undermined
their rights. In practical terms, a decision to re-shuﬄe power from territorial units and
large enterprises to the FEC had to be made in the Federal Assembly and would require
territorial and economic subjects to willingly decrease their powers and grant them to
federal bodies. Instead of opening up the question of the articulation of forces in the
federation, the FEC thus remained within the boundaries of the existing constitutional
order and, when delegates in the Assembly failed to pass its austerity recommendations,
they would be imposed top-down as ‘temporary measures’.27
The official response to the economic crisis was articulated in the Long-term Pro-
gramme of Economic Stabilization that was drawn up in 1983 by the Kreigher Commission
27Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 11.
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in consultation with 350 leading politicians, economists and experts.28 The Stabilization
Programme called for an increase in the reliance on market forces, as opposed to economic
plans, in the regulation of the market; the establishment of a compulsory domestic market
in convertible currency; a movement towards making the dinar convertible by gradually
introducing world prices in the Yugoslavian market; a realistic exchange rate and real
interest rates; a greater integration of the units of the Yugoslavian economy; exposing
investment decision-makers to risks and tougher action against unprofitable enterprises;
and limitations on international borrowing.29
The solutions were articulated through the language of self-management and embed-
ded in the hegemonic conception of social division. The economic crisis was represented
as having exposed Yugoslavian society to
[...] increased pressure by various anti-self-management and anti-socialist ideas of
nationalism, liberalism, bureaucratism, statism and pseudo-liberalism and the value
system our fundamental ideas and results of the material transformation of our entire
socialist self-managing community as a whole are contested.30
The necessary changes specified in the Stabilization Programme were represented as part
and parcel of
[...] the development of social relations and productive forces, changes which for the
given stage of development provide answers as to how to resolve the accumulated
social and economic contradictions in the long-term development of self-management
and the strengthening of the federal character of the Yugoslavian community.31
Furthermore, the changes were represented as necessary for realising ‘the constitutionally
determined socio-economic status of workers’ and for ensuring ‘the consistent development
of self-managing socio-economic relations defined by the 1974 Constitution’.32 Although
the necessary changes were represented as cardinal for the realisation of the 1974 Consti-
tution, traces of a critique of its decentralising effects were visible in calls for eliminating
28Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 159.
29For a summary of the main points of the Stabilization Program see: Burg, “Political Structures”,
p. 11. For Kraigher’s account of the logic behind the Stabilization Program see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a
State that Withered Away, pp. 159-162. For the conclusions of the Stabilization Program see: The Federal
Commission on Economic Stabilization Problems. The Concluding Party of the Long-Term Programme
of Economic Stabilization. Belgrade: Jugoslavenski Pregled, 1983.
30Ibid., p. 100.
31Ibid., p. 100.
32Ibid., pp. 7, 11.
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‘all forms of autarky, regional isolation and restriction’ and demands that delegate assem-
blies expand their understanding of the common Yugoslavian terrain and ‘take care of
it’.33 The Stabilization Programme demanded that the whole working class, nations and
nationalities unite in the struggle to overcome existing economic contradictions and that
the institutions of the political system bear responsibility for the implementation of the
necessary economic changes.34 As was noted in academic circles at the time, the obstacles
to the implementation of the Stabilization Programme lay in their political implications.
The realisation of the changes in the economic terrain would have undermined the pow-
ers of republics, provinces and enterprises to intervene in the economy.35 Consequently,
although the Stabilization Programme was accepted by the LCY, the Presidency and the
Federal Assembly, as the basis for a unified self-managerial response to the emerging eco-
nomic problems, it not only failed to suture the dislocatory effects of the economic crisis
but further expanded its scope to include the institutional landscape, since the territorial
units and enterprises simply ignored its recommendations.
Furthermore, since Yugoslavia was unable to service its foreign debt despite the initial
austerity efforts of the FEC in the 1980-1983 period, the IMF also got involved in the
economic stabilization process.36 The FEC negotiated a series of stand-by agreements
and financial aid packages with the IMF that further substantiated the necessary eco-
nomic changes from the Stabilization Programme to include large devaluations of the
dinar (in relation to a basket of currencies of the main industrial countries); ‘realistic’
33The Federal Commission on Economic Stabilization Problems, The Concluding Party of the Long-
Term Programme of Economic Stabilization, pp. 111-102.
34Ibid., p. 108.
35Burg, “Political Structures”, pp. 11-12.
36For the administrative measures introduced by the FEC in the period and the reasons for their
failure see: Yugoslavia Devalues the Dinar, 13 June 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11749;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:df27763d- 65b1- 4bcb- b829- 87da16547aaa (visited on 02/15/2016); Yugoslavia’s
Economic Difficulties, 14 August 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11717; Records of Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/
osa:daba2835- 6d84- 4a64- 8e4a- 42d55fdba6a3 (visited on 02/15/2016) and Yugoslav Government
Introduces Drastic Austerity Program, 20 October 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11989;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:9e3d988b-14d7-45ee-9376-c172f0813879 (visited on 02/15/2016).
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internal borrowing rates (which should reach the level of 1% above the rate of inflation);
the free-market formation of prices, goods and services and lowering of individual and
social consumption.37
In July 1983, in order to be able to guarantee the repayment of loans, and under the
threat of the resignation of FEC’s President if rejected, the Yugoslavian Federal Assembly
adopted a set of laws drafted in cooperation with the IMF. The laws made the National
Bank of Yugoslavia a direct debtor and the Federation a guarantor of all the credit the
country received, regardless of the subject that took them out (enterprises, workers as-
sociation and/or territorial units). The law on foreign currency was designed to prevent
Yugoslavian enterprises and corporations from taking out foreign loans that could not
be repaid. The President of the FEC Milka Planinc called for unity in the implemen-
tation of the measures, and warned that every citizen would need to make sacrifices for
their realization. According to reports from the time, the adoption of the rules marked a
‘turning point in the country’s modern history’ and ‘the beginning to the real post-Tito
era’.38 Since the new rules put in place to ‘save’ the economy rearticulated the relation-
ship between the federal banks and the enterprises/territorial units, at the expense of
the latter, and were drafted in cooperation with the ‘capitalist’ IMF, they gave rise to
criticism of the FEC, from communists in the territorial units, veteran organizations, and
the Army. They claimed that the measures were anti-constitutional and undermined the
very foundations of the self-managing order.39
Despite the passage of the laws and the declared support of the Stabilization Program,
in the discussion of the 1984 budget in the Federal Assembly, the republics and provinces
opposed every single reform measure, leading to the resignation of the Finance Minister in
37Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 96; and Martin and
Tyson, “Can Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting Tito’s Succes-
sors”, pp. 189-190.
38First Radical Changes Inaugurated in Yugoslavia’s Economy, 13 July 1983. [Electronic record].
HU OSA 300-8-3-12160; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:9d206522-287b-4e66-bec9-b9b3e837a757 (visited on
02/15/2016).
39Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 157.
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protest.40 The inability to both implement the Stabilization Programme through existing
institutional forms and to contain the economic crisis gave rise to constant tensions in the
1980s between the FEC and the Assembly and within the LCY. The FEC Presidents in
the period – Djuranović (1977-1982), Planinc (1982-1986) and Mikulić (1986-1988) – were
unpopular and constantly criticized. Mikulić and the sitting FEC members he presided
over, were even forced to resign in 1988, a development unprecedented in the history of
socialist Yugoslavia. At the time of their resignation, Yugoslavian inflation had reached
250%.41 Although the FEC was constantly applying temporary measures (freezing and
de-freezing prices, devaluing the dinar, freezing wages, etc.) it failed to manage inflation,
increase productivity, improve the balance of payments deficit, or prevent a drop in the
standard of living. In 1987 it made public that, despite all efforts, Yugoslavia would
not be able to service its foreign debt and that by 1990 the debt would grow to US$40,
000 million.42 The dramatic drop in the standard of living and the central position the
FEC had in the economic terrain and made it a target of a growing number of workers’
strikes.43 As I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, Slobodan Milošević capital-
ized politically from workers’ discontent.
The inability of the regime to contain the crisis opened questions of responsibility,
40Yugoslavia’s Finance Minister Resigns, 29 December 1983. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
3-12104; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:cf4d40f1-1294-4f02-80a5-559304d774ea (visited on 02/16/2016).
41For more about the deadlock between the FEC and other institutions see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a
State that Withered Away, pp. 153-155. For an account of Mikulić’s resignation see Situation Report:
Yugoslavia, 17 January 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-219-1; Records of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society
Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
58ca551e-0fa2-4cc9-a77d-834bb1f43781 (visited on 02/16/2016).
42In 1987, according to the FEC, the Yugoslavian debt was 9th in the world and estimated to be
somewhere between US$23, 000-25, 000 million. Of that 71.9% was the accumulated debt of republics
and provinces, which were unable to pay anything toward reducing the debt, leaving the whole burden on
the federation. Furthermore, Yugoslavia’s internal debt, the amount that self-managing enterprises owed
to each other had reached US$20, 000 million. See: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 16 September 1987.
[Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-217-8; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research
Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European
University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:c1f118ed- 9a22- 46ef- 971c-
de7cf59f9c98 (visited on 02/15/2016).
43Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 18 December 1987. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-217-12;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:880d5db0-59e4-489a-8125-d8d97af54b0f (visited on 02/16/2016).
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legitimacy and the nature of the constitutional order. In order to bring about a society of
free producers in the future, the powers of the working class to autonomously manage the
products of its labour had to be limited by austerity plans and administrative measures in
the present, which in turn failed to contain the crisis. As the regime was failing to resolve
the economic crisis solutions were discussed in academic circles. These included the recog-
nition of labour and capital markets as indispensable segments of the market economy,
changes in the principles of self-management, the replacement of social property with the
concept of collective property, and the restoration of a truly mixed economy.44 By 1987,
some economists were arguing that the resolution of the crisis necessitated the introduc-
tion of private enterprise and the depoliticization of the economy, and were questioning
the possibility of realising self-management in a context marked by the concentration of
economic power in the LCY.45 They were articulating links between the economic crisis
and the functioning of the political order and looking for solutions in the political terrain
in place of instead of trying to stabilize ‘objective’ (macroeconomic) factors. In doing
so they were revealing that the self-managing order was not rooted in objective material
forces and historical antagonisms, but rather in the power of a particular party, the LCY.
In sum, the economic crisis rendered the limits and failures of self-management to orga-
nize economic relations and generate economic prosperity visible. It is important to note
that the worsening economic conditions did not in themselves determine the (in)ability
of the regime to contain them, nor the recommendations and laws articulated in response
to them. The changing circumstances indicated a need to reform, but the form of change
could not be read from the conditions in a linear fashion. In addition, the deepening
of the economic crisis indicated that Yugoslavian society was not becoming towards an
utopian image of free producers, since the producers’ standard of living was dropping. In
the most immediate sense, however, the failure of existing institutional forms to tackle the
economic problems in a systematic manner exposed the limitations of the decision-making
process structuring the Yugoslavian imaginary, thus dislocating the horizon further.
44Jože Mencinger. “From a Capitalist to a Capitalist Economy?” In: Yugoslavia in Turmoil: after
Self-managemenet? Ed. by James Simmie and Jože Dekleva. London: Piner Publishers, 1991, p. 80.
45Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 18 December 1987.
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6.4 The Crisis of Federalism: Institutional Forms Fail to Decon-
test and Deliver
In Chapter 5, I argued that the system of governance and institutions for discussion
sedimented the hierarchical identitary logic that underpinned the order. The delegate
and assembly systems anchored federal institutions in lower-level (territorial units, com-
munities, enterprises, etc.) self-managing subjects while cooperation at the federal level
followed the principle of equal participation of the territorial units for the purpose of re-
alising national equality and self-management. In all financial, monetary and investment
issues, the delegations of Yugoslavia’s constitutive units were granted the right to veto
decisions that were contrary to their self-managing interests.46
Although these rules were in line with a particular representation of social unity, in the
context of the changed economic conditions that marked the 1980s, they failed to deliver
a systematic response to the economic crisis. The laws proposed by the FEC as necessary
for the realisation of the Stabilization Programme were either vetoed by delegations in the
Chamber of Republics and Provinces, or selectively applied since their implementation
lay in the hands of the territorial units.
Examples of the failures of the institutional landscape during the period at stake are
numerous. In November 1980, for instance, Yugoslavia’s social plan for the upcoming
1980-1985 period, drawn up by the FEC, was not adopted on scheduled time due to a
failure of delegates to agree on the terms of financing the development of underdeveloped
regions, social production, national defence and Yugoslavia’s common monetary policy.47
46Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 10; andWhat’s Wrong with Yugoslavia’s Economic System, 10 Novem-
ber 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11983; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central
European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:45e19006-d297-42d5-
a562-35a17f3b7146 (visited on 02/12/2016).
47Differences over Yugoslavia’s Five-Year Social Plan, 24 November 1980. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-11770; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:d5ae1ffc-654d-4fd4-92b2-4d903ce1bb54 (visited on
02/16/2016).
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This failure to agree was represented as a minor crisis and it prompted the LCY to produce
a report on the Ideological and Political Aspects of the Plan to Assure the Continuation
of the System of Socialist Self-Management.48 At the time, the conflicts over the Five-
Year Plan were represented in an optimistic manner, as evidence that ‘the provisions of
the constitution promulgated in 1974, aimed at protecting the interests of Yugoslavia’s
constituent republics and provinces, are being taken seriously’.49 In 1981, delegates from
SR Slovenia vetoed a draft of a regulation to tax every departure from the country, while
in January 1982 a scheduled federal price-rise regulation was not passed in the Assembly
due to the failure to forge a consensus between the delegations. Both laws were drafted
by the FEC and formed part and parcel of its attempt to curb Yugoslavia’s indebtedness
through administrative measures.50
The tensions between the FEC and the delegates in the federal institution of discussion
were visible by November 1981. The delegates of the Chamber of Republics and Provinces
criticised the FEC for Yugoslavia’s economic failures and demanded that the institution as
a whole or its individual members be held responsible for the past mistakes that brought
about the accumulation of economic problems. By not assuming responsibility for its ac-
tions, a delegate from Slovenia claimed, the FEC was undermining self-management. The
institution was to be held accountable for the economic problems since ‘it had initiated
the measures to be taken in almost 100% of the cases’. In response, the President of the
FEC defended the FEC and asked the Assembly to see the extent to which republics and
provinces were the ones to be blamed for the existing economic problems.51 Of 25 major
laws to be adopted by the Federal Assembly in 1983, only eight were passed, with the re-
48Yugoslavia’s Five-Year Plan Suggests Sociopolitical Continuity, 19 December 1980. [Electronic
record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11757; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Pub-
lications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University,
Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:e8a67072-3236-43a6-931f-4480f98087e7
(visited on 02/16/2016).
49Differences over Yugoslavia’s Five-Year Social Plan, 24 November 1980.
50What’s Wrong with Yugoslavia’s Economic System, 10 November 1982.
51For a summary of the debate at the Assembly see: Yugoslavia’s Parliamentary Style, 14 December
1981. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11900; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research
Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European
University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:8328edcf- 0591- 4183- 8f88-
2792bdf68b2c (visited on 02/15/2016).
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maining 17 left awaiting further negotiation.52 In December 1983, the Yugoslavian finance
minister who negotiated with the IMF and Western creditors, resigned in protest of the
1985 federal budget and the new draft law to regulate the allocation of foreign currency.
The FEC, in coordination with the IMF, had demanded the creation of a unified foreign
currency market in Yugoslavia, but this failed to translate into a set of regulations, leaving
foreign currency in the hands of enterprises and territorial units.53 In July 1985 again,
two laws proposed by the FEC to regulate foreign currency revenues failed to obtain the
necessary majority in the Chamber of Republics and Autonomous Provinces, and were
only implemented as temporary measures.54
Even when laws were passed in the federal institutions for discussion, their practical
implementation was still in the hands of the republican/provincial institutions and orga-
nizations. In cases of dissatisfaction with a particular law, territorial leaderships could
chose not to enforce it.55 In 1982, for instance, republican and provincial delegates failed
to implement a law adopted by emergency procedures requiring them to allocate set sums
of hard currency to the Yugoslavian National Bank and, in doing so, subsidise the import
of crude oil whose price had sky-rocketed. The failure forced refineries to borrow dol-
lars from domestic or foreign banks and pushed the FEC to limit oil-consumption even
more.56 By the end of 1983 it became apparent that the austerity measures, drafted in
cooperation with the IMF and passed under pressure, had not been implemented in a
systematic manner by territorial units, prompting the LCY to convene and examine the
52Crisis and Dissent in Yugoslavia, 23 October 1984. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12218;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:115a5462-bcca-4ad8-a780-437c91a6eea3 (visited on 02/16/2016).
53For an analyisis of the Yugoslavian foreign currency market in the 1980s see:Martin and Tyson, “Can
Titoism Survive Tito? Economic Problems and Policy Choices Confronting Tito’s Successors”, pp. 194-
195. For details about Florijančić’s resignation see: Yugoslavia’s Finance Minister Resigns, 29 December
1983.
54Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 12 August 1985. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-215-8; Records
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/
10891/osa:b4a00b2c-d15f-4039-b4c3-8f82c7ab13d2 (visited on 02/16/2016).
55Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 12.
56Oil Supply Problems in Yugoslavia, 15 March 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11953;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:0b3cc454-5941-44b5-955d-950a92ff6cba (visited on 02/16/2016).
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problem.57
The inability of existing institutional forms to suture the dislocations on the economic
terrain gave rise to problematizations of the institutional landscape. Najdan Pašić, a
member of LC Serbia and the CC LCY, was the first to question the practices associated
with the 1974 Constitution within the context of the economic crisis, and to articulate
a set of ‘causes’ and ‘solutions’ that included the institutional landscape. According to
Pašić, the stagnation of self-management was caused by the concentration of power in
republican, provincial and communal institutions. These units were effectively behaving
like states, alienating the power of the working class and blocking the process of the
withering away of the state. The entire existing institutional landscape was dislocated
according to Pašić:
We have come close to a situation in which almost everyone has the right to veto
every decision and thus block any decision-making process, even in cases when it is
necessary to make a decision beneficial to the common public interest [...] delegations
and assemblies composed of various delegations are squandering all their energy
on lengthy procedures designed to harmonize various interests, without having the
strength or time to control the executive agencies, these agencies behind the backs
of assemblies make and implement ‘practical policy’. We cannot have a system of
self-management without a system of responsibility required by such a system [...]
One must know is responsible to whom and for what.58
Pašić demanded the establishment of a Commission to systematically analyse the oper-
ation of the institutional landscape, focusing on three aspects in particular. First, the
manner in which socio-political communities (communes, provinces, republics and the
federation) translated their constitutional rights in the economic terrain into practice and
the extent to which they were transgressing constitutionally defined boundaries. He main-
tained that the transgressions of the constitution resulted in the ‘institutionalization of
partial interests’ and obstructed the articulation of a unified Yugoslavian policy. Second,
he demanded that the electoral system be examined and new forms considered in order
to institute a ‘chain of responsibility’ and bring the delegate system under public control.
57Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 15; and Crisis and Dissent in Yugoslavia, 23 October 1984.
58An interview with Najdan Pašić printed in Danas, 12 October 1982, quoted in Discussions in Yu-
goslavia of Changes in the Political System, 6 December 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
3-11980; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:80026a32-1180-4c6f-bf4e-513a392c68a0 (visited on 02/16/2016).
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He maintained that the responsibility of office holders currently was a mere formality that
failed to materialise in practice. Third, Pašić demanded that the bureaucratic machin-
ery in the socio-political communities be examined and new ways of curbing its powers
designed. He claimed that, given the size of the bureaucracy, Yugoslavian socialism was
still a form of state-socialism. Similarly, he argued that the existing order was sustained
by ‘an exaggerated use of the state’s legal power’ and that social relations, the conditions
of work and production were all over-regulated. The bureaucracy and the plethora of
laws, acts and prescriptions were all blocking the free and spontaneous development of
self-management and rendering the working class into a mere object of state-tutelage,
‘lost in a jungle of laws’.59
Despite disagreements with Pašić’s diagnosis of the problem in the LCY, the demand
for an examination of the political system was accepted and a special Commission for
that purpose established. In 1985, after three years of discussion and negotiations with
experts, academics and party members, the Commission drafted the Critical Analysis of
the Functioning of the Political System of Socialist Self-Management. According to the
conclusions of the Critical Analysis, the inability to articulate a common Yugoslavian
policy to tackle the economic problems was caused by the ‘statist’ behaviour of the del-
egates from territorial units and the failure of workers’ organizations to associate across
territorial units. In other words, the failures were not represented as inherent to the
decision-making rules and the general provisions of the 1974 Constitution.60 The Critical
Analysis reasserted that
[...] the constitutional principle of consensus is a means for realising the full equality
of nations and nationalities and for constituting the common interests in Yugoslavia,
and there can be no majoritarian decision-making on this [common] terrain.61
Rather, the problem was located in the minds of the delegates who were acting exclusively
59Yugoslav Leaders Disagree about Reforming the System, 22 April 1983. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-12059; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:0d5ef8c2-cd14-48c5-a41d-5f02c02520dd (visited on
02/16/2016).
60Josip Vrhovec. “Uvodno izlaganje [Introduction]”. In: Kritička analiza funkcionisanja političkog
sistema socijalističkog samoupravljanja [A Critical Analysis of the Functioning of the Political System of
Socialist Self-management]. 24. Sednica CKSKJ. Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1986, pp. 32-33.
61Ibid., p. 33.
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from the ‘narrow’ perspective of their own (republican/provincial/communal) interest and
thus failing to take the common Yugoslavian interest into account.62
To fix the problem, the Critical Analysis proposed substantiating existing articles
about the unity of the Yugoslavian market (Article 251 and Article 252) and the specifi-
cation of the legal consequences in cases of failure to implement federal directives (Article
273 and Article 278).63 Much like the Stabilization Programme, the Critical Analysis was
embedded in the hegemonic conception of social division and articulated through the lan-
guage of self-management. It claimed that the Stabilization Programme could only be
implemented if communists forged a unified theoretical-political position regarding social
development withini the LCY and then mobilized the working people in the institutions
of the political system to realise that position in practice.64 In this sense, the solution
to the deepening crisis lay in forging a ‘high degree of theoretical and practical unity of
all socialist subjects in society’.65 For this purpose, the Critical Analysis demanded that
the constitutional role of ‘the internal driving and unifying forces of the delegate and
political system, the key carriers of the historical interests of the working class and the
development of socialist self-managing socialism’ be further substantiated, referring to the
LCY, the Socialist Alliance and Trade Unions.66 The lack of unity within the LCY was
represented as stemming from the unwillingness of its members to ‘democratically adjust
positions’ and their neglect of the ‘historical interests of the working class’.67
In a nutshell, the Critical Analysis concluded that there was nothing essentially wrong
with the terms under which order was constituted and it thus represented its failures as
caused by a misinterpretation of the rules and the misbehaviour of political subjects. In
this sense, the Critical Analysis concluded that the solution to the crisis lay in specify-
ing and removing ‘observed weaknesses, deformations and problems’ in the constitution’s
62Vrhovec, “Uvodno izlaganje [Introduction]”, p. 34.
63Smiljko Sokol. “Ostvarivanje ustavnog koncepta društveno-političkih zajednica u svjetlu ‘Kritičke
analize’ [Realizing the constitutional concept of the socio-political community in the light of the ‘Critical
Analysis’]”. In: Politička misao 23.2 (1986), p. 56.





‘practical functioning, to realise its basic principles’.68 An academic at the time main-
tained that the Critical Analysis simply reflected ‘the constraints on innovation inherent
in the system’.69
The debate about the relationship between the existing institutional forms and the
deepening crisis was not confined to party circles. The issue was discussed in the media
and in academic circles and a variety of positions were articulated which went beyond the
stance that the inability to contain the crisis was cause by the misinterpretation of the
constitutional rules. In 1983, for instance, at the Marxist Center of the CC LC Serbia,
Yugoslavian sociologists and party members organized a discussion about the functioning
of the political system, and concluded that the solution to the crisis lay in transforming
the electoral system so that citizens could elect the best among many candidates from the
LCY and ‘improve’ the political system.70 Similarly, Slavoljub Ðukić, a prominent jour-
nalist and political commentator, argued that resolving the economic crisis necessitated
cadre changes, since the power-holders in territorial units would never introduce changes
‘by means of which their own positions would be endangered’. Solving Yugoslavia’s deep-
ening crisis necessitated a purge of all ‘decentralized etatists’ from positions of power.71
The sociologist Radoš Smiljković criticised the sitting party leaderships for holding on to
power despite their inability to resolve the crisis, while the sociologist Dragomir Drašković
represented the existing hierarchical party system as the source of the ‘manipulative op-
portunism’ of party leaders that refused to take responsibility for their mistakes.72
In a series of articles published in the newspaper Borba, the Zagreb University pro-
fessor Jovan Mirić maintained that the 1974 Constitution itself was causing the existing
68Vrhovec, “Uvodno izlaganje [Introduction]”, p. 22.
69Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 19.
70Debate Continues on Reforming the System in Yugoslavia, 1 June 1983. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-12043; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:b186ee66-dd0a-4585-b893-5c7ccc7719f0 (visited on
02/06/2016).
71Danas, 3 May 1983, quoted in Who Actually Rules in Post-Tito Yugoslavia, 18 May 1983. [Elec-
tronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12049; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute:
Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University,
Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:c77c5074-19fa-48fe-a22b-219eca0057db
(visited on 02/16/2016).
72Večernje Novosti (Belgarde), 13 February 1986 and Duga (Belgrade), 24 January 1986; quoted in
Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986.
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crisis because it strengthened the autonomy of the republics and provinces at the expense
of the powers of the federal government. The decentralization of power led to the destruc-
tion of the unified Yugoslavian market and constant interference in market mechanisms.73
One of the country’s leading experts in constitutional law and the co-writer of the 1974
Constitution Jovan Ðorđević, articulated a broader critique of the existing system when
calming that order was characterised by a dislocation between ‘reality’ and ‘theory’. He
illustrated this gap with the ‘fact’ that:
[...] we are ostensibly building a federation, while in fact what we have is a confed-
eration; that we are are ostensibly building a self-managing society, while in reality
we are strengthening and broadening the state bureaucracy; that we are supposed
to be building a free society, while in fact we are imposing limitations, coercion and
repression on society.74
Both Mirić and Ðorđević were in effect maintaining that the deepening crisis was in essence
political and implying that its resolution necessitated amending the 1974 Constitution.
As I will discuss in the following chapter, similar ideas informed the LCS’s transformist
project which was weaved together in the second half of the 1980s. In contrast, the Zagreb
University professor Zdravko Tomac, defended the 1974 Constitution and, in line with the
Critical Analysis, argued that the problem lay not in the rules themselves but in their
practical application.75
Svetozar Stojanović, a well-known professor of sociology associated with the journal
Praxis, maintained that the LCY misrepresented the problems Yugoslavia was facing.
While the Stabilization Programme represented the crisis as being caused the economic
contradictions associated with the existing stage of development, Stojanović argued that
the economic crisis was produced by the political order. Yugoslavia was marked by the
73Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 30 November 1984. [Electronic record].HU OSA 300-8-47-214-1;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:418ca94d-3420-4bba-8bba-ac38e0bf1ed1 (visited on 02/27/2016).
74Jovan Ðorđević in a discussion at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade,
quoted in: ibid.
75Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 208.
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total dominance of the political over every other terrain, including the economic.76 In
this sense, the causes and solutions to the crisis lay not in ‘objective’ macroeconomic
parameters but in the distribution of power within the system. To resolve the deepening
crisis, Stojanović proposed a gradual institutionalization of political pluralism. First, the
democratization of the LCY from within; second, the separation of the Socialist Alliance
from the LCY and its transformation into an independent political organization partic-
ipating in power; third, the separation of Trade Unions and their transformation into a
genuine vehicles of self-management; and fourth, the strengthening of the federal struc-
ture. This process was to be paralleled by the introduction of a mixed economy open to
private ownership within the context of a fully integrated Yugoslavian market.77
In sum, the worsening economic conditions that marked the period and the inability
of the institutional landscape to produce a unified, even, and systematic policy to contain
the economic crisis further dislocated the Yugoslavian order. As the republican/provincial
delegates in reference to their self-managing interests either rejected or impeded the deci-
sions made by the FEC which represented the same decisions as paramount for stabilizing
the self-managing order, the signifier ‘self-management’ gradually attained a floating char-
acter. These contradictions opened the question of the functioning of the political system
and, in expanding the scope of the debate, simply dislocated more of the elements consti-
tutive of self-managing socialism. A variety of self-managing solutions to the crisis were
put forward that were either incompatible with one another or were dealing with different
aspects of the existing order. Given the hegemonic role of the LCY, the contradicting
positions about the nature of the crisis and the solutions to it reflected differences within
the party itself and the inability of its leadership to converge on a set of working causes,
effects and solutions to the crisis.
76Die Welt, 14 May 1983; quoted in: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 1 March 1985. [Electronic record].
HU OSA 300-8-47-215-3; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publica-
tions Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:2614d69b-554f-4925-a63b-a5823124a7f7 (visited on
02/27/2016).
77Die Welt, 15 and 17 November 1983; quoted in: Crisis and Dissent in Yugoslavia, 23 October 1984.
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6.5 The Crisis in the LCY: Disunity and the Inability to Redefine
the Order
In Chapter 3 I argued that the LCY’s hegemony was predicated upon its ability to univer-
salize a working class identity and fix different national identities within a single space of
representation. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 I traced the identitary logic through which a
unified representation of society was constituted and sedimented into institutional forms.
The LCY’s hegemony was sustained by its ability to forge a unified Yugoslavian political
subject out of different self-managing and national identities. By the 1980s the LCY was
substantially territorialized in the same way as the federal institutions. Its organs were
composed of members delegated by republican/provincial organizations and responsible
to them in practice, while its central leadership rotated in accordance with territorial
quotas.78 The inability to implement the Stabilization Programme and the tensions and
conflicts between the delegates in the Assembly and the FEC reflected the differences
in positions within the LCY, since the delegates were also members of the LCY. In this
sense, the changing economic conditions and the inability of the institutional landscape
to suture their dislocatory effects further exacerbated the differences in an already terri-
torially differentiated party.
The central topic of the Eleventh Plenum of the CC LCY that convened in June 1980,
one month after Tito’s death, was unity. The leadership pledged to follow Tito’s path,
further develop the revolution and self-managing socialism, and it praised the successful
struggle against Yugoslavia’s internal and external enemies.79 After the economic crisis
was made public, the leadership articulated an ambiguous and contradictory response at
the Fifteenth Plenum of the CC LCY. The economic problems were represented as caused
by the stagnation of self-management and the failure to make the workers in enterprises
decision-makers in income distribution. The leadership called republics and provinces to
remain responsible for their own markets and stressed the importance of the unified Yu-
78Burg, “Political Structures”, pp. 13-14.
79The Yugoslav Central Committee’s 11th Plenum, 16 June 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-11746; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:f36af2f8-b9c9-4a36-9978-0cc9d6595e1e (visited on 02/16/2016).
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goslavian marke. It also criticised the neglect of market laws without criticising central
planing.80
The discussions that unfolded in preparation for the first LCY Congress following
Tito’s death, held in June 1982, were marked by a debate about the relationship between
republican/provincial party organizations and central party organs, with two different po-
sitions emerging. Some called for the deepening of democratic centralism and the increase
in the power of the federal party leadership, while others demanded further pluralisa-
tion from within the LCY. Both positions centered on the notion of further developing
self-management, the latter citing Kardelj’s pluralism of political interests as central to a
self-managing order.81 Furthermore, the republican/provincial party congresses, that took
place in preparation for the LCY Congress, stressed different elements of the self-managing
discourse as central in the post-Tito era. On the one hand, the LCs Croatia and Slovenia
articulated an opposition to any changes in the federal decision-making rules that were
circulating as potential solutions to the crisis, labelling them as ‘unitarist’ and contrary
to the self-managing rights of the nations and nationalities.82 The tone of the LC Serbia,
Vojvodina and Kosovo’s Congresses were shaped by the Kosovo protests that shook SR
Serbia in 1981. Although I will discuss these protests in great detail in the following chap-
ter, for now it is still important to stress that the Kosovo Albanian protesters demanded
the ‘upgrading’ of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo into a republic and that their de-
mands were read as an attempt to fragment SR Serbia that could lead to the secession of
80Yugoslav CC Plenum Deals with Economic Crisis, 10 December 1980. [Electronic record]. HU OSA
300-8-3-11761; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Depart-
ment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url:
http : / / hdl . handle . net / 10891 / osa : 3273af84 - edef - 4bcb - a819 - ef8c2cc218dd (visited on
02/16/2016).
81Precongress Struggle in Yugoslavia over Party Statutes, 27 January 1982. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-11970; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:e460e9b9-a655-47da-ac50-6ce4317f05c4 (visited on
02/16/2016).
82The Aftermath of the Slovenian Party Congress, 28 April 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-11935; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:33067039-ced5-40ec-8113-aab2032c907d (visited on 02/16/2016);
Three More Regional Party Congresses, 24 May 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12026;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:c0036ce5-7bb9-4644-9ce5-163fa1dfff34 (visited on 02/16/2016).
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the province from Yugoslavia. At the Serbian congress, the Serbian leadership stressed the
importance of the struggle for unity and the common interest in both Yugoslavia and SR
Serbia. The Kosovo protests were represented as an exemplar of what would come about
if so called ‘particularisms’ enter the political terrain. Similarly, the provincial delegation
of AP Kosovo reaffirmed its unity with both SR Serbia and Yugoslavia and condemned
all attempts to re-articulate the balance of forces between provinces and republics. The
Montenegrin and Bosnian congresses also focused on unity. The former concluded that
republics and provinces were politically insignificant since the working class within them,
which forms part of the broader Yugoslavian working class, was the actual subject of
politics. The latter strongly condemned national particularism and pledged to protect
the country’s and party’s unity. The congress of LC Vojvodina, the second autonomous
province of SR Serbia, criticized ‘unitarism’ and ‘centralism’ and was closer in tone to LCs
Slovenia and Croatia.83 It is important to note that all congresses still operated within
the system of divisions discussed in Chapter 3, although they stressed the centrality of
different aspects of the order (unity or decentralization). As discussed in Chapters 3 and
4, the tension between these two logics characterised the imaginary horizon.
The first post-Tito Congress of the LCY, held in June 1982, was described by observers
at the time as ‘the congress of disagreements’ that ended with ‘formless compromises’.84
The delegations failed to agree on the rules that would structure the internal operation
of the LCY. The resolution adopted verbally reaffirmed the importance of democratic
centralism in the LCY, but failed to substantiate how it would be realised in practice
given the territorially differentiated nature of the LCY. It reaffirmed the central role of
differences between the republican and provincial party organizations for the development
83Three More Regional Party Congresses, 24 May 1982 ; Yugoslavia’s Last Two Regional Party Con-
gresses, 16 June 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12020; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at
Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:d7231b3f-8892-
4371-acaf-aae9c08c638c (visited on 02/16/2016).
84Wolfgang Höpken. “Party Monopoly and Political Change: The Lague of Communists since Tito’s
Death”. In: Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p. 34.
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of LCY policy and the realisation of workers’ self-management.85 Furthermore, although
the congress adopted the Stabilization Programme as a platform for the struggle of the
working class against worsening economic conditions, the manner in which it was to be
translated into concrete economic practices was not substantiated.86
Between the 1982 and 1984, six of the 12 meetings of the CC were devoted to the
deepening economic crisis but, due to different views, they failed to produce a workable
blueprint for translating the recommendations of the Stabilization Programme into spe-
cific practices. The dependence of the economy on the IMF loans and the involvement of
the institution in the attempts to stabilize the economy called for the readjustment of the
LCY’s ideology vis-à-vis Western market capitalism, and caused further internal party dis-
putes.87 The differences were not articulated into coherent antagonistic blocks/projects.
For instance, many of the supporters of the Stabilization Programme and IMF conditions,
also criticised the strengthening of the FEC which accompanied the austerity measures
and thus came close to those that opposed the arrangement altogether.88 Pašić’s critique of
the existing institutional forms discussed in the previous section was yet another point of
internal differentiation. Since he effectively called for the restriction of republican, provin-
cial and communal powers on the economic terrain, and given the central role those rules
played for the realisation of national equality and self-management, his analysis was per-
ceived by some as anti-constitutional.89
The Thirteenth Plenum of the CC LCY held in June 1984, convened to resolve ideo-
85For an analysis of the different positions regarding the functioning of the LCY before and during
the Twelfth Congress see: Höpken, “Party Monopoly and Political Change: The Lague of Communists
since Tito’s Death”, p. 36. For the resolution adopted by the Congress regarding cadre policy and the
functioning of the LCY see: The League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Tweelfth Congress of the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia. Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1983, pp. 146-148.
86The Aftermath of the Yugoslav Party Congress, 20 July 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-12017; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://
hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:d38e8012-488e-49d9-a6f3-7c400cb9bca7 (visited on 02/16/2016); and
The League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Tweelfth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,
pp. 165-171.
87Ideological Struggle Intensifying, 1 March 1983. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12080; Records
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/
10891/osa:0aaf30cc-b7ff-4a9d-ac6d-ace7a4c2ffbe (visited on 02/16/2016).
88Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 99.
89See: Höpken, “Party Monopoly and Political Change: The Lague of Communists since Tito’s Death”,
p. 38; andYugoslav Leaders Disagree about Reforming the System, 22 April 1983.
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logical differences within the party, again failed to produce a blueprint for the implemen-
tation of the Stabilization Programme. According to reports from the discussions, the
163-member CC LCY disagreed on every point but one, namely that a multi-party sys-
tem could not be the solution to the deepening crisis.90 The leadership was compelled to
acknowledge that ‘differences in understanding and implementing certain positions and
decisions from the Stabilization Programme’, including ‘differences and disagreements
even in the understanding of certain essential questions’ were paralysing it from within.91
Observers noted that the LCY was experiencing a semantic crisis since the cardinal nodal
points of Yugoslavian self-managing socialism – unity, self-management, responsibility,
change, Marxism and Titoism – were ‘taking on different meanings for different factions
within the LCY’.92 Disunity in the central party organs had reached such a degree that
the resolution prepared by the Presidium could not be adopted and the CC decided to
present the text for an organized discussion to the whole LCY membership (2, 200, 000)
in an attempt to forge a consensus regarding the future of the order.
The results of the party-wide discussion, which were reported to the CC LCY in March
1985, brought to light that the membership did not share the same differences of opin-
ion as the central party organs. Most importantly, it also showed that the differences of
opinion among the membership did not overlap with the territorial subdivisions of the
party.93 The results rendered visible that the upper leadership, which was meant to assure
party unity, was effectively more divided than the party base. In an attempt to fix the
problem, at the Eighteenth Plenum of CC LCY held in 1985, the CC reaffirmed demo-
cratic centralism by passing a resolution that threatened all party members, including the
Presidium and the CC members, with expulsion if they acted against positions/policies
adopted by the CC. In practice, this intervention gave the CC the right the supervise
republics and provinces, and was put in place to counter the federalization of the party
90The Aftermath of the Yugoslav Central Committee Plenum, 28 June 1984. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-12241; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:e6fc40b6-1f8c-4711-9ed9-ee972674045c (visited on
02/16/2016).
91Komunist, 10 July 1984 (supplement), p. 3; quoted in: Burg, “Political Structures”, p. 16.
92The Aftermath of the Yugoslav Central Committee Plenum, 28 June 1984.
93Burg, “Political Structures”, pp. 16-17.
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and the transformation of internal differences into divisions along territorial lines. Ac-
cording to the new rules, which ultimately aimed at creating the conditions of possibility
for implementing the Stabilization Programme:
[...] the agencies of the republican and provincial CC’s will be obliged to inform the
CC LCY regularly about how the resolutions of the CC LCY have been implemented
and their results. All attempts to deny the principle of democratic centralism should
be energetically resisted, regardless of whether centralist, bureaucratic uniformity is
in question or liberal ideas leading to the federalization[of the party]; they objectively
constitute an attack on the LCY as a united revolutionary organization.94
However, although the resolution put in place rules for policy implementation, and was
incorporated in to the statute of the LCY at the Thirteenth Congress in June 1986, it
failed to resolve the problem of translating the Stabilization Programme into a set of
practices accepted by the central party organs.95
The leadership of LC Serbia was the first to articulate a coherent position regrad-
ing the causes, effects and solutions to the crisis of self-management by in November
1984.96 Contrary to other republican and provincial LCs that were marked by internal
differences regarding the content of the reform, the Serbian leadership drew up 38 theses
regarding the nature of and solution to the deepening crisis that were binding to all of
its members. By 1984, as I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, SR Serbia had
already experienced a series of mutually antagonistic protests by Kosovo’s Albanians and
Serbs/Montenegrins that contested the notion of national equality and the terms under
which unity was constituted. The republican reform proposal was an attempt to suture
both SR Serbia’s internal dislocations as well as the all-Yugoslavian crisis.
The reform proposal articulated by the Serbian leadership was overdetermined by the
signifier ‘unity’. It called for the strengthening of the enterprises as the basic economic
unit; the strengthening of the executive branch of the government; the democratization
94Yugoslav Central Committee Demands Discipline, 3 September 1985. [Electronic record]. HU OSA
300-8-3-12262; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Depart-
ment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url:
http : / / hdl . handle . net / 10891 / osa : 53191264 - 2359 - 471e - a160 - d6b99324c536 (visited on
02/16/2016).
95Ibid.
96Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 20 December 1984. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-214-2;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:88282ad7-ace8-4fed-a266-6ae1954e5fc5 (visited on 02/16/2016).
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of the electoral system; and the strengthening of unity within SR Serbia by concentrat-
ing power in the hands of the republican institutions and at the expense of the two
autonomous provinces. It reiterated elements of Pašić’s critique from 1982, such as the
problem of the institutionalization of partial interests and the lack of responsibility of office
holders, but it added more elements to the critique. To resist administrative interventions
of territorial units in the economy, LC Serbia proposed the strengthening of the role of
enterprises to enable them to manage their activities in accordance with the needs of the
Yugoslavian market. This would ‘naturally’ integrate the fragmented Yugoslavian market.
The proposal also stressed the need for closer institutional cooperation between the Fed-
eral Assembly and the FEC, demanding that severe sanctions be imposed in cases when
adopted legislation is not implemented in the republics/provinces. To create a culture of
responsibility in the delegate system, the proposal demanded that multiple candidates be
nominated for each legislative level. In order to counter the territorial differentiation of
the central party leadership, the proposal called for the election of delegates in the CC
LCY by the LCY Congress and not by republican/provincial organizations. In contrast
to the transformations at the federal level, which would have resulted in the decrease
of power of the republics and provinces, the leadership demanded the strengthening of
the power of the SR Serbia vis-a-vis its constitutive provinces. The proposal, however,
rejected any substantial changes to the constitutional order and interventions in the rules
structuring decision-making in federal institutions.97
The proposal of the Serbian leadership was received with criticism. The leadership of
Vojvodian in particular rejected it as an expression of unitarism and argued that, instead
of suturing the deepening crisis, it would simply contribute to further divisions within the
LCY. In response these criticisms, Slobodan Milošević, at the time a fairly anonymous
member of the Belgrade League of Communists City Committee declared:
We have been threatened with a political crisis if we continue to [do nothing more
than] discuss these problems. All right then, let us enter that political crisis. This
97Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 30 November 1984 ; for an academic analysis of the proposals from the
time see: Höpken, “Party Monopoly and Political Change: The Lague of Communists since Tito’s Death”,
pp. 38-41; and Dennison I. Rusinow. “Nationalities Policy and the "National Question"”. In: Yugoslavia
in the 1980s. Ed. by Sabrina P. Ramet. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, pp. 152-153.
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crisis is going to produce a great uproar about the question of unity and separatism.
In such a crisis separatism will not prevail, because the people have accepted unity.
The leaders incapable of seeing this will lose the public’s confidence. If separatism
is not opposed, our country will have no prospects for the future. It can only
disintegrate.98
He explicitly rejected the critique that the Serbian communists were unitarist, claiming
that the label which, as discussed in Chapter 3, originated in the unitarist project of
the Serbian bourgeoisie in ‘old’ Yugoslavia, was constantly deployed to exclude Serbian
demands and proposals. He added that the Serbs were tired of this rhetoric and that ‘we
Serbs have no reason whatsoever to bow our heads to anyone’.99
The Serbian reform proposal and Milošević’s representation of the proposal, are im-
portant because they rendered visible that elements of what in 1988 became the anti-
bureaucratic revolution were already in circulation in 1984. Furthermore, it is also im-
portant to note that the Serbian reform proposal which, as I will show in the following
chapter underwent changes after Milošević became the de-facto leader of LC Serbia in
1987, was initially not articulated in national but rather working class terms. Yet its
particularistic origins were visible in the sense that it was put forward by a particular
republican leadership with the aim of suturing the dislocated Yugoslavian order. In the
following chapter I will discuss the Serbian attempts to reform the order and its effects
in greater detail.
In sum, despite all efforts, the Yugoslavian leadership failed to suture the conceptual
dislocations that the changing economic conditions and failing institutional landscape
gave rise to in the 1980s. The territorially differentiated leaderships within the LCY
began privileging particular elements of the self-managing order over others, and giving
the signifier ‘self-management’ a floating character. This, in turn, further weakened the
Yugoslavian imaginary and made the forging of a unified solution to the deepening cri-
sis more difficult. Within this context, the first attempt to suture the dislocated order
emerged within the ranks of SR Serbia. Eventually, as I will show in the following chap-
ters, internal party differences crystallized into antagonistic divisions and resulted in the
98Politika, 24 November 1984; quoted in: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 30 November 1984.
99Ibid.
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dissolution of the LCY in January 1990.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have looked into the interplay of institutional and economic factors that
undermined the unity of the LCY and rendered the disorderly guise of the Yugoslavian
order visible. By drawing out the main themes and developments in the 1980-1986 period,
I have shown that the crisis Yugoslavia was experiencing is irreducible to a single factor.
I have argued that economic, institutional, and theoretical-ideological issues affected one
another and reflected a deepening disunity within the hegemonic LCY. I showed the extent
to which the 1980s were a ‘historically new situation’ due to the deaths of Yugoslavia’s
two leaders and their impact on the ability to sustain order. Furthermore, I have argued
that economic crisis rendered visible the inability of the self-managing order to generate
the working class prosperity it was premised upon. The changing economic circumstances
were, in turn, bound up with the institutional landscape since they exposed its limits
in delivering a systemic/even response to tackling the worsening economy. Different re-
publican/provincial delegates rejected decisions made by the FEC in reference to their
self-managing rights, while the FEC demanded their implementation for the purpose of
‘saving’ the self-managing order. I have also shown that the dislocatory effects produced
by the changing economic conditions and the failing institutional landscape reflected in
a growing disunity within the hegemonic LCY. The inability of the LCY to substantiate
a systemic response to the economic crisis weakened the Yugoslavian imaginary by dis-
locating more and more of its constitutive elements. An observer in 1984 captured the
irreducibility of the crisis to a single factor in claiming that it ‘runs deeper than any of
its economic, social or political aspects viewed alone’ and that it ‘runs through the entire
Yugoslavian system and is inherent to that system’.100
Overall, my main point in this chapter has been that in and through these develop-
ments the signifier self-management floated and its failure to provide a source of unity
100Crisis and Dissent in Yugoslavia, 23 October 1984.
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in purpose/direction became more and more visible. The changing economic conditions
indicated the Yugoslavian order was not becoming a prosperous self-managing society,
while the institutional deadlock showed that self-management acquired different mean-
ings to different republican delegates and institutional actors. Lastly, the representational
failures of self-management were also reflected in the inability of the LCY to maintain
unity and articulate a single Yugoslavian space of representation to suture the dislocated
order. The Serbian party was the first republican branch of the LCY that articulated a
platform to suture the structural dislocations and further develop self-management. The
platform was centred on the notion of unity and operated within the boundaries of the
existing imaginary. In the following chapter, I look at the national dimension of the cri-
sis and map out the ways in which the hegemonic system of social division, based on a
hierarchy between nation and class, was gradually disarticulated by the end of the 1980s.
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CHAPTER VII
Hegemonic Crisis: Politicizing National Identities in
the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the LCS’s
Transformist Project
7.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, in this chapter I examine the politi-
cization of national identities in SR Serbia within the context of the deepening crisis of
the LCY’s hegemony. While in the previous chapter I looked at the economic and in-
stitutional dimension of the hegemonic crisis, in this chapter I thus focus on its national
dimension.
In the review of the existing literature on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, I have dis-
cussed the tendency to represent the emergence of Croatian nationalism in general, and
the CDU in particular, as a ‘normal’ reaction to the emergence of Serbian nationalism
and the consolidation of Slobodan Milošević’s power within the ranks of the LC Serbia
(LCS). In addition, as I will show in the following chapter, developments in SR Serbia in
the second half of the 1980s were important nodal points in the CDU’s own representation
of its origins and aims in the first democratic elections.
The aim of this chapter is to account for the politicization of Serbian national identity
from within its discursive context – the crisis of self-managing socialism and the dislo-
cation of the hegemonic representation of national identities – precisely because Serbian
nationalism plays a cardinal role in explaining the emergence of the CDU. To provide an
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account of the politicization of the Serbian national identity as a process rather than an
essence, and explain the role that Slobodan Milošević played in it, my analysis centres
around the Gramscian idea of transformism. As discussed in Chapter 2, transformism is
a process of gradual and continuous absorption of the active elements produced by social
groups, including those that seem irreconcilably hostile and antagonistic to the power-
holders.1 The aim of a transformist strategy is to maintain or deepen the power of the
existing regime by expanding the basis of its legitimacy.2 A successful transformist project
results in decreasing the antagonistic potential of the remaining excluded elements and
the broadening of the hegemonic block, while a failed transformist project leads to the
expansion of the logic of equivalence, the drawing of clear-cut political frontiers and the
deepening of antagonistic relations.3 The degree of legitimacy of the existing order, the
distribution of power within its institutions as well as the types of demands raised and
strategies used to advance them, all come to bear on the form and outcome of a particu-
lar transformist project. Accounting for it therefore necessitates looking into the types of
demands being raised, the addressee of those demands and the way in which they operate
within the framework of the existing institutional system. Do they, for instance, just aim
to modify it or amount to a full-fledged refusal to be governed under its terms?4
The argument advanced in this chapter is that Slobodan Milošević’s political project
can best be accounted for as a particular form of transformism that operated by ab-
sorbing the demands produced by active social elements in SR Serbia and deepening the
legitimacy of the LCS. It moved the LCS’s position closer to that of social groups that
articulated their demands in national terms, even those that were initially antagonistic
to the socialist regime and the LCS. However, this strategy brought about the deepening
of divisions between republican parties constitutive of the LCY and the disarticulation of
the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. In the first section, I discuss the impact that the 1974
Constitution had on the distribution of power within SR Serbia and the republic’s specific
1Norval, “Trajectories of Future Research in Discurse Theory”, p. 220.
2Norval, Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse, pp. 198-199.
3Norval, “Trajectories of Future Research in Discurse Theory”, p. 220.
4Aletta J. Norval. “Pictures of Democratic Engagement: Claim-making, Citizenization and the Ethos
of Democracy”. In: (Forthcoming), p. 7.
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position in the Yugoslavian order. In the second section, I map out the contestations of
national equality by Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and the failures
of the regime to suture the political space dislocated by their intensification. I also look
into the role that intellectuals in Belgrade played in the politicization and antagonization
of national identities in SR Serbia and Yugoslavia. In the third section, I relate the failure
of the sitting Serbian leadership to suture the political space dislocated by the national
contestations to the emergence of Slobodan Milošević within the ranks of the LCS. I flesh
out the manner in which the new constitutional concept articulated by the LCS under his
leadership absorbed some of these demands and the LCS’s strategies to deepen its hege-
mony within a weakened Yugoslavian imaginary. I also show the precise manner in which
Milošević’s transformist project had a divisive effect on the LCY and how it contributed
to the dying of the Yugoslavian imaginary. In the concluding section, after rehearsing my
main points, I introduce the following chapter.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is important that the limits of my discussion
are clearly specified. Given the scope of my thesis, in this chapter I will not examine the
constitutional concept that emerged in SR Slovenia, nor the social demands articulated in
that context.5 Furthermore, in my analysis of the discourse of the Belgrade intellectuals,
I will focus on their articulation of the Kosovo problem, and the Serbian nation in rela-
tion to it, exclusively in two documents; a petition written in support of the demands of
Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and a Memorandum drafted by the Serbian Academy of Arts
and Sciences. I will not look at the different debates that marked Belgrade’s intellectual
scene at the time, which were of course much more heterogeneous.6
7.2 The Constitution of SR Serbia in the Yugoslavian Imaginary
The 1974 Constitution discussed in Chapter 5 divided SR Serbia internally and placed it
in a very distinct position within the Yugoslavian order. It further decentralized power
5For an excellent analysis of both see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 312-343.
6For an excellent analysis of the Belgrade intellectual scene in the 1980s, see: Dragović-Soso, Saviours
of the Nation: Serbia’s Intellectual Opposition and the Revival of Nationalism.
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and substantiated the autonomy of its constitutive provinces, AP Vojvodina and AP
Kosovo. This resulted in SR Serbia’s fragmentation into three elements: two provinces
defined by the constitution and ‘narrow Serbia’ (SR Serbia minus the provinces) that was
constitutionally undefined. In this sense, the 1974 Constitution had an uneven effect;
on the one hand it strengthened the power of republics vis-a-vis the federation, but it
also weakened the power of SR Serbia vis-a-vis its provinces. This articulation of forces
followed a particular logic, namely that the vesting power at lower institutional levels
within a multi-national political context would bring about national equality and the de-
contestation of national identities. The same logic extended to the autonomous provinces.
Precisely because of their difference from ‘narrow Serbia’, in terms of historical experience
and national composition, the decontestation of national identities and the maintenance of
order was represented as contingent upon a degree of provincial autonomy. AP Vojvodina
and AP Kosovo differed greatly in practice. AP Vojvodina was economically developed
and nationally very heterogeneous, with a narrow Serbian majority.7 AP Kosovo was the
least developed territorial unit in Yugoslavia with an overwhelming Albanian majority
and a relatively small Serbian minority.8
The Albanian nationality occupied a peculiar subject position within the framework
of self-managing socialism. The Albanians were constituted as a nationality rather than
a nation. Although they formed a minority in Yugoslavia as a whole, they formed an
absolute majority in AP Kosovo. The Serbs occupied a diametrically opposite subject
position. They were constituted as a nation and, while they formed a relative majority
7According to the 1981 census, Vojvodina’s population was 54.6% Serb, 14% Hungarian, 5.4% Croat-
ian, 8.2% Yugoslav and 17.8% composed of other national minorities. In other words, the Serbs formed
a narrow majority in SR Vojvodina. See: Vojvodina: A "Paradise" for National Minorities?, 30 De-
cember 1983. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12101; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central
European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:60f3f633-50ab-4ca6-
ad40-9ea58a36e2d7 (visited on 03/29/2016).
8According to the 1981 census Kosovo’s population was 77.4% Albanian, 13.2% Serbian, 3.7% Muslim,
1,7%Montenegrin, 0.8% Turkish and 3.1% as other. In other words, Serbs formed a minority in AP Kosovo
and Albanians an absolute minority. See: Exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, 18 May 1981. [Electronic record].
HU OSA 300-8-3-11890; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:100212b5-23c9-4013-8c35-ff8a5c7438f3 (visited on
02/16/2016).
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in Yugoslavia, they formed a clear minority in AP Kosovo.9 In addition, the historical
territories of Kosovo and Metohija played a central role in Serbian state and identity
formation because they encompassed the centre of the medieval Serbian state and the
Serbian Patriarchy.10
The constitution of Albanians as a nationality, and the Serbs as a nation within the
Yugoslavian imaginary horizon, sedimented a hierarchical relationship between the two
groups. The Yugoslavian-Albanians were represented as forming part of a nation whose
native country borders Yugoslavia, while the Serbs were represented as native to Yu-
goslavia.11 Furthermore, the hierarchy was reproduced by the fact that Albanians are not
Slavs. In this sense, the existing system of divisions implied that the Serbs were ‘more’
Yugoslavian than the Albanians in an a priori fashion, both because of their non-Slavic
ethnicity and their association with a foreign socialist country that was ideologically hos-
tile to Yugoslavia’s variant of socialism. In other words, the terms under which national
equality was constituted within the framework of the order already placed the Albanians
in an unequal position.
The constitution of sovereignty in the post-1974 period dislocated the power relations
in SR Serbia. On the one hand, the working people, nations and nationalities were rep-
resented as realising ‘their sovereign rights in the autonomous provinces’. On the other
hand, republics were constituted as ‘states based on the sovereignty of the people’.12 In
other words, although sovereignty was exercised both in the autonomous provinces and
in SR Serbia, the republic was constituted as the exclusive carrier of statehood. The
two representations of sovereignty complicated the political landscape of SR Serbia and
9For a discussion of the position of AP Kosovo and the Albanian nationality from a historical perspec-
tive see: ‘Kosovo between Yugoslavia and Albania’, pp. 15-48 in: Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia:
Tracking the Break-up [1980-92].
10The Kosovo was also the site where the Serbs lost from the Ottoman armies in 1389, marking the end
of the Serbian medieval state. This has given rise to a ‘two edged’ myth of Kosovo within the Serbian
national discourse. It is both a place to be avenged and a place of glory because the Serbian army
was said to chose to struggle despite certain defeat rather than just capitulate in front of the Ottoman
army. See: The Kosovo Events in Perspective, 28 April 1981. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
3-11799; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:5fe7713f-b32a-434e-aa38-c6d4288fe60f (visited on 02/16/2016)
11According to the Constitution, this was the difference between nations and nationalities. See: The
Constitution the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Appendix.
12Ibid., Article 3 and Article 4.
168
created the conditions of possibility for complaints from both the republican and provin-
cial perspective. The constitutional rules could be deployed to legitimise demands for
further expanding the power of the provinces as a means to ‘truly’ realise the sovereignty
of the nations, the nationalities and the working class. Equally, the existing rules could
be deployed to demand the limitation of provincial powers to prevent the hollowing out
of the statehood attributed to SR Serbia. In addition, ‘narrow Serbia’ did not have in-
stitutions independent of the two autonomous provinces. Their delegates participated in
the Serbian Assembly, Presidency and Executive while the delegates from ‘narrow Serbia’
had no presence in the organs of the provinces. As discussed in Chapter 5, the provinces
were also represented as a particularity in federal institutions and thus resembled the
republics. They were granted veto power in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces and
enjoyed both equal numerical representation as republics and veto power in the Collective
Presidency. In this sense, the provinces were granted rights to delegate their particular
interests to federal instances without consulting the institutions of SR Serbia. In practice,
the delegates of SR Serbia at the federal level covered only ‘narrow Serbia’, a territory
that was neither mentioned in the constitution nor defined as a constitutive element of
the Yugoslavian federal order.13
The first problematization of the dislocatory effects that the 1974 Constitution had
on SR Serbia was articulated in 1977 in an internal document of the LCS. The Serbian
leadership criticised the provincial leaderships’ tendencies to pursue independent policies
in the fields where SR Serbia (as a sovereign state) had rights, thus undermining SR
Serbia’s statehood. They requested the modification of existing practices, to bring them
in line with the constitutional rules, but their requests were ignored and the issue swept
under the carpet.14
In sum, it is important to bear in mind that the 1974 Constitution placed SR Ser-
13For a detailed analysis of the constitutional position of SR Serbia, AP Kosovo and AP Vojvodina see:
Dimitrijević, “Sukobi oko ustava 1974 [The Conflicts arround the 1974 Constitution]”; and Vesna Pešić.
“Serbian Nationalism and the Origins of the Yugoslav crisis”. In: Peaceworks 8 (1996).
14In a 1977 session of all the relevant leaders in the LCY CC (Vojvodina and Kosovo included) no
compromise on the issue was reached. The Kosovo leaders maintained that the document was a ‘bible of
Serbian nationalism’ and accused the Serbian leadership of undermining provincial autonomy and acting
in contradiction to the constitution. For an analysis of events and the position of the Serbian leadership
in 1977 see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 173-176.
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bia in a particular position within the order, not comparable to that of other republics.
However, this position was not the product of a predetermined project against Serbia as
a state or the Serbs as a nation. Rather, SR Serbia’s position was linked to the terms
under which unity and division were represented and the outcome of struggles for their
substantiation into rules. Furthermore, it is also important to bear in mind that the Serbs
and Albanians occupied diametrically opposite subject positions and that a hierarchical
relationship between the two already formed part of the constitutional order. The fact
Serbs were constituted as ‘more’ Yugoslavian than Albanian was reflected the regime’s
differential treatment of their contending demands, even before the coming to power of
Slobodan Milošević. These structural factors shaped the trajectory of the contestations
on the ground and the regime’s response, but they did not predetermine them in an a
priori fashion, since they could be represented in multiple ways.
7.3 Contending Demands for Constitutional Change in AP Kosovo
and the Emergence of the Serbian National Myth
7.3.1 Kosovo Albanian protests and regime response
As argued in previous chapters, the Yugoslavian identity was decontested into a hierar-
chy in which an overarching working class identity determined the political content of
Yugoslavia’s national identities. The essence of these identities was represented as their
mutual equality. The members of the Albanian nationality in AP Kosovo were the first to
contest the hegemonic representation of their position as equal, and to articulate demands
for constitutional change.
On March 11 1981, a student protest denouncing poor accommodation and living con-
ditions broke out in the capital of AP Kosovo, Priština. Initially, the student demands
were articulated on the socio-economic terrain. They expressed their dissatisfaction with
high unemployment, poverty, backwardness and social inequalities in AP Kosovo. They
marched to LC Kosovo’s headquarters chanting ‘we want deeds not words’ and ‘some sleep
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in arm chairs while others don’t have bread’. Kosovo’s leadership recognized the student
demands as legitimate, but condemned their articulation through a public demonstration
claiming that their dissatisfactions could also be mobilized by the ‘enemies’ of socialist
Yugoslavia.15 In preparation for the celebration of deceased Tito’s birthday on March 23
1981, the provincial leadership ordered the round-up of all student leaders, claiming they
might use the celebration to generate disorder. In response, students joined by other cit-
izens took to the streets to demand their release and denounce Kosovo’s inferior position
in Yugoslavia. Their core demand was that Kosovo be transformed from a province to
a republic.16 This demand was articulated through national signifiers, such as: ‘we are
Albanian not Yugoslavian’, ‘unity with Albania’, and ‘Trepča works, Belgrade builds’.
The provincial leadership maintained that the protests were of a nationalist counter-
revolutionary character and police violence was used to reinstitute order.17 On March 30,
the students of the three largest faculties in Priština University declared a boycott of
teaching and, by April 2, the protests had spread across the province. Factory workers
joined the students and citizens, and there were reports of protest actions being prepared
among the Albanians in SR Montenegro.18 There were also reports of the demolition of
Serbian/Orthodox Holy Sites such as churches, monasteries and cemeteries.19 On April
3, a state of emergency was declared in the province and federal troops were sent in to
establish order. Official sources reported twelve dead and 150 wounded but alternative
sources claimed the casualties were higher.20
The demands of Kosovo Albanians were articulated violently and extra-institutionally,
and suggested that the Albanian protesters felt unequal because they did not have their
15Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 15; and Kosovo: One
Year after the Riots, 17 March 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-298; Records of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society
Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
53f675ee-28ff-4113-bb8c-4af6ba639d2a (visited on 02/16/2016).
16Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 16.
17Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 185.
18Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 196.
19Desecration of Serbian Graves in Kosovo, 21 May 1981. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11885;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:53f675ee-28ff-4113-bb8c-4af6ba639d2a (visited on 02/16/2016).
20Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 16; Ramet, Nationalism
and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 196; and Kosovo: One Year after the Riots, 17 March 1982.
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own republic. This meant that, contrary to their constitution as a nationality, they effec-
tively raised their demands as a nation and appropriated Kosovo on numerical grounds.
Furthermore, by making references to a unified Albanian nation and calling for unity with
Albania, their demands transgressed the boundaries of the Yugoslavian imaginary. The
demand for transforming Kosovo from a province into a republic, within the context of
a broader Albanian identity different from the Yugoslavian, implied that the protesters
wanted Kosovo’s secession from Yugoslavia.
Due to the content of the demands and the strategy deployed in their articulation, the
provincial, republican and federal leaderships represented the events as part and parcel of
a counter-revolution plotted by the enemies of Yugoslavia.21 The leadership maintained
that the demand ‘Kosovo-Republic’ was articulated just to create the conditions of pos-
sibility for Kosovo’s secession from Yugoslavia.22 To re-establish order, hundreds of LC
Kosovo members were expelled from the LCY and some of the sitting leaders were forced
to resign. Students and faculty members associated with the protest were expelled from
the University of Priština.23 The provincial police claimed it had uncovered 30 illegal
groups in AP Kosovo, the biggest of which were the Marxist-Leninist group of Kosovo
and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians which were allegedly linked to
the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania.24
In line with the hegemonic representation of the nature of social divisions, discussed in
Chapter 3, the federal leadership represented the protests as a counter-revolution driven
by a part of the Albanian population in Kosovo and as antagonistic to all nations and na-
tionalities in Yugoslavia. From their perspective, despite being articulated exclusively by
Albanians as Albanians, the demands were not the expression of the Kosovo-Albanian na-
21The Kosovo Unrest - The Causes and the Consequenes, 7 April 1981. [Electronic record]. HU
OSA 300-8-3-11798; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications De-
partment: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:29b463a2-6d2c-40cc-9341-6be4b2f02d35 (visited on
02/16/2016).
22A Separate Kosovo Republic in Yugoslavia, 16 June 1981. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
3-11875; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:4b831271-e2cd-4664-95e4-74590f8f6288 (visited on 02/16/2016).
23Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 9; Ramet, Nationalism
and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 197; and Kosovo: One Year after the Riots, 17 March 1982.
24Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 13.
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tional interest but antagonistic to it. In this sense, the federal leadership maintained that
the demands had nothing to do with ‘the attitude of the large majority of working people
and citizens of Kosovo, with the interests of the Albanians, Serbs, Montenegrins, and
members of other nations in AP Kosovo’.25 The federal leadership placed the province’s
economic backwardness at the centre of its explanation, claiming the deepening economic
crisis was making Yugoslavia more susceptible to all forms of nationalism, and that the
protests were just an expression of this negative trend.26
The Serbian leadership added a particular element to the federal leadership’s inter-
pretation of the events in AP Kosovo. It represented the protests as the consequence of
SR Serbia’s failed statehood that was caused by the misinterpretation of the 1974 Con-
stitution. The Serbian leadership claimed that the behaviour of provinces as republics in
practice created the conditions of possibility for thinking of them as republics and for-
mulating demands for changing their formal status. From their perspective, the Kosovo
protests resembled the refusals of AP Vojvodina’s leadership to submit to the position
of the central leadership in Belgrade on multiple issues, since both practices developed
under the assumption that the provinces were in fact republics. To solve both problems,
the Serbian leadership demanded a stricter implementation of the existing constitutional
rule about republican sovereignty. They claimed that the puzzle to be solved was how
to develop the ‘autonomy of the provinces in the [Serbian] republic while respecting the
elements of their constitutionality within Yugoslavia’s federalism’ and also to ‘strengthen
the togetherness in the [Serbian] republic and the unity of the Serbian state’.27
AP Vojvodina’s leadership contested the equation of Vojvodina and Kosovo and re-
proached the Serbian leadership for instrumentalizing the counter-revolution in AP Kosovo
25Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 188.
26Yugoslav Government Concerned about Internal Security, 15 November 1983. [Electronic record].
HU OSA 300-8-3-12114; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications
Department: Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest.
url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:3ff07804-dd7c-4c53-9f1f-7f31239ae6a1 (visited on
02/16/2016); and Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 188-191.
27The Serbian Question - One of Yugoslavia’s Major Internal Problems, 26 January 1982. [Elec-
tronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-11972; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute:




to contest the autonomy of the provinces in general. From their perspective, the LCS was
trying to increase its power at the expense of that of the provincial leaderships. The
generalisation of the Kosovo problem into a problem of provincial autonomy was thus,
according to them, the expression of ‘nationalism’, ‘unitarism’, ‘centralism’ and therefore
antagonistic to the self-managing order.28 It is important to stress that critique of the
LCS’s representation of events came mostly from Serbian nationals in CC LC Vojvod-
ina.29
7.3.2 Kosovo Serb/Montenegrin protests and regime response
Despite the regime’s representation of the protests as driven by class antagonisms, the
protesters were exclusively Kosovo Albanians and they protested as Albanians. Fur-
thermore, the protests were staged in an Albanian majority province, in a context that
already granted AP Kosovo a significant degree of autonomy and protected the cultural
and linguistic rights of its Albanian population. Their demands and strategies dislo-
cated already complicated national relations in the province. They were interpreted by
Serbs/Montenegrins as directed against them and as a threat to their own position in the
province.
The dislocation was exacerbated by the publication of the 1981 census which showed
that the Serb/Montenegrin population of AP Kosovo was progressively decreasing.30 In
the aftermath of the 1981 Kosovo protests the number of Serb/Montenegrin emigrants
from AP Kosovo had increased and different interpretations of the causes behind their
demographic decline in the province emerged.31 These interpretations ranged from those
focusing on economic factors, those focusing on the practical ramifications of the 1974
Constitutional rules, to those representing the decline as the product of an systematic at-
tempt to ‘cleanse’ AP Kosovo of the Serbian/Montenegrin nations by so called ‘Albanian
28Three More Regional Party Congresses, 24 May 1982.
29Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 196-197.
30Exodus of Serbs from Kosovo, 18 May 1981.
31Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 198.
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nationalists’.32 The latter formed the backbone for the contestation of the regime’s rep-
resentation of the Kosovo problem by self-declared delegates of the Serbian/Montenegrin
nations in AP Kosovo.
Before the 1981 protests, there had hardly been any mention of the immigration of
Serbs/Montenegrins from Kosovo. By 1982, in the words of observers from the time, the
demographic decline and the migration became ‘one of the most pressing political issues
of the Yugoslav federation as a whole and of the province of Kosovo and the republic of
Serbia in particular’.33 In March 1982, just as Albanian students took to the streets to
mark the first anniversary of the 1981 protests, a group of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins
drew up a petition addressing federal institutions and demanding more effective measures
to stabilize national relations in the province.34 In the same year, orthodox priests drew
up a petition addressing federal and republican institutions to ‘raise their voice for the
protection of the spiritual and biological being of the Serbian nation in Kosovo and Meto-
hija’.35 In August 1983, 100,000 people gathered at the funeral of Aleksandar Ranković,
the former head of Yugoslavia’s State Security Service and a staunch centralist, whose
purge I discussed within the context of the Croatian Spring movement in Chapter 4. The
gathering at his funeral was said to be a statement of support for his strong-arm policy
against Albanians in AP Kosovo.36 In May 1985, a Kosovo Serb army employee was al-
legedly attacked by Kosovo Albanians and impaled with a bottle while working his land
in the province. The Belgrade media picked up the case and represented it as an exemplar
of the position of the entire Serbian/Montenegrin nation in AP Kosovo. A massive public
32Why Are so Many Serbs Leaving Kosovo?, 16 November 1982. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-15197; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:a46d2d71-fffc-4adc-9c39-fb3a369138b0 (visited on 02/16/2016).
33Ibid.
34Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986.
35This marked the beginning of the open involvement of the Orthodox Church in SR Serbia’s politics.
For an detailed analysis of the role the Serbian Orthodox Church in the politicization of the Serbian
national identity in the 1980s see: Radmila Radić. “Crkva i "srpsko pitanje" [The church and the serbian
question]”. In: Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju Srpska strana rata: trauma i
katarza u istorijskom pamćenju [The Serb Side of the War: Trauma and Catharsis in Historical Memory].
Ed. by Nebojša Popov. Beograd: Republika, 1996.
36Yugoslav Government Concerned about Internal Security, 15 November 1983.
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uproar followed, although the truthfulness of the allegations was highly questionable.37
In October 1985, self proclaimed delegates of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins drew up a
petition signed by 2,016 people, in which they expressed that they were discriminated in
AP Kosovo and demanded that the Serbian and federal institutions establish order and
protect their constitutional rights. They also accused the sitting provincial leadership of
tacit approval of the migrations of Serbs/Montenegrins. They demanded the return of
Serbian/Montenegrin migrants to AP Kosovo; the annulment of sales contracts between
Albanian buyers and Serb sellers; the prohibition of the usage of the Albanian flag; and
the implementation of Serbian language laws to counteract the Albanian language laws
in the province. They also called for the removal of all ‘Albanian chauvinists and Serbian
opportunists’ from positions of power.38
The Kosovo Serb/Montenegrins continued exerting pressure on the Serbian and the
Yugoslavian leadership throughout 1986. In February, 95 complained to the Federal
Assembly in Belgrade that Albanians were buying up property in Kosovo and circum-
scribing Serbian/Montenegrin communities. They also accused the provincial police of
ignoring sexual crimes against non-Albanian women, and their general complaints as
non-Albanians. To fix the problem they demanded that the authorities protect them
more effectively from the Albanians and they threatened to migrate if their demands for
order and equality were not met. Their demands were represented as a matter of social
unity in the province, and they declared that they would ‘either live united in Kosovo’ or
leave.39 In April, 500 Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins expressed their concern over the lack of
equality in Kosovo, and threatened that they would migrate if their national position was
37The facts of the case were and remain completely unclear. Martinović latter claimed that the injury
was self-inflicted and thereafter he withdrew his allegations. The police and army investigated the case
but were unable to converge on a conclusion. For more on the Marković case see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a
State that Withered Away, p. 240; Sell, Slobodan Milošević and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, p. 78; and
Nebojša Vladisavljević. Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and
Nationalist Mobilization. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 98.
38Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986 ; and Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away,
p. 242.
39Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 15 December 1986. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-216-12;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:77148eca-41a6-45c8-92bc-76ebc7c9f984 (visited on 02/16/2016); and Situation
Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986.
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not improved and their rights protected. In June, the police forcibly halted an organized
mass migration of Serbs/Montenegrins from Kosovo Polje.40 In November, in response to
a rape case involving an 11 year old Serbian girl by a 17 year old Albanian in AP Kosovo,
a self-proclaimed delegation of all Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins marched to Belgrade to
protest to officials in the Federal Assembly. They maintained that the rape was nation-
ally motivated, protested their worsening national position, and threatened to resort to
violence. In the words of one of the delegates:
Let us say that you [the Yugoslavian government] cannot guarantee our safety and
civil rights. If you do not help us then you will be to blame for our actions, and
don’t be surprised if you hear that we have resorted to killing one another [. . . ]
raping women and children is not sexually motivated but is [committed as] an act
of nationalistic hatred. Brotherhood and unity cannot be built in this way.41
They demanded a special session of the Federal Assembly to deal exclusively with AP
Kosovo and the implementation of measures that would guarantee their constitutionally
granted equal rights. Furthermore, they explicitly linked the worsening position of their
nation in the province to the constitution of Kosovo within the existing order. This is
how they articulated the issue:
We, the Serbs from Kosovo are for a strong and harmonious Yugoslavia. This is why
we have come to the Federal Assembly, to ask for the return of the civil rights we
have lost in Kosovo [. . . ] The constitution has created the current situation, and
it must be changed. The politicians of our province, from top to bottom are the
culprits [...] We will no longer remain silent!42
The politicization of Kosovo Serb/Montenegrins was represented as a response to a threat
they were facing as a nation. This threat emanated from the Albanians as a nationality,
who were seen as having taken over and undermined national equality. They articulated
their demands in terms of equality and justice and blamed the provincial leadership for
failing to address their position as a national group. They were not undermining the hege-
mony of the LCY nor were they questioning its legitimacy. They represented the Kosovo
problem as a dislocation of national equality in AP Kosovo, and demanded that those in




power to suture it and re-stablish order. However, their demands were articulated in op-
position to the 1974 Constitution. They blamed the terms under which national equality
was decontested for undermining their position as a nation in AP Kosovo and represented
the rights granted to the Albanian nationality (education in their own language, national
symbols etc.) as a threat to their own identity. Furthermore, they also represented the
provincial leadership as complicit in undermining their national position.
The regime’s response to the protests of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins was ambiguous.
Although provincial, republican and federal authorities condemned the protests, they also
acknowledged that their migration as a nation group formed part of the Kosovo problem.
Consequently, the regime represented its reversal as central to suturing the dislocated
relationship between national identities in AP Kosovo.43
The AP Kosovo leadership acknowledged that the migration of Serbs/Montenegrins
was a product of overt and covert pressure and policies were introduced to reverse it. To
redress the unequal position of the Serbian/Montenegrin nation in Kosovo, the Provin-
cial Commission for the Prevention of Emigration was established and the Municipal
Assembly took steps to guarantee jobs for the Serbs/Montenegrins that wished to re-
turn to Kosovo.44 These practices were represented as attempts to foster harmonious
national relationships in the province, but in practice they discriminated against locals in
employment and politicized national difference.45 The provincial leadership maintained
that the principle of national equality should not be undermined when struggling against
nationalism, and that all Albanians should not be grouped under the nationalist denom-
inator.46 In doing so, the provincial leadership worked towards de-antagonising Albanian
43Rise of Tension in Kosovo Due to Migration, 28 June 1983. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-
8-3-12166; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Background Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http:
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:97db0e37-5591-41ba-ab43-77a65e5c4b42 (visited on 02/16/2016).
44Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 15 December 1986.
45See Fadil Hoxa and Ilijaz Kurtesi statements in: Rise of Tension in Kosovo Due to Migration, 28
June 1983.
46For instance, Sinan Hasani’s statement about the Kosovo problem in Solutions Sought to the Koso-
var Problem, 19 April 1984. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12172; Records of Radio Free Eu-
rope/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports; Open Society
Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
1db78e36-39a3-490b-b6a1-26044ad449dd (visited on 02/16/2016), and the report in Situation Report:
Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986.
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and Serb/Montenegrin identities in the province and remained within the boundaries of
the hegemonic system of social division. The cardinal concern of the provincial leadership
was to keep the involvement of SR Serbian and federal institutions in AP Kosovo to the
minimum. To be able to do so, they represented the relationship between nations and
nationalities in Kosovo as continually improving.47 This ‘positive’ image conflicted with
Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins’ contention that the situation in AP Kosovo was a ‘lawless
and unbearable’.48
The federal leadership also acknowledged the migration of Serbs/Montenegrins to be
a problem and instituted rules to reverse it. From their perspective, the migrations were
caused by AP Kosovo’s economic underdevelopment and high unemployment rate, while
the economic conditions made Kosovo’s working class susceptible to all forms of nation-
alism.49 In November 1986, the Yugoslavian Presidency held a special session devoted to
AP Kosovo and the problem of emigration. The Prime Minister instructed all socialist
organizations in SR Serbia and AP Kosovo to work together towards developing Kosovo’s
economy and, in doing so, reverse the migrations. The Croatian delegate in the State
Presidency, stressed that the ‘stabilization of [...] Kosovo must be the affair of the entire
country’ and criticised the counter-revolutionary attempts of Albanian irredentists ‘to
break the chain of socialism in Yugoslavia at its most sensitive link’. He also criticised
the Kosovo Serb/Montenegrin protesters for representing all Albanians as ‘foreigners’ that
furthered the interest of irredentists and traitors, and for contributing to the emigration
of their own nation from the province.50
Although federal institutions did not represent the Kosovo problem in national terms,
the rules implemented as a solution to the problem exacerbated divisions along national
lines. For instance, groups composed of federal and SR Serbian officials were set up to over-
see investigations and decisions in legal cases involving Albanians against non-Albanians.
47Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 March 1986.
48In contrast to the provincial leadership’s representation, and to legitimize their own demands and
mobilize more protesters, the Serbs/Montenegrins engaged in rumour campaigns and exaggerated the
scale of activities against them. See: Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the
Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization, p. 105.
49Rise of Tension in Kosovo Due to Migration, 28 June 1983.
50Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 15 December 1986.
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The burden of proof in these cases was placed on Albanians. Furthermore, the right of
Albanians to acquire property from Serbs/Montenegrins was suspended through a ban
of so called ‘ethnically motivated’ sales of property.51 The acknowledgement that the
provincial legal system was possibly nationally biased, the introduction of nation specific
bans of property sales, and the fact that the (national) migration was discussed at the
federal level as part and parcel of the Yugoslavian crisis, were all evidence of the regime’s
responsiveness to the pressures exerted by Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins.
The leadership of SR Serbia used the protests of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins to legit-
imise the position that its ability to secure law and order was impaired by the ambiguous
definition of the relationship between the provinces and SR Serbia in the constitution. On
the LCS’s initiative, the Presidency set up a Constitutional Commission to investigate,
among other things, the constitutional position of SR Serbia as part of the Yugoslavian
crisis. In 1986 the Commission included the status of SR Serbia in a set of issues that
need to be considered when proposing constitutional amendments.52 However, the Ser-
bian leadership did not endorse the demands articulated by the protesters. To halt the
protest marches to Belgrade the head of the LCS Ivan Stambolić visited Kosovo Polje in
April 1986. He urged Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins not to leave the province and warned
them of potential manipulations of their justified discontent by the enemies of Yugoslavia.
He remained within the boundaries of the hegemonic system of social division in claiming
that:
I am convinced that in the Kosovo League of Communists, among the Albanians as
well as among the Serbian and Montenegrin nations [. . . ] there is enough strength
to beat the counter-revolution [. . . ] Do not allow a bunch of irredentist [. . . ] to
51Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], p. 71; Situation Report: Yu-
goslavia, 17 July 1986. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-216-7; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Cen-
tral European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:3c05ac96-dfc7-4091-
bb7a-84c90f0d4b7b (visited on 02/16/2016); and Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 15 December 1986.
52The others issues included the status of public ownership, the relations between the re-
publics/autonomous provinces and the central government, creating a unified Yugoslav market, protecting
the common interests of the country as a whole and federal system of planning. Thus the position of
SR Serbia was represented as forming part of the Yugoslavian crisis by 1986. See: Situation Report:
Yugoslavia, 20 November 1986. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-216-11; Records of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society
Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
78f759fc-a4ae-45a4-9f33-532de5d78006 (visited on 02/16/2016).
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poison relationships between Serbs and Albanians here, and do not allow a bunch
of Serbian nationalists to do the same!53
However, Stambolić’s speech failed to pacify the protesters and they continued marching
to Belgrade throughout 1986. In response, the Serbian leadership ordered the police to
block the roads to the capital and prevent the protest marches.54 The inability of the sit-
ting Serbian leadership to acknowledge their demands and represent their interests only
antagonised the protesters further, and expanded the discontent with the provincial lead-
ership to include the LCS’s leadership.
The ambiguity of the regime’s response to the protests of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins,
in contrast to the straight forward exclusion of those staged by Albanians in 1981, can be
accounted for through the different subject positions the groups occupied in the order, as
well as by the content of their demands. Since the leadership had already represented the
Albanian protests in the province as a fermenting counter-revolution driven by national-
ists, the enemy of the regime, and the enemy against which Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins
articulated their demands, overlapped at one level. In this sense, part of their grievances
were in continuity with the official representation of the Albanian protests. In addi-
tion, given the difference in the manner in which the two groups were constituted within
the order, the Serbian/Montenegrin’s were a priori relatively more included, since their
protests could not be represented as driven by an external antagonistic nation. Unlike
the Albanian protesters, the Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins neither questioned the integrity
of Yugoslavia nor the legitimacy of the order as such. They simply blamed the provincial
leadership for failing to impose order and protect their constitutionally granted rights.
They gradually extended their dissatisfaction to include the sitting Serbian leadership, on
the same grounds. The Albanians, on the other hand, demanded a territorial reorganiza-
tion of the federation which, if realised, would have dislocated the constitutional position
of other republics and provinces.
It is important to note that the legal practices instituted in response to the protests
of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins indicated that the regime acknowledged their particular
53An excerpt from Ivan Stambolić’s speech in Kosovo Polje quoted in: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that
Withered Away, p. 246.
54Ibid., p. 248.
181
position as unequal vis-a-vis the Albanians in the province. However, these practices
contributed to the politicization of national difference. On the one hand, the attempts
to suture the dislocations discriminated against Albanians as a national group while,
on the other, they failed to absorb the demands of the protesting Serbs/Montenegrins
in an all-encompassing way. The regime could not absorb the demands of protesting
Serbs/Montenegrins within the framework of the existing order, without altering the bal-
ance of forces articulated through it. Satisfying the demand to remove the provincial
leadership, for instance, would have meant that an alliance between extra-party forces
and the Serbian leadership was forming, and that it was antagonistic to fellow commu-
nists in the leadership. Furthermore, the sitting provincial leadership was installed in
response to the 1981 protests precisely because it was in line with LCY’s interpretation
of the events. Satisfying the demand to take back the rights granted to Albanians as a
nationality for instance, would have transformed the terms under which national equality
was decontested within the order and altered the subject positions of other nations and
nationalities.
The demands of both protesting groups resembled one another in linking the disloca-
tion of their freedom and equality to the existing constitution and demanding its alter-
ation. Their discourses were antagonistic because they demanded constitutional changes
in diametrically opposite directions (decentralise-centralise), but their underlying logic
was very similar. Both politicised national difference and equality with the aim of trans-
forming the balance of forces articulated through the existing order. In a broader sense,
the contending claims about equality, justice and the constitutional order rendered visible
the failure of the existing constitutional rules to decontest national identities into subject
positions. Their nation-centric articulation also rendered visible the limits of the regimes’
reading of events as forming part and parcel of the working class struggle constitutive of
the existing imaginary. These discursive failures were picked up by a group of Serbian
intellectuals and, after Milošević came to power in 1987, they also made their way into
the LCS’s discourse on Kosovo.
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7.3.3 The Serbian intellectuals: the mythical dimension to the Kosovo prob-
lem
In contrast to the Serbian leadership, a group of intellectuals in Belgrade endorsed the de-
mands of the protesting Serbs/Montenegrins, inscribed them within the context of the all
Yugoslavian crisis and articulated an alternative space of representation centered around
a unified Serbian national subject. Their reading of events ran against the hegemonic
conception of social unity and the representation of nations as constitutively divided into
members that are included (class) and those that are excluded (counter-revolutionaries,
nationalists, liberals, etc.). It flipped the relationship between the Yugoslavian and the
national upside down, by making the national central to politics, and rendering Yugosla-
vian identity contingent upon it. To do so, they first represented the existing order as
already underpinned by national particularities.
In January 1986, 212 Serbian intellectuals signed a petition addressing the Federal and
the Serbian Assemblies in support of the October 1985 petition of Kosovo Serbs/ Mon-
tenegrins.55 To add political weight to the petition they represented it as a plebiscite,
signalling it articulated a universal position rather than a particular reading of events.
The intellectuals represented the condemnation of the petition-plebiscite by the regime
as the reason for their involvement in the debate. They expressed their support for the
demand for ‘radical measures that would ensure the nation and all of its constitutional
rights and prevent the forced exodus from its ancient hearths’.56 Furthermore, the intel-
lectuals maintained that the dislocations experienced by the Serbian nation in AP Kosovo
were also caused by the failure of the Serbian state to ‘help and protect its nation’.57 The
protesting Serbs/Albanians articulated their demands against the provincial leadership
55According to Magaš, the petitioners were representative of Belgrade intellectuals. The signatories
included 52 professors and among them 34 members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences, six retired
army generals, and 1 member of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Orthodox priests. The petition
was also signed by three former Praxis editors which formed part of the so called ‘Yugoslavian critical
left’: Zagorka Golubović, Mihailo Marković and Ljuba Tadić. The petition was also supported by Milan
Kangrga a Praxis editor from Croatia. Magaš claims the petition marked the ‘consolidation of [. . . ] a
political gravitational centre outside of the LCY and to its right’. For her analysis of the petition and its
significance see: Magaš, The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up [1980-92], pp. 52-53.
56“Petition by Belgrade Intellectuals”. In: The Destruction of Yugoslavia: Tracking the Break-up
[1980-92]. London: Verso, 1993, p. 49.
57Ibid., p. 50.
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for failing to secure law and order and never mentioned the Serbian state as a protector
of their national identity.
The intellectuals’ position was articulated in a dramatic and emotionally-laden tone.
They spoke in the name of:
All of those who have been shaken by the suffering of Serbs and other nationali-
ties in Kosovo and Metohija, all those who are concerned for the destiny of Serbia
and Yugoslavia, all those in whom conscience and a sense of responsibility are not
dead[...]58
Those that failed to respond to the suffering of Serbs were represented as apathetic towards
Serbia and Yugoslavia within their discourse. In this sense, they equated the destiny of
the Serbian nation in AP Kosovo with the destiny of the Yugoslavian order as such.
The experience of national suffering and the migrations from the province were not
represented as caused by the 1974 Constitution nor the counter-revolutionary activities
of enemies. According to the petition, they were part of a ‘chronicle of a long, destructive
genocide on European territory [. . . ] going on for three centuries’.59 The new element
in the sequence of historical abuses was the enemy embodied in the Albanian state and
the ruling institutions in Kosovo associated with it, which were working towards mak-
ing Kosovo ethnically pure. Developments on the ground were articulated as products
of a systematic policy of genocide that could expand to include the territories of Serbia,
Macedonia and Montenegro.60 The Albanians were represented as the national minority
that had ‘the greatest constitutional rights in the world’ while the Serbian nation in AP
Kosovo as one whose right to autonomy had been systematically undermined and abused.
Furthermore, the entire legal-constitutional order of the country was deemed complicit
because it was being ‘harnessed to hide such a crime’.61 Their discourse was thus antago-
nistic to any position that defended the existing constitutional order on the grounds that
it tacitly supported the genocide in Kosovo.
The Belgrade intellectuals also contested the regime’s reading of the situation in
Kosovo by representing it as mere ‘ideological babble’ that served as an ‘alibi’ for them to





remain in power.62 Speaking in the name of the Serbian nation as an undivided political
subject, the petition asserted that ‘no nation willingly gives up its right to exist’ and
that the Serbian nation would ‘not be an exception to this rule’.63 To prevent genocide
in Kosovo they demanded a deep social and political transformation of Yugoslavia that
included: changes in the relationship between the autonomous provinces and SR Serbia,
the right to spiritual identity, the right to defend the foundations of Serbian national
culture and the right to ‘the physical survival of the nation on its land’. The protesters,
in contrast, did not raised their demands as part of a broader national subject that
shared a common spirit and culture with Serbs across Yugoslavia. Furthermore, while
the protesters never mentioned any systemic transformation of the Yugoslavian power
structure but simply demanded that the LCY protect their rights, the Belgrade intellec-
tuals demanded ‘democratic reforms’ to ensure ‘a firm juridical order and ensure equal
rights for all citizens’.64 In this sense, the petition expanded the scope of the contestations
significantly.
A Memorandum drafted by Serbian Academy of Sciences in September 1986 further
substantiated critique of the existing order and the role of the Serbian nation, as a unified
subject, in its transformation.65 The logic underpinning the Memorandum was that the
1974 Constitution, formed part and parcel of (a) particular national project(s) and was
not, as the LCY maintained, the expression of a universal self-managing project and the
interests of the Yugoslavian working class.
The deepening economic crisis and the leadership’s inability to resolve it were rep-
resented through elements that formed part of the debate on the issue, as discussed in
Chapter 6. The Memorandum represented Yugoslavia’s economic crisis as caused by the
decentralised and fragmented economic system. The failure of the leadership to resolve
the problems was represented as a deliberate strategy of the republican leaderships to pre-
62“Petition by Belgrade Intellectuals”, p. 51.
63Ibid., p. 50.
64Ibid., pp. 50-51.
65For a detailed analysis of the activities of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences see: Oliv-
era Milosavljević. “Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke [The abuse of the authority of science]”. In: Srpska
strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamćenju Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom
pamćenju [The Serb Side of the War: Trauma and Catharsis in Historical Memory]. Ed. by Nebojša
Popov. Beograd: Republika, 1996.
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serve their own hegemony. To resolve the problem, the Memorandum claimed, they would
have to go beyond their particular interests and go against the constitutional order that
secured their hegemony. The Yugoslavian economic terrain was represented as fragmented
into eight economic areas rooted, ideologically, in the notion of ‘national economies’66 and
the regime as a symbiosis of ‘nationalism, separatism and power-love’.67 It is important
to note that, in interpreting the crisis, the Belgrade intellectuals represented the exist-
ing order as the embodiment of national particularism. The sitting leaderships were not
delegating the interests of their republican classes according to the Memorandum, but
exclusively of their nations.
The 1974 Constitution, discussed in Chapter 5, was represented as inconsistent with
its premises. It claimed that Yugoslavia was a federation while in reality, due to the
decision-making rules, procedures for constituting federal bodies, the centrality of the
republics in implementing federal laws and the absence of an institution that represents
the Yugoslavian working class as a whole, it transformed Yugoslavia into a confedera-
tion.68 Furthermore, the existing system of power was represented as underpinned by the
‘primacy of the national’ because republics were granted statehood while federal powers
were hollowed out. In this sense, the Memorandum maintained, the political realities in
Yugoslavia were in complete contradiction with the LCY’s universal working class project.
The gap between ‘reality’ and ‘theory’ was to be blamed on the 1974 Constitution, which
brought about the institutionalization of national particularism.69
The inconsistencies were not unintended failures or shortcomings. Rather, they were
represented as produced by the consolidation of the national projects of Yugoslavia’s two
most developed republics, SR Slovenia and Croatia. From this perspective, what was
represented as incoherent, with its own premises, attained coherence. The 1974 Constitu-
tional rules were articulated as designed exclusively by the two republics which ‘tailored
66The Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. The Memorandum (a draft). Autumn 1986. [Electronic






the social and economic system of Yugoslavia, according to their own needs’.70
The idea of self-management, the signifier basing and limiting the imaginary horizon,
was articulated as infused by the same particularism. The Memorandum maintained it
was subject to the hegemony of ‘territorialized leadership’ which defined its scope, form
and meaning. In this sense, it was just an instrument for realising their power and not a
social formation that Yugoslavia was becoming towards.71 The Memorandum represented
self-management as ‘a beautifying principle, not the foundation of society’ and claimed
that all of the elements of order were structurally dislocated, since there was ‘no real eco-
nomic planning, nor market, nor state’.72 The delegate and assembly systems were added
to the chain of failures, since territorial leaders decided on the delegates and not the
workers themselves.73 The Memorandum’s reading of the existing order thus unmasked
self-management’s mythical character and revealed there was nothing beyond the politi-
cal terrain grounding it. The Memorandum added the LCY’s legitimacy to the chain of
failures and claimed that it was based exclusively on the ‘revolutionary currency’ earned
during WWII. In the present, the party had ‘coalesced’ with the state and transformed
into a conservative force whose only function was to ‘engage in long and fruitless discus-
sions that created the illusion of political activity’.74 The party talked about revolution
but prevented any change in practice.
Due to this chain of failures, the Memorandum represented the Yugoslavian crisis
as moral rather than economic or political. It maintained that the value system of the
Yugoslavian society was ‘unknown’.75 To suture it, the Memorandum demanded the trans-
formation of Yugoslavia into a democratically integrated federation, in which institutions
were ‘democratically constituted’ and decision-making driven by ‘a free, rational, public
dialogue’. In contrast, the existing system was represented as driven by ‘the combinatorics
of self-declared and self-elected protectors of national interests, taking place behind the








It was only after this all-encompassing critique of the existing order that the Mem-
orandum carved out a new political agent that could transform it. The agent was the
Serbian nation represented as a coherent unified identity, that was both the victim of the
existing order and the only universal position from which Yugoslavia could be transformed
and ‘saved’.
To politicize Serbian national identity, the Memorandum contested the tenet that na-
tions were equal within the self-managing order, and mapped out the ways in which the
Serbian national question was in reality ‘unresolved’.77 These included the failure to con-
stitute Serbia as a state of the Serbian nation, the failure to protect the rights of Serbs
outside of SR Serbia and in the provinces, as well as the economic exploitation of SR
Serbia by SRs Slovenia and Croatia.78 Furthermore, the Memorandum maintained that
the very frontiers of the Yugoslavian imaginary, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, were
drawn in antagonism to the Serbian nation. The hegemonic system of social unity and
division was put in place to subjugate and pacify the Serbian nation by representing it
as ‘oppressive, unitarist, centralist, police-like’ and imbue it with a paralysing sense of
guilt. While the LCY claimed that the nations were constitutively split between those
that were included and excluded, the Memorandum thus maintained that, in practice,
the entire nation was represented through the attributes of the ‘old’ Serbian bourgeoisie.
It concluded that ‘despite having sacrificed itself the most for the creation of socialist
Yugoslavia, the Serbian nation had failed to realise its national equality’.79
The Memorandum omitted that the frontiers of the Yugoslavian imaginary worked to
decontest all nations and nationalities, and not just the Serbian. Furthermore, it rep-
resented the Slovenian and Croatian nations having already realised their fullness in the
1974 Constitution and ‘through long term politics against Serbia’.80 The differences be-
tween SR Slovenia and Croatia were dissolved and the two republics represented as the






same due to ‘a common historical destiny, religion, desire for greater independence and,
as the two most developed countries [...] the same economic interests’. Furthermore, they
united politically to ‘forge a lasting coalition in the struggle for power’. The Memoran-
dum represented Josip Broz Tito and Edvard Kardelj as embodiments of this anti-Serbian
coalition, simply because Tito was Croatian and Kardelj Slovenian.81 Following the same
logic, the entire order was in fact the working of the Croat-Slovene coalition that was
driven by the principle of ‘a weak Serbia for a strong Yugoslavia’.82 The failure to define
‘narrow Serbia’ constitutionally, in contrast to the constitutionally defined autonomy of
SR Serbia’s provinces, was also represented as a deliberate strategy against the Serbian
nation.83 In contrast to the sitting LCS leadership, the Memorandum claimed that this
was ‘not about the legal interpretation and proper implementation of the existing consti-
tution’ but about ‘the Serbian nation and its state [and] the fact that after four decades
of living in Yugoslavia, the Serbs do not have their own state’.84 This was ‘the worse
possible defeat in peace-time imaginable’85 and the ‘exodus’ of Serbs from Kosovo was
just a ‘spectacular witness of this historical defeat’.86
Lastly, the Memorandum was very critical of the sitting Serbian leadership because it
failed to address the unequal position of the Serbian nation and criticise the institutional
divisions erected to divide it from within. It represented the leadership as ‘unprepared
for the historical task arising from the exceptionally difficult constellation of forces in the
Yugoslavian community’.87
The Memorandum’s reading of the Yugoslavian crisis was based on the conception that
national difference translates into political division. Although this was a new conception
of the nature of social division, the Memorandum represented the hegemonic order as
already structured by this logic. Furthermore, it carved out a Serbian national identity
as the only agent that could subvert the existing balance of forces and ‘save’ the universal









The implications of the petition and the Memorandum were far reaching. On the one
hand, they showed that an alliance outside of the LCS was forming between the protesting
Serbs/Montenegrins and the intellectuals in Belgrade. On the other hand, this alliance
was weaved together through a new conception of social unity that was articulated through
the signifier (Serbian) nation and contested the hegemony of the LCY. The Yugoslavian
leadership denounced the Memorandum as an expression of ‘destructive anti-socialism’
and maintained that it would implement stern measures against forces that were working
to reverse ‘the direction of socialist self-management’.88 The sitting Serbian leadership,
drew on the hegemonic conception of social division and contested the Memorandum’s
representation of the nation and its interests, by claiming that it was in fact against its
‘real’ interest. According to Ivan Stambolić the Memorandum was:
[...]the old chauvinist concern for the fate of the Serbian cause with the well-known
formula that Serbs will win wars but lose in peace [...] In short, the so called
Memorandum, more precisely, [...] could be entitled ‘In Memoriam’ for Yugoslavia,
Serbia, socialism, self-management, equality, brotherhood and unity [...] Essentially,
it is diametrically opposed to the interests of Serbs throughout Yugoslavia.89
In sum, the contending demands for national equality emerging in AP Kosovo and the
failure of the regime to suture the dislocations opened up the space for alternative read-
ings of events on the ground. The Belgrade intellectuals articulated the Kosovo problem
within a new system of representation that centred on the notion that national difference
translated into political division. They also expanded their critique to include the legit-
imacy of the LCY and questioned its hegemonic position. It was within this discursive
context, that Slobodan Milošević became a hegemonic figure in the LCS after 1987.
88Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 20 November 1986. The LCY decided to cut public funding to the all
institutions at odds with socialist criteria. See: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 252.
89An excerpt from Ivan Stambolić’s speech at Belgrade University from October 1986, quoted in: Julie
Mertus. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999,
pp. 140-141.
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7.4 Slobodan Milošević’s Transformist Anti-bureaucratic Revo-
lution and the New Constitutional Concept
Slobodan Milošević weaved together a transformist project that absorbed the demands
emerging from society, by putting himself and the LCS forward as part of the Yugosla-
vian institutional order that would improve the position of Kosovo’s Serbs/Albanians,
transform the constitution of SR Serbia and resolve the Yugoslavian crisis. While this
strategy worked to consolidate the legitimacy of the LCS in its republican context, and
to decrease the antagonistic potential of the Serbian intellectuals and the protesting
Serbs/Montenegrins, the strategy had a divisive effect on the LCY. Gradually, a clear
cut political frontier between the LCS and LC Slovenia crystallized within the federal
party, and led to a total break between the LC Slovenia and the LCS leadership in 1989.
7.4.1 The rise of Slobodan Milošević and the absorption of social demands
During a visit to AP Kosovo in April 1987, Milošević, then the President of Serbia’s
Party Presidency, listened to the grievances of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins who stormed
a meeting of delegates he was attending. He defended them against the provincial police
which tried to prevent them from entering, by stating that ‘nobody neither now nor in
the future has the right to beat you’. Thereafter, the protesting Serbs/Montenegrins saw
in him a representative of the institutional order that understood and acknowledged their
difficult position as non-Albanians.90 Milošević pushed for a a special session of CC LCY
on Kosovo in June 1987 and in it he demanded the formulation of and efficient systematic
approach to the Kosovo problem. This included holding former communist party leaders,
that worked towards granting Kosovo autonomy in the 1970s, accountable for the 1981
90Between 10,000 and 15,000 Serbs/Montenegrins stormed into the meeting of delegates. For details
about the event see: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 4 May 1987. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
47-217-3; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http :
//hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:b78fccf4-fad4-46a4-b290-b00c7181fe8a (visited on 02/16/2016);
and Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991, p. 227.
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riots and for supporting Albanian nationalists.91 Defending the protesters in Kosovo from
the provincial police, and acting in accordance with their demands, marked the beginning
of a new alliance forged between a segment of the LCS and the forces external to the
party. The alliance was based on the agreement that the protesters would ‘channel their
initiatives towards official organizations and halt non-institutional action’ in return for
Milošević’s support in institutions.92
After forging an alliance with forces external to the party, Milošević used the critique
against the sitting LCS leadership to consolidate his hegemony within it. Up until 1987,
the LCS was committed to the struggle against all nationalism, Albanian and Serbian, on
equal terms. Milošević, and the LCS after he became its central figure, articulated a new
position regarding the Kosovo problem and nationalism, one grounded in a differentiation
between Albanian terrorism and Serbian nationalism. Between September and December
1987, those that maintained that Serbian and Albanian nationalism presented an equal
threat to Serbia and Yugoslavia were purged from the LCS because of their ‘soft-approach’
to the problem.93
The purges and the new discourse on Kosovo articulated by the LCS also brought
it close to the position articulated by the intellectuals. This was evident in Milošević’s
representation of the purges in the LCS and the Kosovo problem as part and parcel of a
pressing historical task:
A great, virtually historic mobilization is under way in the Serbian party and Cen-
tral Committee. Solving the Kosovo situation is no longer just a political task; it
is a matter of out honour before history and our children [. . . ] the situation in
Kosovo cannot be resolved by pen-pushing, and there is no place for pen-pushing
91His requests resulted in the purge of the by then retired Fadil Hoxha, the former head of LC Kosovo
and Yugoslav Presidency, for ignoring the essence of national equality and the struggle against great
Albanian nationalism. By calling into question his credibility, Kosovo’s autonomous status, achieved
under his leadership, was also questioned. See: Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution:
Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization, pp. 68, 101.
92Ibid., pp. 102, 104.
93For detailed analysis of the Eight Session of CC the LCS after which Milošević became the leader of
the LCS see: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 268-282. For an analysis of the divisions
within the Serbian party before the purges see: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 22 October 1987. [Electronic
record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-217-10; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute:
Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University,
Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:6102a925-344b-4015-933b-0d355f239c91




It sounded like a reply to the Memorandum’s critique of the old LC Serbian leadership,
in the form of an assurance that the new leadership knows exactly what is at stake.
Furthermore, this discursive shift was also marked by a new representation of the existing
constitutional order that resembled that of the intellectuals. From being a matter of
properly implementing the 1974 Constitution, the issue was now represented as a matter
of the Serbian state, its diminished power within the existing order, and the discontent
of its people. Regarding these issues Milošević claimed that:
Serbia is the only republic in Yugoslavia [. . . ] that does not have the basic rights
of a state on its territory; this cannot go on any longer [. . . ] Serbia did not take
it upon itself to have two provinces in order to become a second class republic and
abolish itself [. . . ] The people will not tolerate this!95
In practical terms, the new leadership sought to integrate a ‘truncated’ Serbia by es-
tablishing a unified judiciary, defence, and security system, a single foreign policy, and
a social/financial plan on the whole of its territory.96 In demanding unification in this
form, the LCS was contesting the autonomy of the provinces and challenging the power
of the provincial leaderships. The demands for centralising in this direction overlapped
completely with the intellectuals’ solution to the problem. However, since the provincial
leaderships had to consent to all amendments to SR Serbia’s constitution according to ex-
isting constitutional rules, realising these demands necessitated forging alliances between
the provincial leaderships and the new Serbian leadership. Furthermore, these leaderships
had to willingly consent to a transformist political project that would result in a decrease
in their own power.
94Yugoslavia’s "Serbian Question", 22 July 1988. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-3-12271; Records
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Background Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/




7.4.2 The anti-bureaucratic revolution: deepening the LCS’s hegemony and
the new constitutional concept
To be able to change the constitution of SR Serbia, the LCS forged alliances with social
forces antagonistic to the sitting leadership of LC Vojvodina and forced their resigna-
tion. Similar events, albeit more dramatic, unfolded in SR Montenegro. Faced with a
completely different set of circumstances in AP Kosovo, the Serbian leadership purged
the sitting AP Kosovo leadership on the grounds that it had failed to implement its new
Kosovo policy. Through these events, and the political divisions that they gave rise to,
the meaninglessness of the hegemonic system of social division was rendered even more
visible.
Before moving on to an analysis of the events and reactions that emerged in response
to them, it is necessary to explain the broader logic that gave them a degree of unity.
The events in AP Vojvodina, SR Montenegro and sporadic rallies in ‘narrow Serbia’ were,
according to their participants both ‘rallies of solidarity’ and an ‘anti-bureaucratic revo-
lution’. The rallies attempted to mobilize as many people as possible behind the demands
of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and represented Milošević as the ‘positive’ segment of the
institutional order that would meet their demands and resolve the Serbian problem. Since
they centred on the notion of the Serbian nation, understood as a unified subject, they
usually failed to draw the support of non-Serbs and in practice worked towards unifying
the Serbian population across Yugoslavia into a single project. Eventually, as I will dis-
cuss in the following chapter, they also expanded to Serb majority parts of SR Croatia.
However, the rallies also expanded their scope of reference to a broader critique of the
Yugoslavian order and represented it as paralysed by the bureaucracy’s unwillingness to
introduce reforms. In contrast, Slobodan Milošević was praised as the ‘positive’ power
holder, willing to implement revolutionary changes and rid the working class and citizens
of the evil bureaucracy. In this sense, the contestations also addressed the struggle of
the working class against the bureaucracy alienating its power and could be inclusive of
the entire working class. Because of this ambiguity, the contestations amounted to the
expansion of the chain of equivalence between the LCS, the intellectuals, the dissatisfied
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Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and the members of the working class that supported social-
ism and wanted reform.
The first rallies of solidarity were staged in AP Vojvodina in the summer of 1988 by
members of the local branch of the Socialist Alliance that supported the LCS’s demands
for change and a newly formed Committee of Kosovo’s Serbs and Montenegrins. The
speakers demanded that the provincial leadership support the LCS’s position with re-
gards to AP Kosovo and Serbian unity. Initially, the provincial leadership rejected these
demands and claimed the rallies were just ‘a power ploy aimed at reducing provincial au-
tonomy by playing on Serbian national emotions’.97 In September 1988, a rally of 30,000
Serbs/Montenegrins was held in the southern part of Serbia to denounce the harassment
of Serbs in AP Kosovo and mobilize Serbs living outside of the province behind their
cause. The speakers at the rally criticized the Yugoslavian regime for ‘tolerating Alba-
nian nationalism’, supported Milošević’s ‘hard-line on Kosovo’ and the amendments that
would put the two provinces under Belgrade’s control.98 Thereafter, six consecutive rallies
involving around 100,000 people were held across ‘narrow Serbia’, SR Montenegro and AP
Vojvodina. Those gathered chanted ‘we want arms’, ‘Kosovo is Serbia, Vojvodina is Ser-
bia’, ‘we want freedom in Kosovo’ and ‘we love you Slobodan’. They were also organized
by the local bodies of the Socialist Alliance and the Committee of Kosovo Serbs and Mon-
tenegrins. The crowds comprised of a mix of local inhabitants and Serbs/Montenegrins
from Kosovo.99 The Committee of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins asked for permission
to hold rallies in SR Slovenia and SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, but their requests were re-
jected by the republican authorities.100 By October, the rallies in AP Vojvodina expanded
to include workers dissatisfied with wages and unemployment, as well as students. Under
pressure from a massive two day ‘anti-bureaucratic’ protest, estimated to include between
97Yugoslavia’s "Serbian Question", 22 July 1988.
98Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-218-8;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:9acfd12b-8aa2-4f1c-addc-0751c67811de (visited on 02/16/2016).
99Ibid.
100Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 308.
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20,000 and 100,000 people, the sitting leadership of LC Vojvodina resigned.101 The new
leadership was in line with the LCS’s transformist project.
The LCY was divided internally about the nature of the rallies and their relationship
to the existing order. On the one hand, the leaderships of SR Slovenia, SR Croatia, and
SR Bosnia and Herzegovina supported AP Vojvodina’s leadership, while the Kosovo lead-
ership represented them as identical to the counter-revolutionary protests of Albanians
in 1981.102 The LCY ordered all republics to act against the rallies, demanding that the
LCS to do likewise and prevent them from occurring in the future.103 The Yugoslavian
Presidency maintained that the rallies were ‘forms of pressure and undemocratic methods’
that were ‘causing immeasurable damage to all nationalities of Yugoslavia’.104
The LCS, on the other hand, rejected this interpretation all together and represented
the rallies in a completely different light. First, the Serbian leadership claimed the rallies
were not expressions of nationalism, since those gathered came in support of the vic-
tims of (Albanian) nationalism and could not be equated with the Albanian separatist
offenders.105 To justify the uni-national mobilization driving the rallies, which ran against
LCY’s representation of social division, Milošević explained that:
People can gather only on the grounds on which they feel attacked and endangered.
They are attacked as Serbs and Montenegrins; they are leaving their homes as Serbs
and Montenegrins, and therefore they defend themselves as Serbs and Montenegrins.
They cannot defend or gather as Dutch or Protestants, or as cotton plantation
workers, since none of them is threatened for being one of these.106
Second, the protests against the sitting Vojvodina leadership were represented through
101Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 11 October 1988. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-218-9; Records
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports;
Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/
10891/osa:dfa06996-70df-4ef3-b6b2-0f2c551d0786 (visited on 02/16/2016). For an detailed analysis
of events and circumstances see: Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall
of Communism and Nationalist Mobilization, pp. 157-160.
102Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988 ; and Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered
Away, p. 309.
103Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nation-
alist Mobilization, p. 147.
104Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988.
105Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nation-
alist Mobilization, p. 147; Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 309; and Situation Report:
Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988.
106Excerpt from Slobodan Milošević’s speech at the joint Session of the Serbian state and party presi-
dencies held in September 5, 1988. Quoted in: Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 310.
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the self-managing discourse, as expressions of popular discontent with the bureaucracy
that tried to preserve the status quo. In what amounted to a ‘justified’ anti-bureaucratic
reaction, the people had taken politics into their own hands. According to Milošević:
The demand of the working people and citizens gathered in Novi Sad [Vojvodina]
that the provincial leadership submit its resignation expresses the views and will of
the great majority of the working people and citizens of Vojvodina, because through
its policy and attitudes toward the key problems of the Socialist Republic of Serbia
and Yugoslavia, the provincial leadership has lost its reputation and the trust of the
people and thus the ability to represent their demands and interest.107
The day after the resignation of Vojvodina’s leadership, massive demonstrations of in-
dustrial workers, students and citizens broke out in SR Montenegro. They lasted, on
and off, from October 1988 until January 1989. The protesters demanded the resigna-
tion of the republic’s leadership, higher wages, a hard line against Albanian separatists
in Kosovo, and supported the constitutional changes proposed by the Serbian leadership.
They clashed with the police and, in an attempt restore order, the state of emergency
was introduced for the first time since the Kosovo Albanian riots in 1981. In January
1989, under immense social pressure, Montenegro’s leadership resigned and was replaced
by supporters of the LCS’s transformist project.108
The LCY divided along the same lines regarding the events in SR Montenegro. Ini-
tially, the leaderships of SR Slovenia, SR Croatia, and SR Bosnia and Herzegovina sup-
ported the leadership of SR Montenegro. The Slovenian leadership accused the LCS of
driving the protests and deliberately creating disorder.109 The spill over of protests from
SR Serbia into another republic raised concerns in SR Croatia and SR Bosnia and Herze-
govina in particular because of their national composition. Their leaderships feared the
rallies could spill over to the territories under their control and demand their own res-
ignation. The federal party leadership and the Federal Presidency also supported the
sitting Montenegrin leaders and declared a state of emergency in the republic to protect
it and re-establish order. The central party leadership claimed that nationalist forces were
demanding personnel changes and manipulating workers’ protests, and that the Serbian
107Excerpt from Slobodan Milošević’s speech from the special session of the Presidium of the LCS, held
in October 6, 1988. Quoted in: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 11 October 1988.
108Ibid.
109Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 311.
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nationalist platform sought to undermine the Yugoslavian order.110
In contrast, the Serbian leadership publicly supported the protests in SR Montenegro
and represented them as embodying ‘the justified demands of the workers and citizens
of Montenegro [...] their socialist character and orientation towards brotherhood and
unity’.111 They also demanded evidence for the Slovenian contention that the LCS was
organizing protests in other republics. The accusation was represented as forming part
and parcel of LC Slovenian’s attempts to destabilise Yugoslavia by antagonising national
identities.112
In AP Kosovo, the Serbian leadership faced a completely different set of circum-
stances. Unlike Vojvodina and Montenegro, where pressure against the sitting leader-
ship could be exerted through existing social grievances about the position of Kosovo’s
Serbs/Montenegrins, economic dissatisfaction and demands for constitutional change and
leadership resignation, in Kosovo Milošević could only put himself forward as a leader
that could bring about favourable changes among the relatively small group of Kosovo’s
Serbs/ Montenegrins. Consequently, the LCS’s hegemonic aspirations could not have been
articulated as the democratic struggle of the people against ‘evil’ bureaucrats that were
preventing constitutional changes. In response to the circumstances in the province, the
Serbian leadership proceeded by repeating the same scenario top down. They pushed for a
purge of AP Kosovo’s leadership on the grounds that it encouraged anti-Serbian feelings
and actions among Albanians, and for their responsibility for the 1981 protests in the
province.113 This move was supported by the federal party leadership and was scheduled
to take place on November 17 1988 at a session of CC LC Kosovo.
In opposition, 2,000 Albanian miners organized a protest defending the sitting leader-
ship and demanding that the main features of the constitutional order remain unchanged.
They were joined by industrial workers, university students and school pupils from all
110Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 11 October 1988.
111Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 311.
112Ibid., p. 312.
113Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 11 November 1988. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-218-10;
Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation
Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.
net/10891/osa:528468b7-1a60-4dbe-b424-36ad9dc6b91f (visited on 02/16/2016).
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parts of Kosovo and their protest lasted for five days. By November 18 50,000 people
were protesting on the streets in support of the sitting leadership. They chanted pro-
Yugoslavian slogans such as ‘Tito-Party’, ‘long-live the LCY’ and ‘long live brotherhood
and unity’. Failing to respond to their demands, the leadership of LC Kosovo resigned and
a new leadership that supported constitutional change took its place. The new leader-
ship denounced the workers ’protests as antagonistic to LCY’s Kosovo policy and deemed
them counter-revolutionary. In this sense, the 1988 pro-Yugoslavian protests articulated
by the Kosovo working class were equated with the 1981 protests of Kosovo’s Albanians
as Albanians, although the demands put forward were diametrically opposited.114
In February 1989, 1,300 miners organized an underground hunger strike in the Trepča
mine, just as the Serbian Assembly was gathering to vote on the amendments to SR
Serbia’s constitution. They protested the practice of ‘equating the entire Albanian pop-
ulation as separatist and nationalist’, demanded the immediate resignation of Kosovo’s
new leadership, the improvement of the socio-economic conditions in the province, and
the rejection of the amendments. They also called for federal party leaders and Slobodan
Milošević to come and speak to them directly.115 The day the Serbian Assembly passed
the constitutional amendments, the Trepča strike expanded into a general strike that
included mines, large state enterprises and students, and brought the province to a stand-
still. In an attempt to pacify the situation the new provincial leadership resigned, but
as soon as the miners left the pits, a state of emergency was declared and the leadership
that voted for constitutional change re-installed.116 In March 1989, after the amendments
were ratified by the AP Kosovo Assembly, the general strike transformed into riots and di-
rect confrontations with the police and the federal army. The authorities made wholesale
arrests, that included the purged leader of AP Kosovo, Azem Vallasi, who was charged
114Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nation-
alist Mobilization, pp. 182-183; and Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 11 November 1988.
115Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 8 March 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-219-4; Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
768e38c7-8b39-4eee-98e0-e8b566461d4d (visited on 02/16/2016).
116Vladisavljević, Serbia’s Antibureaucratic Revolution: Milošević, the Fall of Communism and Nation-
alist Mobilization, pp. 184-185; Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 333; and Situation
Report: Yugoslavia, 8 March 1989.
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with having plotted a counter-revolution.117
Although the federal organs supported both the cadre changes in AP Kosovo and
the constitutional changes in SR Serbia, the rejection of the pro-Yugoslavian demands of
Trepča miners, and the introduction of special measures, transformed the already exist-
ing tensions between SR Serbia and SR Slovenia into clear cut antagonistic frontiers. SR
Macedonia, SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, AP Vojvodina and SR Montenegro supported the
introduction of emergency measures, while SR Slovenia opposed them, and demanded the
resignation of the newly installed leadership in AP Kosovo out of humanitarian concern for
the striking miners. Furthermore, a meeting in support of the Trepča miners, attended
by the leader of LC Slovenian Milan Kučan was organized by the Ljubljana branch of
the Socialist Alliance. The speakers opposed the introduction of the state of emergency
and demanded peace and togetherness in Kosovo. Kučan stressed that the rights of all
nations had to be respected on an equal footing, otherwise there could be no ‘stability,
common life, and peace in Kosovo, Serbia and Yugoslavia’.118 Furthermore, mounting so-
cial opposition to the rallies of solidarity developed in SR Slovenia. The Socialist Alliance
in SR Slovenia, for instance, represented the anti-bureaucratic protests as ‘uncivilized
and contributing to demagoguery, primitivism and intolerance’.119 In contrast, its Serbian
counterpart was actively involved in organizing and coordinating them. The leader of LC
Slovenia described the protests against the bureaucracy and rallies of solidarity as ‘fuel-
ing the darkest human and nationalist passions’. In contrast, his counterpart in the LCS
saw them as a legitimate democratic overthrow of those who had lost the support of the
people.120 The critique of the links between the LCS and the anti-bureaucratic protests
and solidarity rallies increased once the events in AP Kosovo rendered fully visible that
the LCS was primarily interested in the expansion of its own hegemony within the exist-
117Approximately 240 Albanian ‘nationalists’, intellectuals, writers and businessmen were placed in
’isolation’ sometimes for merely advocating opposition to Serbian control of Kosovo or even for just
feeding the strikers and demonstrators. Anyone suspected of Albanian nationalism and separatism was
also arrested. See: Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 17 August 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-
47-219-10; Records of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department:
Situation Reports; Open Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.
handle.net/10891/osa:73380124-a7e8-42ef-9368-7ba40ecad85c (visited on 02/16/2016).
118Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 8 March 1989.
119Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 23 September 1988.
120Ibid.
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ing order, and supported social demands selectively to the extent that they contributed
to this. Furthermore, after the passage of the amendments to the Serbian constitution
Milošević declared that the hegemonic struggle would not be contained to SR Serbia and
that the LCS’s transformist project would expand to include the entire Yugoslavian order:
Those who expect that now, when she has finally become a republic, Serbia will
join the defenders of the status quo and opposed changes to the 1974 Constitution
are deluding themselves. Serbia did not become a state to sleep on the wreath of
glory, but [...] to forcefully initiate democratic changes to make Yugoslavia a strong
community of equal nations and nationalities, able to break with the crises, poverty,
and humiliation in which she now lives. Of course those who do not care about
Yugoslavia claim that our intentions and plans are unitarist and hegemonic.121
In this vein, he represented LC Slovenia’s critique of the events in Kosovo as ‘primitive,
vengeful aggressiveness incompatible with the culture of present-day Europe’ and a ‘fas-
cist display of irrational hatred’ that only deepened Yugoslavia’s social and economic
crisis. He called for the closure of all debates in Yugoslavia, the implementation of radical
reforms and the establishment of a new kind of socialism.122 By now, the articulation
of forces within the existing order had shifted, and through the protests, delegates that
were in line with the LCS’s transformist project occupied positions of power in four out
of seven territorial units. He publicly rejected the invitation of the Slovenian leadership
to hold a meeting and resolve the problems between the two republics.123
In sum, the social demands articulated by Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins were absorbed
by the LCS to expand its hegemony and consolidate it through constitutional change. Af-
ter the coming to power of Milošević, the party also adopted the language and positions
of the Serbian intellectuals and decreased their antagonistic potential. In the process,
Slobodan Milošević came to occupy an ambiguous position; he was both in power and
the addressee of an evolving movement that demanded changes within the existing order
without contesting the hegemony of the LCY as such. From this position, he could put
himself forward as the potential leader of a new transformed Yugoslavia. However, the
121Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, pp. 283-294.
122Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 27 June 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-219-8; Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
81d42585-44c6-4403-a023-104bf46ff232 (visited on 02/16/2016).
123Ibid.
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transformist project was deeply rooted in the contestations that emerged in the context
of SR Serbia in the 1980s. The transformist strategies of the Serbian party exacerbated
the differences within the LCY and brought about the drawing of clear-cut antagonistic
frontiers between LC Slovenia and Serbia.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I have mapped out how national equality was contested, first by Kosovo
Albanians and thereafter by Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins and how the regime failed to inte-
grate these contestations into the hegemonic system of social division. I have also showed
how the inability of the regime to maintain and control social divisions on the ground
opened up the space for alternative readings and gave rise to a broad socio-historical cri-
tique by Serbian intellectuals. Their reading of events on the ground represented nations
as unified subjects and the Serbian nation in particular as unequal and blocked under
the terms of the 1974 Constitution. Furthermore, the intellectuals contested the LCY’s
hegemonic position and represented self-management – the empty signifier constituting
the fullness of the Yugoslavian society – as structurally dislocated. They sutured this
dislocated space through the constitution of a nation centred space of representation that
subverted the hegemonic system of social division, discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5.
I have argued that the rise of Slobodan Milošević can only be understood within
this particular context, as an absorption of the demands emerging from society and the
deepening of the LCS’s hegemony. The demand for constitutional change was central
to linking the LCS and broader social groupings together into a transformist project,
whereby the antagonistic potential of social demands was diffused. Gradually, through
the so called ‘solidarity rallies’ and the ‘anti-bureaucratic revolution’, the Serbian branch
of the LCY consolidated its hegemony and made the changing of Serbia’s constitution
possible. However, the weaving together of a transformist project and the co-optation of
(Serbian) nation centred demands by the LCS, had a massive impact on the Yugoslavian
imaginary horizon. Their inclusion gradually blurred the lines of inclusion and exclusion
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that shaped the Yugoslavian self-managing community. The contradicting position the
LCS took regarding working class demands completely blurred the frontiers that based
the imaginary horizon. On the one hand, it included the social demands emerging in AP
Vojvodina and SR Montenegro on the grounds that they expressed legitimate working
class demands and discontent. On the other hand, it excluded the demands of Kosovo’s
miners, that were articulated through Yugoslavia’s founding discourses, and equated them
with the demands of Kosovo’s protesters in 1981, that were articulated in opposition to
the existing constitutional order and Yugoslavia. In doing so, the LCS rendered visible
that its central aim was not to satisfy working class demands but to expand its own
hegemony. The events in Kosovo (1989) thus rendered the particularistic nature of the
LCS’s transformist project visible and also shed a new light on the meaning of the anti-
bureaucratic revolution and the solidarity rallies. These developments gave rise to the
realignment of forces within the LCY and the gradual drawing of an antagonistic frontier
between the LCS and the LC Slovenia. The introduction of a political antagonism within
the ranks of the party that was meant to embody the unity of the working class meant
that the LCY was undergoing a fully- fledged hegemonic crisis and that the Yugoslavian
imaginary was dissolving.
It is within this context that the LC Croatia decided to pluralise the Croatian political
landscape and call for democratic elections. The first elections were in fact a hegemonic
struggle about the new terms under which unity and division would be constituted in the
post-1990 period in SR Croatia. In the following chapter I examine the discourses of three
parties that competed in the elections and the impact the CDU’s victory had on the new
terms of constituting unity.
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CHAPTER VIII
The Articulation of Democratic Identities in the
Socialist Republic of Croatia
8.1 Introduction
Drawing on the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, and the insights from previous chap-
ters, in this chapter I aim to reactivate the creative moment of constituting a new order
out of the dying Yugoslavian imaginary in SR Croatia. The first multi-party elections,
that were held between April and May 1990, brought the Croatian Democratic Union
(CDU) to a hegemonic position in the process of building a democratic order out of the
dying Yugoslavian imaginary.1 The specific historical conjecture, characterized by the
crisis of the LCY’s hegemony and the unravelling of state-socialism across Eastern Eu-
rope, in synergy with the absolute majority electoral system, made it possible for the
CDU to play an exceptionally creative role after coming to power. The party shaped the
trajectory of Croatia’s transition from a socialist republic in a federal state to an inde-
pendent market oriented multi-party democracy, and fixed the new terms of forging social
unity and division. Furthermore, the hegemonic position it acquired after the elections
enabled the party to cover up the particular mythical origins of the post-socialist imagi-
nary. The party’s discourse provided a horizon of intelligibility for explaining the past and
1The CDU claimed 205 out of 356 seats in the Assembly, even though the party got only 41,9 % of the
overall vote. The League of Communists of Croatia Party of Democratic Change got 35% of the vote and
only 107 seats in the Assembly. The electoral victory gave the CDU the power to realize its constitutional
conception, since it dominated the first assembly by a two-third majority. For details about the electoral
outcome see:Kasapović, “Electoral Politics in Croatia 1990-2000”.
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the present while its sedimentation into an imaginary contributed to the intensification of
national antagonisms and the dissolution of Yugoslavia. As discussed in the introductory
chapter, the CDU governed the Republic of Croatia through a secession process, the war
that broke out as a result of the secession, and the consolidation of state sovereignty on
pre-war territories.
As I maintained in Chapter 2, the party’s negative impact on Croatia’s democratic
transition has been widely discussed in the existing literature. However, existing accounts
have failed to problematize the content of the party’s project in the run up to the first
elections, when the logics for grounding the democratic order were opened to contestation.
Furthermore, in categorizing the CDU as ‘nationalist’ and the League of Communists of
Croatia Party of Democratic Change (LCC PDC) as a ‘reformed communist’ party, these
accounts seem to imply that the CDU’s emergence somehow reflected existing national
identities that a former communist party failed to express in the new context. In doing
so, these accounts partially reproduced the discourse of the CDU and its representation
of its aims and origins. This problem is not contained to academic circles. Even 26 years
after the first democratic elections the argument is constantly deployed by the CDU and
its supporters to discredit the political position of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the
successor of the LCC PDC. The CDU has taken on itself to express the ‘true’ interests of
the Croatian nation, while the SDP is constantly labelled as a ‘Yugoslavian’, ‘communist’,
even a ‘četnik’ party, and discredited on the grounds that it is unable to reflect the ‘true’
interest of the Croatian nation.
To reactivate the creative moment of constituting a new order out of the dying imag-
inary in the Croatian context, and show the contingency behind the CDU’s articulation,
I analyse the political projects of three important players in Croatia’s transition to a
democratic order – the LCC PDC, the CDU and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP).
To avoid the limitations bound up with categorizing and separating the parties into na-
tionalist and/or reformed-communist, I bring all three under a single analytic framework
and examine the ways in which each moulded itself to the political context by weaving a
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political project that attempted to define and shape it.2 Much like in previous chapters,
by national identity I do not refer to a particular set of people whose (essential) interests
can be (better or worse) represented by a political party. Rather, I understand it as s
a signifier that constitutes political projects that aspire to become hegemonic through
the articulation of demands. From this perspective, the signifier ‘nation’ is understood
as an element contingent upon the broader context and the particular political project it
circulates in.3
By conceptualizing the nation as a signifier rather than an extra-discursive essence,
in this chapter I unpick its articulations in the project of a party conventionally not cat-
egorized as ‘nationalist’ while showing that the articulations of the signifier ‘nation’ by
two parties categorized as ‘nationalist’ are grounded in a contingent articulation of that
signifier. To unpick the different articulations of the signifier that lay at the center of
these projects, I focus my analysis on three aspects. First, the manner in which each
project was situated in the context of the dying imaginary and the particular demands
that constituted it. Second, the inscription of the past into the pluralized context to
universalize each project. Finally, the particular representations of unity/division and
political subjectivity constitutive of each project.4
To show that the CDU’s articulation of national subjectivity was contingent, in the
first section I map out the context in which the LCC, then a branch of a dissolving
LCY, gave up its hegemonic position in SR Croatia. In the second section, I analyse the
projects of the three parties following the above considerations. Through this analysis
I show that, despite articulating antagonistic political projects, the CDU and the SDP
both represented relations between nations as relations of power and thus subverted the
terms under which unity was constituted in the Yugoslavian imaginary. I also show that
2Finlayson, “Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism”, p. 104.
3In this sense the ‘nation’ can become an articulatory principle that defines unity as such. Equally,
it can circulate in discourses that articulate unity through other signifiers, such as class or citizen for
example. The implication of this framework is that neither one nor the other reflects the ‘real’ meaning
of the signifier ‘nation’, since the ‘nation’ as a political reality does not exist prior to its articulation in
a discourse. See: ibid.
4My focus is based on Laclau’s conceptualization of political discourses (myths) as principles of read-
ing a given situation that are associated with the experience of a particular group aspiring to become
hegemonic. See: Laclau, New Reflections on the Revolution of our Time, p. 61.
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the LCC PDC reiterated the identitary logic of the dying imaginary and de-contested
national relations within its project. In the concluding section, after summarizing my
main points, I reflect on the implications of each project, and the sedimentation of the
CDU’s project in particular, into a new democratic imaginary horizon.
Before moving on to the analysis it is important that the limits of my discussion are
clearly specified. Given the scope of my thesis and the trajectory of Croatia’s transition
after the elections, I have chosen to omit the Social Liberal Union and the Coalition
of Peoples Accord from my analysis. The former because it failed to gain a significant
amount of votes and the latter because it dissolved after the first elections. In contrast,
the CDU and the successor of LCC PDC (The Social Democratic Party) have remained,
to this day, the two major parties in Croatian politics. Although the Serbian Democratic
Party did not gain a significant amount of votes in the elections, the antagonism between
its political project and the CDU dominated regime that came to govern SR Croatia after
the elections escalated into the first armed conflict of the War of Yugoslavian Dissolution.
In this sense, the Serbian Democratic Party’s project shaped the frontiers of the new
imaginary horizon in a profound way.
8.2 The Hegemonic Crisis of the LCY and the Introduction of
multi-partyism in SR Croatia
As discussed in Chapter 7, the contestations of the Yugoslavian imaginary were predom-
inantly located in SR Serbia and, in the second half of the 1980s, in SR Slovenia too.
In different ways, the leaderships in both republics grew increasingly tolerant to extra-
party politicizations and gradually absorbed social demands into their solutions to the
Yugoslavian crisis. In 1989, the Slovenian leadership called for further decentralization
and proposed the transformation of Yugoslavia into an asymmetrical federation.5 Fur-
5Mitija Žagar. “The collapse of the Yugoslav federation and the viability of asymetrical federalism”.
In: The Changing Faces of Federalism: Institutional Reconfiguration in Europe from East to West. Ed.
by Sergio Ortino, Mitija Žagar, and Vojtech Mastny. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005,
pp. 124-125.
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thermore, in 1989 Yugoslavia’s first opposition party was formed in SR Slovenia and it
demanded, among other things, the introduction of political pluralism, the transformation
of Yugoslavia into a contractual union, and the drafting of a new Slovenian constitution.6
In contrast, for reasons discussed in Chapter 7, the Serbian leadership had a broad base
of support in its republic and it worked towards expanding its power to the entire Yu-
goslavian order. It demanded the centralisation and integration of the federation and the
introduction of the ‘one man one vote’ voting principle in the LCY, which would have
dissolved territorial delegations all together.
Commentators from the period described Croatia as ‘the silent republic’.7 There were
no social demands contesting the existing constitutional order while the Croatian lead-
ership focused on uniting Yugoslavian communists into a common struggle against all
anti-socialist forces in the federation.8 Initially, the Croatian leadership supported Miloše-
vić’s rise and recognized the need to change Serbia’s constitution to resolve the Kosovo
problem. It expressed discontent with developments in SR Serbia only after it became
apparent that the LCS was in fact expanding its hegemony through the anti-bureaucratic
revolution possibly at the expanse of the LCC’s. Its critique of the anti-bureaucratic rev-
olution was accompanied by a critique of demands for political pluralism articulated in
SR Slovenia. Following the frontiers of exclusion that formed the basis of the Yugoslavian
imaginary discussed in Chapter 3, the Croatian leadership labelled the anti-bureaucratic
revolution ‘neo-Stalinist’ and the social demands in SR Slovenia as ‘traditional liberalism’,
and representing both as equally antagonistic to the self-managing order.9
6Milan Jajčinović. “Ulazak u višepartijski sistem: što znači osnivanje odbora, saveza i udruženja
koja se deklariraju kao demokratska [Introducing mutlipartism: the meaning of committes, leagues and
associations that idenfity as democratic]”. In: Danas (24 January 1989).
7Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 26 May 1989. [Electronic record]. HU OSA 300-8-47-219-7; Records of
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute: Publications Department: Situation Reports; Open
Society Archives at Central European University, Budapest. url: http://hdl.handle.net/10891/osa:
f6e36c90-37bd-4365-ad57-3ce8294862c5 (visited on 04/14/2016).
8The ‘White Book’ drawn up by the Croatian Central Committee quoted all of the works in the cultural
sphere, mostly from Slovenia and Serbia, that were unacceptable and anti-socialist. See: Zvonimir Despot,
ed. Bijela knjiga Stipe Šuvara: originalni dokument Centra CK SKH za informiranje i propagandu [Stipe
Šuvar’s White Book: the Original Documents of CC LCC’s Propaganda and Information Centre]. Zagreb:
Večernji edicija, 2010. For more about the implications of the position of the Croatian leadership see:
Jović, Yugoslavia: a State that Withered Away, p. 235; and Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918-2008 [Croatia
1918-2008], pp. 613-615.
9Situation Report: Yugoslavia, 26 May 1989.
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Although the LCC distanced itself from both developments, their very unfolding had
a detrimental effect on its own hegemony, which was contingent upon the overall unity of
the LCY. By assigning antagonistic meanings to concepts constitutive of the Yugoslavian
imaginary, these developments had rendered its mythical character visible and put into
question the LCY’s hegemony and the universality of the self-managing project. The
expansion of solidarity rallies to the Serb-majority part of SR Croatia in mid-1989 had
a particularly detrimental effect on the LCC’s hegemony. The Serbs in Croatia that
organized rallies of solidarity also articulated their support of the LCS’s conception of
Yugoslavia’s future form and protested the LCC’s support of the striking Trepča min-
ers. They claimed that the Croatian leadership was conservative and prevented necessary
changes, just like the protesters in AP Vojvodina and SR Montenegro.10 Their politiciza-
tion made visible that the LCC was failing to de-contest the Serbian national identity in
SR Croatia and delegate the interests of Croatian Serbs.
Drawing on Kardelj’s conception of the ‘pluralism of self-managing interests’, the
Croatian leadership proposed the pluralization of the political space via reformed self-
managerial institutions and the transformation of SR Croatia into a ‘non-party democ-
racy’. In doing so, the LCC hoped to retain its hegemony in the republic.11 The meaning
and application of the concept became a source of debate, both within the LCC and the
wider public, and the proposed solution failed to suture the dislocated political space.12
In December 1989, a Coordinating Body of the Croatian Opposition was established and
it drafted a petition which demanded the legalization of political parties and their equal
10For more about the expansion of the anti-bureaucratic revolution in Croatia see: Situation Report:
Yugoslavia, 26 May 1989 ; and Ivo Goldstein. Dvadeset godina samostalne Hrvatske [Twenty Years of
Independent Croatia]. Zagreb: Novi Liber, 2010, pp. 70-72
11The leadership wanted to transform the Socialist Alliance into a site for expressing competing socialist
ideas and projects. It maintained that non-party democracy would pluralize the political space without
reducing politics to a mere intra-party struggle. Due to the multinational context, the leadership argued,
multipartism would bring about the politization of national identities and the emergence of nationalism.
See: Davor Pauković. “Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj 1989-1991”. PhD thesis. University of Zagreb,
2010, p. 70; and Jasna Babić. “Ustavne brane: Ustav SFRJ ne zabranjuje saveze, nego političke stranke
[Constitutional obstacles: SFRY’s constitution doesn’t prohibit alliances, but political parties]”. In:
Danas (7 March 1989).
12Pauković, “Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj 1989-1991”, pp. 70-73.
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participation in politics.13 Concurrently, for reasons discussed in Chapter 7, LC Serbia
and LC Slovenia broke off all political ties and introduced an antagonistic divide into the
LCY.
Under pressure from the disarticulation of the identitary logic of the Yugoslavian imag-
inary at the federal level, the expansion of the solidarity rallies to SR Croatia and the
emergence of social demands contesting its own universal position, the LCC legalized all
political parties and called for the democratic election of a Constitutive Assembly. The
leadership concluded that the future form of the federation was an issue of such impor-
tance and contestability that decision-making necessitated a new social consensus.14 By
pluralizing the political space and calling for elections, the Croatian leadership recognized
that its own position regarding the issue was not universal. Furthermore, at its Extraordi-
nary Congress in January 1990, the LCY dissolved, bringing about the complete collapse
of the universal working class subject and the Yugoslavian self-managing project. The
elections to the Croatian Constitutive Assembly were to be held in two rounds between
April and May 1990, following the absolute majority electoral procedure.15
The elections took place in the context of the complete disarticulation of the broth-
erhood and unity and the self-managing discourse discussed in Chapter 3. The elements
that were once fixed into moments within a Yugoslavian space of representation were now
opened to re-articulation within new spaces of representation that competed for hege-
mony. In the following section I analyse the political projects articulated by three parties
13The petition addressed the Croatian Parliament and Presidency demanding: the legalization of po-
litical parties and their equal participation in the elections visa-a-vis the LCC, the release of all political
prisoners, that the sitting leadership protects the sovereignty of the Republic and works towards resolving
the crisis by protecting the rights of all individuals, nations and groups, the holding of free elections within
a month for a Constitutive Assembly. This body consisted of then still illegal opposition organizations,
initiatives and citizen associations, that included the Croatian Democratic League, the Croatian Demo-
cratic Union, the Association for a Yugoslavian Democratic Initiative, the Transnational Radical Party,
the Croatian Peasant Party, the Croatian Socio-Liberal League, the Society for Yugoslavian-European
Cooperation, the Initial Committee of the Croatian Socio-Democratic League, the Croatian Christian
Democratic League, the Initiating Committee of the League of Students of the Zagreb University and the
Croatian Society for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights. See: Pauković, “Politička tranzi-
cija u Hrvatskoj 1989-1991”, pp. 142-143; and Davor Pauković. “Posljednji kongres Saveza komunista
Jugoslavije: uzroci, tijek i posljedice raspada”. In: Suvremene teme 1.1 (2008).
14Pauković, “Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj 1989-1991”, pp. 144-145.
15The opposition parties strongly disproved of the leaderships choice of a ‘winner takes it all’ electoral
system, but the leadership claimed the specificity of the historical conjecture and the crisis called for a
clearly articulated political project. See: ibid., pp. 175-176.
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that took part in the elections.
8.3 The Myths and Subjectivities Articulated in the Electoral
Campaign
8.3.1 The Croatian Democratic Union
8.3.1.1 The project: democratic transformation, confederalism and the am-
biguous ‘nation’
According to the CDU, the political context was characterized by an all-encompassing
structural crisis. Internally, Yugoslavia was experiencing an economic, political, social
and national crisis. It was torn between the (Serbian) centralist state-forming project,
that rejected the terms of the federalism of the existing constitution, and the (Slove-
nian/Croatian) decentralized project, that demanded the expansion of the confederal
rules. Internationally, the single-party socialist ideology that determined and structured
the Yugoslav political landscape was collapsing.16 The party maintained that a (new)
order could emerge out of the (existing) disorder only through a complete ‘democratic
transformation’ of the Croatian society.17 It defined politics as the space for creating:
[...] a spiritual and material climate that would prevent the democratic decline of
the Croatian masses and [catalyize] the revival of the economic and cultural life.18
Traditional parliamentary democracy was articulated as the adequate institutional frame-
work for conducting politics in the above sense. The new order was to be organized around
the nation as ‘the highest form of social association’, while the universal principle ground-
ing it was to become ‘the internationally recognized right of every state [. . . ] to choose
its economic, social and cultural system in accordance with the will of its nation’.19
16For the party’s account of the crisis see:Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Prednacrt programske
osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party Program]”, p. 59; for the party’s account of the two mutually
exclusive state-forming concepts see: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The
Program’s Foundations and Objectives]”, p. 73.





The ‘democratic transformation’ did not transgress the boundaries of SR Croatia to in-
clude the whole of the Yugoslavian political space. Rather, the signifier ‘Yugoslavia’ was
articulated as a mere condition of possibility for its realization. The CDU demanded
that ‘republican consensus’ become the only decision-making procedure in the federation
so that decisions could not be imposed on republics by federal institutions. The party
demanded Yugoslavia’s transformation into a confederation so that ‘the Croatian nation
[can] decide about its own future’.20
A similar logic structured the party’s position on economic issues. It opposed any
form of federal centralization that would limit republican sovereignty.21 Its project failed
to specify which articulation of forces between the federation and the republics it advo-
cated. The party articulated ‘the draining of the national income from SR Croatia to
other parts of Yugoslavia’ as the main problem to be tackled, justifying its choice of focus
by reiterating the arguments advanced by participants of the Croatian Spring regarding
the detrimental effects of the Yugoslavian economic re-distribution policy on the economy
of SR Croatia.22 While these demands were raised as a means to increase the ability of
the republican working class to dispose of its surplus value in 1971, their grounding in
the new context became ‘the realization of full national sovereignty in the territory of
the SR Croatia’.23 In this case the signifier nation did not attain an exclusivist meaning
but remained within the signification attributed to it by the LCY and it included the
(economic) interest of (all) the citizens of the republic.
The decision by the Serbian leadership to cut-off all ties with SR Slovenia was rep-
resented as an expression of ‘great-Serbian expansionism’ that posed a threat to ‘the
Croatian nation and SR Croatia’.24 In response, as a means to protect the nation from
this threat, the party demand the constitution of ‘the territorial integrity of the Croatian
20Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”, p. 78.
21Ibid., p. 79.
22Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica. “Programska deklaracija osnivačke skupštine HDZ-a [The Decla-
ration of the CDU’s Constitutive Assembly]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan
Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 65.
23Ibid., p. 65.
24Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica. “Proglas građanima i Saboru SRH i cijelome hrvatskom [A Dec-
laration to SRC’s Citizens, its Assembly and to all Croatian people]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by
Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 70.
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nation in its historic and natural borders’. It is important to note that the party did
not demand the protection of the territorial integrity of the Croatian nation within the
current borders of SR Croatia. This would have meant that the members of the Croatian
nation living in other republics were not in need of protection. The adjectives ‘natural’
and ‘historical’ expressed the desire of the party to defend the nation as a whole, and not
just that segment of it that lived in SR Croatia. The articulation of the signifier ‘nation’
as including the Croatian nation living in republics other than SR Croatia revealed that
the national subject of CDU’s democratic transformation project transgressed the terri-
torial unit in which the party was running for elections.
It is important to note that the signifier ‘nation’ carried two meanings within the
party’s discourse. In the economic terrain, ‘nation’ was identical to the citizens of the
republic. However, when it came to issues pertaining to territoriality and borders, ‘nation’
included Croats in other republics at the expense of excluding the Serbs in Croatia. The
double signification of the term ‘nation’ made it possible for the party to raise demands
for full republican sovereignty and legitimize them in reference to the existing constitu-
tion, as well as articulating demands that equated ‘territory’, ‘nation’ and ‘sovereignty’,
subverting the identitary logic sedimented through the constitution.
8.3.1.2 Universalizing the project: weaving the myth of the nation- state
Contrary to the party’s articulation of demands, in its reading of the past the signifier
‘nation’ carried only the exclusivist meaning. The party’s reading of the past inscribed
the particular demands it articulated into a history completely determined by an older
project that transcended both the CDU and the dying imaginary. To construct a universal
foundation for its project, the party articulated elements from Croatian history preceding
the socialist period, together with the socialist period, thus producing a continuity. The
party claimed:
[. . . ] we found our program upon three important determinants of recent Croa-
tian history. First, Ante Starčević’s notion of the Croatian historic state rights,
articulated through the libertarian ideas of the glorious French Revolution. Second,
Stjepan Radić’s formulation of the idea of universal-humanist republicanism which
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transferred the state-forming Croatian consciousness from the higher to the lower so-
cial strata. Third, the positive core of the Croatian left which claimed the Croatian
nation’s self-managing rights [. . . ]25
In doing so, the CDU weaved together elements into a political myth that were previously
not articulated into moments in a single political discourse. The party even added the
‘Independent State of Croatia’ – a proto-fascist puppet state in opposition to which, as
discussed in Chapter 3, ‘brotherhood and unity’ came into being – to this myth:
The Independent State of Croatia was not just a quisling formation and a fascist
crime. It was also the expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian nation
to posses its own independent state and the recognition of those aspirations by big
international powers, in this case the government of Hiter’s Germany.26
In articulating a continuity between the proto-fascist puppet state that directed its ex-
termination policies against Serbs and its own project, the CDU signaled that its project
constituted the relation between the Croatian and Serbian nation in SR Croatia as a power
relation. The party also re-articulated Yugoslavian history through the national signifier
and split its legacy into positive and negative elements determined by their contribution
to the formation of a Croatian national state. This reading emptied the imaginary horizon
from its primary subject which, as I showed in Chapters 3 and 5, was the working class.
The party programme maintained that:
The Yugoslavian socialist state was founded by the principles of equality of all na-
tions and their right to self-determination and secession. Tito could reconstruct
the spiritually and materially disintegrated Yugoslavian state [the Monarchy] only
because he swore by those [national] principles. [. . . ] Later that [national] right
became a mere catchphrase because of the absolute power of the centralised Com-
munist Party [. . . ] which was constantly trying to promote the illusion of creating
a socialist Yugoslav identity [. . . ]27
The founding myth of the Yugoslavian socialist imaginary, the National Liberation Strug-
gle, was also re-assessed against its contribution to the constitution of a Croatian na-
tional state and certain elements from it were included into the foundations of the CDU’s
25Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Prednacrt programske osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party
Program]”, p. 60.




project.28 In the light of its reassessment of the dying imaginary, the party concluded
that:
[. . . ] the existence of SR Croatia as the national state of the Croatian nation,
regardless of the extent of our unhappiness with this state, is the foundation for
[Croatian national] sovereignty [and for] further exertions to realize this sovereignty
fully [. . . ]29
The fact that SR Croatia was also the national state of the Serbian nation living in Croatia
according to the existing constitution was omitted, and traces of (Croatian) sovereignty
articulated as being present but not yet fully realized.
The Croatian Spring, also discussed in Chapter 4, was an important constitutive ele-
ment of the foundations of the party’s project. Its reading equated the hegemonic response
of the regime, discussed in Chapter 4, with contemporary developments in AP Kosovo,
discussed in Chapter 7, maintaining that ‘Croatia was Kosovized in 1971 [...] because all
progressive and national currents were removed from the society’.30 This historical inver-
sion created the discursive space for the party to equate ‘Tito’s hegemonic response to
the Croatian Spring’ and ‘Milošević’s response to the politicization of Kosovo Albanians’
and rendering the party’s project antagonistic to both. Through this inversion the CDU
put itself forward as the continuation of a political movement repressed in the past, while
simultaneously emptying out the demands of the movement from the context they were
articulated in, and within which, as I have argued in Chapter 4, they attained meaning.
The constant historical objective of the nation to constitute itself as independent in
its state was manifested in dispersed historical formations – ranging from the writings
and activities of Ante Starević (19th century) and Stjepan Radić (beginning of the 20th
century), to the proto-fascist ustaša movement, all the way until the constitution of the
Socialist Republic of Croatia. The CDU articulated its particular demands as the final
28The positive elements of the anti-fascist struggle were: the establishment of SR Croatia at the end
of WWII since it ‘moved’ the Croatian nation to the victorious side of the war after the defeat of the
Independent State of Croatia; the inclusion of Istria into the territories of Croatia for the first time;
and the re-integration of Rijeka, Zadar, Cres, Lošinj and Lastavo (territories lost to Italy during WWII)
to the homeland. See: Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s




realization of this ‘old’ objective.31
8.3.1.3 Social division and unity: the reconciled nation as a subject of politics
The identitary logic articulated by the CDU subverted the terms under which nations were
constituted as political subjects in the dying imaginary. The party claimed to represent:
[...] all members of the Croatian nation that demand the democratic transformation
of the national, social, political and economic life, regardless of their world-view,
ideological position and religious conviction.32
In other words, those that were excluded from the nation as a political subject through
the divisions that based the dying imaginary, were included back into it through the
party’s project.33 This re-articulation was represented as a national reconciliation that
eliminated all social divisions and ideologies from the political terrain:
The adjective ‘socialist’ should be removed from the name (of the Republic) because
it is a mere ideological insignia. This change of name signifies that the Second World
War has finally come to an end in Croatia and that the nation can reconcile [. . . ] if
future generations continue dividing themselves into the descendants of friends and
foes, there will be no peace in Croatia [. . . ]34
The party reduced the ‘old’ socialist universal back to a myth and put its own (national)
political subject forward as the (new) universal. Following the logic of including the
excluded, the party included the Croatian diaspora into the political body of the nation,
claiming that order and stability necessitated its re-integration with ‘the homeland’.35 As
discussed in Chapter 3, the diaspora was represented as embodying fascism, nationalism,
anti-socialism and capitalism and excluded from the Yugoslavian imaginary. The Croatian
nation in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina was also drawn into the (national) political subject
the party articulated:
31Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”, p. 75.
32Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Prednacrt programske osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party
Program]”, p. 62.
33Following the same logic of including excluded elements, the CDU problematized the exclusion of the
Catholic Church from society and advocated its inclusion. See:Pauković, “Politička tranzicija u Hrvatskoj
1989-1991”, p. 224
34Šeks, “Ciklus tribina: Izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of Discussions: Elections
in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”, p. 52.
35Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Prednacrt programske osnove [A Preliminary Draft of the Party
Program]”, p. 61.
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Those in Croatia that do not see that [. . . ] it is necessary to speak from the position
of the historical-geopolitical interest of the Croatian nation, can surely not be asked
to speak in its name. In articulating our demands, we kept in mind that, even
according to the present constitution, Bosnia and Herzegovina is [also] the national
state of the Croatian nation. The demand [...] is the expression and continuation
of the perspective of Croatian historians from the past [. . . ] who have considered
Bosnian and Herzegovina to be, geopolitically united with Croatia [...].36
Forging social unity around the signifier ‘nation’ which included the Croatian nation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian diaspora had repercussions for the position of
the Serbian nation in Croatia within the party’s discourse. Despite being sovereign in SR
Croatia according to the existing constitution, within the party’s discourse the Serbian
nation in Croatia was represented as a minority living in a territorial unit that belonged
to the Croatian nation. The Serbian nation in Croatia was not a priori included in the
party’s conception of unity, but had to prove its alliance to the Croatian nation by sup-
porting the CDU’s nation centred democratic transformation project. In this light, the
party maintained that it was ‘open to all citizens that identify with the Serbian nation or
any other national minority [. . . ] to the extent that they are willing to participate in the
democratic reconstruction [that the party advocates]’.37 The meaning of the ‘reconstruc-
tion project’ was further substantiated in a speech by a party member:
[. . . ] we don’t accuse anyone nor do we segregate; all of those [people] with hon-
ourable intentions that love the Croatian homeland, the ones that feel the homeland’s
history, present and democratic future as their own, are included [. . . ]38
In other words, the CDU represented an undivided nation as the subject of its demo-
cratic project. The realization of the fullness of that subject, through the constitution
of a sovereign nation state, determined the political terrain and the (new) frontiers of
inclusion/exclusion around which social unity was forged. The party maintained that it
was the expression of that unity and that it would be the agent for realizing the fullness
of the nation in an independent state.39
36Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”, p. 76.
37Ibid., p. 76.
38Neven Jurica. “Ciklus tribina: izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of Discussions:
Elections in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan
Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 83.
39Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, “Programske zasade i ciljevi [The Program’s Foundations and
Objectives]”, pp. 24-25.
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In sum, the CDU’s political project centered on the democratic transformation of
Croatian society. Within the party’s discourse the signifier ‘democratic transformation’
carried the meaning of the constitution of the Croatian nation as a sovereign political
subject in its own state. The future of the Yugoslavian federation was articulated as
completely contingent upon the realization of national sovereignty. Although the party
deployed a dual articulation of the nation when raising demands – one that included the
Serbian nation in Croatia and one that excluded it – its reading of the past and its con-
ception of unity constituted relations between nations in SR Croatia as relations of power.
Within the party’s discourse the signifier ‘Serbian nation in Croatia’ carried the meaning
of a ‘minority’ that inhabits a republic ‘belonging to’ the Croatian nation. The political
subject that came into being through the party’s discourse was a mirror image of the
divided national subject that based the Yugoslavian imaginary since it was articulated
through the inclusion of elements previously excluded from it.
8.3.2 The League of Communists of Croatia–The Party of Democratic Changes
8.3.2.1 The project: legitimacy, democratic socialism and federalism
According to the LCC PDC, the political context was characterized by the termination
of the state socialist phase of the development of Yugoslavia and the transition into a
new phase. The transition brought about the end of the old communist party which
ruled without the expressed will of the majority.40 Within the discourse of the LCC
PDC, the first elections were articulated as a means to attain the democratic legitimacy
its predecessor lacked in the state socialist phase. The fact that the LCC gave up its
universal position and called for elections was represented as a sign that the party running
for elections did not have anything in common with the ‘old’ party that governed without
the expressed will of the majority of the citizens.41 In this light, the party claimed that:
40Savez Komunista Hrvatske-Stranka Demokratskih Promijena. “Izborni program [The Electoral Pro-
gram]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj. Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb:
Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 273.
41Ibid., p. 274.
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[. . . ] the LCC PDC has entered a new constitutive phase [. . . ]. It is forging a new
identity and becoming a contemporary European left-wing party at the doorstep of
the 21st century [. . . ]. This deep political and cultural transformation includes the
re-evaluation of its historical heritage and the creation of new forms and contents.
[...] Marxism ceases to be the only theoretical and ideological foundation; ideological
unity ceases to be the determining factor for forging party unity.42
Despite distancing itself from the LCY, LCC PDC’s political project drew extensively on
elements and logics that formed the basis of the dying imaginary. The party retained the
signifier ‘socialism’ and maintained that democratic socialism was the organizing principle
best suited for the new phase of development. Within the party’s discourse democratic
socialism was represented as an upgraded version of self-managing socialism because of
its expanded conception of rights and freedoms and its endorsement of political plural-
ism. The signifier weaved together the elements ‘parliamentary democracy’, ‘separation
of powers’, ‘individual rights’, ‘citizens’ rights’, ‘workers’ rights’, ‘social justice’ and ‘free
marketeering’, and tied these in with the notion of ‘equality’ reiterated from the program
of the LCY and attributed too ‘citizens’, ‘nations’ and ‘republics’.43
The party’s project was oriented towards Yugoslavia and it called for its transformation
into a ‘democratic federal state community’.44 The LCC PDC reiterated the constitutional
definition of Yugoslavia, signaling that the basic tenets of the constitutional order should
not be changed:
[Yugoslavia] was created and exists as the permanent right of every nation to self-
determination, which includes the right to association as well as the right to seces-
sion. In the SFRY sovereignty rests in the republics; a new constitution can be made
only with the consensual agreement of republics.45
The party demanded cosmetic changes to the existing terms of division sedimented by the
constitution. These included an unambiguously defined division of powers between the
federation and the republics, as well as the inclusion of articles protecting human rights
and freedoms to the existing constitution. Regarding the division of powers, the party
demanded that the republics be given the explicit right to manage their internal affairs






and that federal bodies remained responsible for macroeconomic policy and the territo-
rial integrity of the country.46 The party also expressed its intention to forge alliances
with political parties from other republics once party pluralism was introduced across
Yugoslavia.47
8.3.2.2 Universalizing the project: reiterating the national liberation myth
The continuity between the LCC PDC and the dying imaginary was apparent in its
reading of the past. The party reiterated the founding myth of the LCY, discussed in
Chapter 3, as the origin of its Yugoslavian democratic socialist project. It articulated its
continuity with:
[. . . ] the libertarian and democratic traditions of the Croatian and Yugoslavian na-
tional liberation movement and the working class movement and their achievements
in the struggle for social and national liberation [...]48
It also cited ‘anti-fascism, anti-Stalinism, federalism’,49 ‘Titoism, [...] national equality,
independence’50 as the elements inherited from the LCY. Since, as discussed in Chapter
3, these elements differentiated Yugoslavian socialism from real socialism in the Eastern
Block, the party inscribed them into the present to normalize the possibility of maintaining
the successor of the old hegemon in power despite changed circumstances:
Despite the resemblance of the current changes encompassing the socialist world,
they cannot be repeated in Yugoslavia [...] We are a different country and have
always had a different kind of socialism from the Eastern Block. We have kept
our position with our own power. Our destiny cannot be the same as the destiny
of those communist regimes that collapsed like a house of cards when the external
force keeping them in power [USSR] disappeared.51
46Savez Komunista Hrvatske-Stranka Demokratskih Promijena, “Izborni program [The Electoral Pro-
gram]”, p. 285.
47Ivan Šiber. “Ciklus tribina: izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of Discussions:
Elections in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj [Parties in Croatia]. Ed. by
Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 297.
48Savez Komunista Hrvatske-Stranka Demokratskih Promijena, “Izborni program [The Electoral Pro-
gram]”, p. 273.
49Ibid., p. 273.
50Ivica Račan. “Veliki javni razgovor [A big public talk]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj [Parties in Croatia].
Ed. by Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 299.
51Savez Komunista Hrvatske-Stranka Demokratskih Promijena, “Izborni program [The Electoral Pro-
gram]”, p. 273.
220
By deploying the founding myth of the dying imaginary the party represented its social
democratic project as in organic continuity with the 1945-1989 period. However, the
political subject that formed the basis of the dying imaginary – the working class – was
not mentioned in its articulation of the past.
8.3.2.3 Social division and unity: the plural citizen as a political subject
The LCC PDC reiterated the identitary logic of the dying imaginary but substituted the
working-class with the individual-citizen as the political subject basing the new order.
Through it, the LCC PDC, like the LCY, decontested different national identities and
incorporated them into its democratic socialist project. To begin with, the LCC PDC re-
articulated the relationship between collective and individual rights by maintaining that
the former served the purpose of protecting the ‘the plural form of the individual’.52 It
represented the individual citizen as the new subject of politics:
The system of pluralist parliamentary democracy is rooted in the citizen as the
source of constitutional power and the subject out of which governing republican
institutions are formed.53
The LCC PDC reiterated LCY’s articulation of sovereignty as an attribute of territorial
units and shared between different nations in them. SR Croatia was represented as:
[. . . ] a sovereign democratic state of all citizens, as the national state of the Croatian
nation, as the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia, as well as the state of all nations
and nationalities that live in it. All power [in SR Croatia] is vested in the hands of
the citizens of SR Croatia.54
The different nations in SR Croatia were united in a common interest to live in a modern
democratic state community:
The essence of the nationality policy [. . . ] is the existence and development of SR
Croatia as a modern, developed, democratic state community. This is also our
understanding of the fundamental national interest of the Croatian nation, [...] the
Serbian nation in Croatia and all other nations and nationalities living in our republic
– the interest of all of our citizens.55






Reiterating the logic basing the dying imaginary, the LCC PDC maintained that the
signifier ‘nation’ was not a political subject that determined the frontiers of inclusion and
exclusion. Within its discourse the notion circulated as a folkloric form rather than a
source of power:
The history of the peoples living on the territory of our republic is tightly knit,
our cultural heritage is [. . . ] shared and this commonality should be fostered [...]
Multi-nationality and difference should be seen as richness and not as a source of
political antagonisms [. . . ] Croatia has always been characterized by cultural region-
alism[. . . ] We advocate the expression of cultural (linguistic, customary, historical
etc.) particularities and identities of Croatia’s constitutive regions.56
The LCC PDC maintained that order as such could not be realized separately in one
territorial unit. Rather, federal order was the condition of possibility for republican order
and vice-versa:
The aim of LCC PDC’s nationalities policy is securing the universal and free develop-
ment of each nation and nationality in Croatia and Yugoslavia. This is possible only
within the framework of an equal and democratic Yugoslavian community. None
of the national questions in Yugoslavia can be resolved in their singularity, just for
themselves, but are always contingent upon the [Yugoslavian] totality.57
The party drew an antagonistic frontier between its project and all discourses that equated
‘nation’ with ‘territorial unit’ and articulated relations between nations as relations of
power. It maintained that the identification of the former with the latter would give rise
to ‘national exclusivity, hostility, divisions, antagonisms and clashes’.58 It reactivated the
frontiers grounding the dying imaginary, discussed in Chapter 3, to articulate its enemies:
We are against national imperatives and single-mindedness. We say NO to all forms
of totalitarianism, be it fascist or Stalinist. We’ve said that in the past and we
repeat it today.59
It condensed the meaning of LC Serbia’s transformist project with the CDU’s project
under the denominator ‘totalitarianism’ and represented its own project as antagonistic




59Račan, “Veliki javni razgovor [A big public talk]”, p. 289.
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to both.60
In sum, LCC PDC’s political project was characterized by an attempt to strike a
balance between the old and new. The new order that the party evoked was not in
discontinuity with the dying imaginary, but akin to its democratic upgrade. The party
deployed ‘Yugoslav democratic socialism’ as the new empty signifier that weaved together
a variety of democratic institutional forms and national identities into a single project for
both SR Croatia and the Yugoslavian federation. The party demanded cosmetic changes
to the existing constitution and reiterated the founding myths of the dying imaginary
to universalize its project. The new subject that would base the new order was consti-
tuted through the reiteration of the identitary logic of the LCY with the substitution
of the working class with individual-citizen as the locus of power. Through this subject
the party represented different national identities as politically united. Furthermore, the
party represented order and stability as preconditioned by the articulation of sovereignty
as an attribute of republics and shared between nations.
8.3.3 The Serbian Democratic Party
8.3.3.1 The project: national equality, territorial autonomy and Yugoslavian
democratic federalism
According to the SDP, the political context was characterized by the structural crisis
of the existing party-state order. The party maintained that a (new) order out of the
(existing) disorder could emerge only through the termination of the rule of one party
and the pluralization of the political space.61 Within the framework of political pluralism,
the party centered its project around the Serbian nation in Croatia:
We will be concerned with the position of all of the diasporas of the Serbian nation in
Yugoslavia; in particular we will monitor the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia.62
60Račan, “Veliki javni razgovor [A big public talk]”, p. 299.
61Srpska Demokratska Stranka. “Osnovna načela [Basic Principles]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj [Parties




The party articulated democracy as the condition of possibility for the realization of the
interest of the Serbian nation, both in SR Croatia and Yugoslavia.63 It also equated its
particular project with the Serbian national interest and represented the latter as a mere
reflection of the former. At the level of SR Croatia, the party articulated its central
objective as the realization of equality between the Serbian and Croatian nation. To
realize it, the party demanded the establishment of an autonomous region in SR Croatia
that would reflect ‘the national composition of the territories the Serbs inhabit’.64 The
creation of a new autonomous region was articulated as the necessary precondition for
protecting the will of the Serbian minority from the Croatian majority:
The general democratic Yugoslavian principles that negate the hegemony and ma-
jorization [of a nation over other nations] in Yugoslavia [...] should be inscribed into
the Croatian context. The party demands the establishment of institutions that will
limit every majoritarian and arbitrary will directed against minorities.65
The assumption underlying the demand was that the Serbian and Croatian nations in SR
Croatia were essentially different, and the difference was political. Consequently, the party
demanded the introduction of new institutional divisions that would reflect and, thus re-
produce, this constitutive difference. To legitimize this demand, the SDP re-articulated
the signifier ‘Serbian nation in Croatia’ into a ‘minority’ living in a territorial unit iden-
tified with the Croatian nation.
Articulating ‘equality’ through a demand whose practical ramifications decreased the
power of the Serbian nation in SR Croatia seemed incoherent at the republican level.
Coherence emerged only through the demands the SDP articulated at the federal level.
According to the party, the future of the Serbian nation in Croatia was determined by
the transformation of Yugoslavia into a ‘democratic federal state’.66 Within the party’s
discourse, ‘federalism’ attained a completely different meaning from the one sedimented
by 1974 Constitution. First, its realization necessitated the creation of new autonomous
regions and revoking the autonomous status of Vojvodina and Kosovo. New autonomies
63Jovan Rašković. “Ciklus tribina: izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of Discussions:
Elections in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”. In: Stranke u Hrvatskoj [Parties in Croatia]. Ed. by
Dragan Ðurić, Bojan Munjin, and Srđan Španović. Zagreb: Niro Radničke Novine, 1990, p. 339.




were necessary if ‘the population inhabiting territories with a different ethnic composition
or cultural historical identity decides so on a referendum’.67 The legality of existing au-
tonomous provinces was contested on the grounds that it did not reflect the democratic
will of its inhabitants:
Our democratic federal praxis has to be enriched with a new stance towards Au-
tonomous Provinces [. . . ] the single party regime adopted the conception of au-
tonomous provinces from the Soviet Union without proper conceptualization. Later,
the regime transformed the autonomous provinces into states. Constituted in such
way and [containing] monstrous political projects, the Provinces become disorderly
elements in the states that contain them [. . . ].68
Second, the SDP contested territorial representation at the federal level which, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 5, served as a rule to realize national equality, on the grounds that it
failed to translate the size of the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia into political power. To
redress the ‘injustice’ that placed the Serbian nation in an unequal position, the party
demanded the introduction of the principle ‘one citizen one vote’ at the federal level:
Yugoslavian federalism can be in harmony with democratic principles if the new
order [...] guarantees the equality of [all Yugoslavian] citizens. We are against the
notion of ‘citizen equality’ instituted by the single-party regime because it contracts
and expands the notion of ‘the citizen’ contingently. In that system, a Slovenian
citizen is equal to, and politically represented as, five Serbian citizens. We demand
the institution of the principle ‘one citizen one vote’.69
Within the party’s discourse ‘national equality’ translated into power that was propor-
tional to population size. Akin to the Belgrade intellectuals’ discourse discussed in Chap-
ter 7, equality was not represented as an inherent attribute of each Yugoslavian nation,
irrespective of size. This articulation ran against the representation of nations as a priori
equal within the framework of Yugoslavian self-managing socialism. Consequently, the
signifier ‘Yugoslavian citizen’ did not circulate in the party’s discourse as a subject posi-
tion that linked different, a priori equal, nations into a common political project. Rather,
it was articulated as the solution to the problem of the fragmentation of the Serbian nation
between different republics and provinces brought into being by the 1974 Constitution. In




this representation the SDP project again echoed the myth articulated by Serbian intel-
lectuals and discussed in Chapter 7. Although the party’s project aimed at realizing the
equality of the Serbian nation in SR Croatia, it thus also formed part of a broader politi-
cal project that was gradually weaved together in the second half of the 1980s in SR Serbia.
8.3.3.2 Universalizing the project: weaving the myth of the military frontier
The party read the past in a manner that legitimized its demand for territorial auton-
omy and disarticulated the link between the Serbian nation in Croatia and SR Croatia
constitutive of the dying Yugoslavian imaginary. It inscribed the medieval past70 into the
present, pointing to the failure of the former to reflect the latter:
The regional subdivision of Croatia [...] does not reflect the historical interests of
the Serbian nation. In the past Krajine [medieval military frontiers of the Hapsburg
Empire in the wars against the Ottoman Empire] were constituted and had their own
names and insignia. These entities have been broken up through regional divisions;
[. . . ] We don’t have the impression that the administrative changes have been made
in the interest of constituting a Serbian identity in Croatia.71
Subverting the existing system of divisions, the SDP identified the Serbian nation in
Croatia primary with the Serbian homeland and represented it as a (medieval) diaspora
whose right to territorial autonomy was grounded in a (medieval) sacrifice:
The Serbian diaspora in Croatia and its historical sacrifice [against Ottoman Empire]
is older than the pressures of Starčević’s Party of Rights and the WWII genocide.
But every sacrifice is best defended through democracy and freedom. This is the
reason why the Serbian nation in Croatia has a particular need to unite in democratic
principles of equality and freedom.72
In other words, this ‘historical sacrifice’ was articulated as the very essence of the Serbian
diasporic subjectivity, whose interests the SDP claimed to express in the context of the
70The territories of SR Croatia formed part of the military frontier of the Hapsburg Empire. The
Hapsburgs encouraged the orthodox population from Serbian territories, then part of the Ottoman Em-
pire, to inhabit the border territories of the Hapsburg Empire and become peasant-soldiers. The settled
Orthodox population formed a buffer against Ottoman incursions.
71Srpska Demokratska Stranka, “Osnovna načela [Basic Principles]”, p. 338.
72Rašković, “Ciklus tribina: izbori u Hrvatskoj-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990 [The Cycle of Discussions:
Elections in Croatia-KIC, Zagreb, 27.2.1990]”, p. 339.
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first elections. The signifiers ‘democracy’, ‘equality’ and ‘freedom’ constitutive of SDP’s
political project were articulated as strategies to defend the sacrifice in the present. The
logic underlying the party’s reading of the past was that all the Serbs in Croatia had a
common origin which determined their political interests in context of the 1990s elections.
It is important to note that theme of sacrifice against Ottoman incursions resonated
with the arguments advanced by the Serbian intellectuals to revoke the autonomy of AP
Kosovo, discussed in Chapter 7.
8.3.3.3 Social division and unity: the Serbian nation in Yugoslavia as a po-
litical subject
The identitary logic articulated by the SDP operated through the disarticulation of the
link between the Serbian nation in Croatia and SR Croatia constitutive of the dying
Yugoslavian imaginary. According to the party, the Serbian nation in Croatia could
become a political subject only by forming part of a broader Serbian national body. The
party maintained that its existing identification with SR Croatia was a form of political
misrepresentation:
Nations cannot be equated with the federal units that they inhabit [SR Croatia].
This can only be realized by creating the conditions of possibility for the full affir-
mation of the spiritual and cultural identity of each Yugoslavian nation separately,
regardless of the federal unit it inhabits. [. . . ] The segments of the nation that
live outside of their ‘mother’ Republic [SR Serbia] should be given the right to fully
(nationally, culturally and spiritually) identify with their nation [. . . ]73
In other words, the party articulated unity along national as opposed to republican lines.
The articulation of nations as political subjects transgressing republican divisions meant
that the party re-articulated sovereignty from an attribute of Yugoslavia’s republics to an
attribute of nations as unified subjects within its discourse. This representation, again,
completely contradicted the terms of unity and division that formed the basis of the dying
Yugoslavian imaginary.
The party’s articulation of unity as determined by the signifier (Serbian) ‘nation’
resulted in the articulation of the Serbian nation in Croatia and the Croatian nation as
73Srpska Demokratska Stranka, “Osnovna načela [Basic Principles]”, p. 337.
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essentially different and antagonistic.74 To mark the political difference between, on the
one hand, the Serbian nation in Croatia (and itself as the articulator of its will) and, on
the other hand, the Croatian nation, the SDP drew an antagonistic frontier between itself
and the entire political landscape in SR Croatia:
Pluralism can be paradoxical; it can eliminate itself through itself. In SR Croatia
pluralism took up the form of croatocentric etnomonoism. Even the League of Com-
munists of Croatia has accepted this position. The LCC is not facing an opposition
in the newly formed party’s. Rather, it has been dissolved into an ethnomonoistic
identity shared with other so-called opposition and alternative parties. This trap is
also offered to us, it is offered to the whole Serbian nation in Croatia.75
Irrespective of the radical difference between the CDU and the LC PDC project, the SDP
subsumed both under the same particularistic identitary logic and put its own project
forward as embodying ‘truly’ universal values:
Despite the fact that our party has an ethnic name, in essence it is an ethical party.
It demands tolerance and political freedoms [...] Despite our name, we are a universal
democratic party; our demands are federal and our practices democratic.76
In other words, the SDS claimed its project was universal, democratic and plural simply
because it articulated the demands of a national minority that was, given the ethnomonois-
tic logic grounding the Croatian political landscape, also a political minority. However,
since the SDP articulated division and unity through national signifiers, its project sim-
ply reproduced the particularist logic it claimed to oppose through a different (Serbian)
national signifier.
In sum, the SDP’s political project was articulated through a string of demands that
would bring about the constitution of the Serbian nation as a federal political subject.
In SR Croatia, the party’s project focused on the realization of the equality of the Ser-
bian nation which was understood to be identical to Serbian territorial autonomy in SR
Croatia. To legitimise this demand, the party re-articulated the Serbian nation in Croatia
into a national minority and, thus, a political minority. At the federal level, the party




demanded the transformation of Yugoslavia into a democratic federal state so that, fol-
lowing the principle ‘one man, one vote’, the size of the Serbian nation could translate into
political power in a proportionate manner. Its reading of the past rendered the Serbian
nation in Croatia into a diaspora of the Serbian nation in SR Serbia. The party disar-
ticulated the link between the Serbian nation in Croatia and SR Croatia and between
sovereignty and republic. These links, as discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, were
constitutive of the dying imaginary and their sedimentation made it possible to decontest
national identities in Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the party represented sovereignty as an
attribute of nations that transcended the territorial divisions of the existing order. The
party represented the Serbian nation in Croatia and the Croatian nation as essentially
different and antagonistic and precluded the possibility of their inclusion into a common
political project.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have analyzed the political projects of three parties that took part in the
elections to the Constitutive Assembly of SR Croatia. I have fleshed out the particular
demands that each party articulated, as well as the identitary logic that grounded their
demands. I have shown that, despite the fact that each party deployed the signifiers
‘nation’, ‘democracy’, ‘Yugoslavia’, ‘order’, ’stability’, these were articulated in different
ways into moments within their respective discourse. Whereas the CDU and the SDP
articulated relations between nations as relations of power, the LCC PDC retained the
identitary logic of the dying imaginary and decontested national identities through a com-
mon democratic socialist project. Consequently, both the CDU and the SDP articulated
the ‘Serbian nation in Croatia’ as a national minority, while the LCC PDC retained its
existing constitutional definition.
Each party articulated sovereignty in different ways. The CDU’s discourse operated
through a dual articulation of the concept, as both an attribute of republics in the federa-
tion as well as the Croatian nation in SR Croatia. The SDP articulated it as an attribute
of nations transgressing republican borders in the federation, and represented republics
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as administrative units, that were insignificant in the political sense. The LCC PDC
attributed sovereignty to all citizens of SR Croatia irrespective of national belonging. In
this sense, the LCC PDC retained the identitary logic of the dying imaginary, discussed
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, that national difference does not translate into political
division. Whereas both SDP’s and LCC PDC’s democratic projects were, albeit in com-
pletely different ways, oriented towards transforming Yugoslavia as a whole, the CDU’s
democratic project focused primary on the constitution of the fullness of the (sovereign)
undivided Croatian national subject within its own (sovereign) republic. Furthermore,
although both the CDU and SDP’s political projects were constituted through the same
identitary logic – that national identity translates into political subjectivity in a linear
fashion – the political demands that they raised were mutually exclusive. Whereas the
former articulated SR Croatia as indivisible and historically ‘belonging’ to the Croatian
nation, the SDP demanded the administrative restructuring of SR Croatia to form terri-
torial autonomies that reflect the national composition of the republic. Likewise, whereas
the former demanded the transformation of the federation into a confederation of sovereign
nation-states, the latter demanded the federalization of Yugoslavia into sovereign nations
and the introduction of the principle ‘one man, one vote’. Despite the differences in the
content of their political projects, they both placed the national at the centre of politics
and rendered the meaning of Yugoslavia contingent to it.
Despite having attained only 41% of the electoral vote, the CDU had an absolute
parliamentary majority in drafting the first democratic Constitution of the Republic of
Croatia. Through its rules, the party’s political discourse expanded into an imaginary
horizon, thereby excluding LCC PDC’s articulation of the signifiers ‘nation’, ‘democ-
racy’, ‘citizen’, ‘Yugoslavia’ and reinforcing SDP’s position regarding the threat to the
Serbian minority in Croatia. The CDU’s hegemonic position was reflected in the new con-
stitutional rules to such an extent that the constitutional document read as its electoral
program. The Croatian national subject was constituted as ‘millennia old’ and expressed
through various state-forms listed in the Preamble. These embryonic state-forms had
been developing since the seventh century all the way through to the 1974 Constitution.
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The 1990 elections were constituted as the expression of the will of the state-forming
national subject to become sovereign in its own state. The Republic was constituted as a
‘unitary and indivisible’77 ‘Croatian nation-state and the state of national minorities’.78
Sovereignty was constituted as an ‘indivisible and nontransferable’ attribute of the Repub-
lic79 as well as the ‘inalienable, indivisible, nontransferable’80 right of the Croatian nation
in the Republic. The Republic was constituted part of Yugoslavia formally, ‘until a new
agreement is reached by the republics or until the Croatian Parliament decides otherwise’.
Institutional rules were put into place for protecting the sovereignty of the Republic from
Yugoslavian federal organs, organs of other republics or provinces and members of the
federation.81 In this sense, the institutional conditions of possibility for secession were put
in place. The Serbian nation in Croatia was constituted as a minority and equated with
all non-Yugoslavian minorities. The Croatian diaspora in turn was reintroduced as an el-
ement of the nation and the Republic constituted as responsible for the protection of the
Croatian nation living in other states. This included Croatian nationals living outside of
Yugoslavia as well as those living in other Yugoslavian republics.82 The limits of the new
order were constituted as ‘unity, territorial integrity and independence of the Republic’
and political parties that contested these elements were banned by the constitution.83










This thesis critically examined the emergence of the ‘nationalist’ CDU party in the con-
text of Yugoslavia’s dissolution, without reproducing the party’s own essentialist repre-
sentations of its origins and political objectives. It has done so by analysing the discursive
constructions of the nation in Yugoslavia (1958-1990) and accounting for the party’s emer-
gence within its broader historical and immediate electoral context. By showing that the
‘nationalist’ discourse formed part and parcel of the movement from the universal Yu-
goslavian political imaginary to the particular myths that emerged as it was weakening in
the 1980s, this thesis has showed that the CDU’s project was a particular and contingent
representation of social unity whose very conception was made possible by the historical
conjecture of its emergence. The contention that one cannot assume the existence of a
‘nation’ that pre-exists the practices giving meaning to the term and that are embedded
in a particular historical context, was central to this analysis. This perspective unlocked
the possibility for a new reading of the conditions of emergence of the party that did
not reduce the phenomenon to factors external to the process of collective political iden-
tity formation and dissolution. By way of conclusion, I reiterate the main points of the
argument concerning the relationship between the emergence of the CDU’s nationalist
discourse and its context, drawing out general mechanisms about nationalist identitary
logics, and suggest avenues for future research.
To render the contingency behind CDU’s essentialist representation of the national
subject visible, I first examined the discursive terms under which nations were repre-
sented in and through the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. The analysis showed that
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the hegemony of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia was premised upon its abil-
ity to fix different national identities within a single space of representation, articulated
around a universal working class subject. This was made possible by ‘brotherhood and
unity’ and ‘self-management’ discourses, which defined the boundaries of the Yugoslavian
community and imbued that what is included within its scope with a positive mean-
ing. The enemies of the Yugoslavian community were represented as always potentially
present among all of Yugoslavia’s nations and nationalities. In this sense, the frontiers
that shaped the imaginary horizon differentiated between national identity as potential
enemies, and as ‘good’ working class nationals. Nationalism was represented as one of the
many enemies of Yugoslavian self-managing socialism and, it was paramount to LCY’s
hegemony that the ‘good’ members of the (Croatian, Serbian, Slovenian, Albanian etc.)
nation/nationality prevent the emergence of exclusionary nationalist logics within their
communities. National difference was understood primarily in cultural terms, and not as
a nodal point for drawing frontiers of inclusion/exclusion. The analysis further showed
that the imaginary was marked by a tension between the decentralization/voluntarism
associated with ‘self-management’, and centripetally associated with ‘brotherhood and
unity’. In this sense, the enemies of self-management could be and were represented as
manifesting themselves in practices legitimised in and through the brotherhood and unity
discourse, and vice-versa.
The CDU represented its 1990 electoral programme as in continuity with what it
claimed were ‘the progressive national currents of the Croatian Spring’, which were op-
pressed by the Yugoslavian regime. In so doing, the CDU retroactively reduced the
Croatian Spring to the expression of its very own nationalist electoral programme, for
the purpose of establishing the ‘objectivity’ of the Croatian nation that it evoked in and
through its political project. The thesis rendered the limitations of this representation
visible by showing the extent to which the politicizations of Croatian national identity
in the 1968-1971 period were embedded in the system of social unity and division that
underpinned the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon. These politicizations were conditioned
by the dislocations that were produced by Yugoslavia’s economic reform, the re-opening
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of the so-called ‘national question’ by the hegemonic LCY, the constitutional reform pro-
cess, as well as the liberalization of the socialist political landscape that characterized
the 1960s. Broadly speaking, the contestations pertaining to the Croatian Spring aimed
at transforming the articulation of forces between Yugoslavia’s socialist republics and the
federal institutions for the purpose of expanding the self-managing capacity of the working
class in the republics. The nation that was articulated in and through the contestation
practices that marked the period was represented as antagonistic to the enemies of self-
managing socialism. Furthermore, the analysis showed that the Croatian Spring was not
a united or coherent movement. The differences between the ‘liberals’ in the LCC, the
Matica and the student movement were manifested in incompatible representations of
national sovereignty, the demands of each, as well as the different articulatory strategies
deployed. Unity of purpose was attributed to the movement retroactively by the Yu-
goslavian regime’s hegemonic practices, which excluded all of the actors but included the
demand for republican sovereignty into the rules that structured the imaginary horizon.
The LCY reduced all actors to an allegedly coherent Croatian nationalist project that
was portrayed as threatening the brotherhood and unity of Yugoslavia’s nations and na-
tionalities. In claiming continuity with the Croatian Spring, the CDU drew on the LCY’s
representation of the movement and simultaneously emptied the contestation practices
from the system of social division in response to which they emerged and in the context
of which they made sense.
Central to CDU’s electoral programme in 1990 was the contention that the 1974 Con-
stitution of Yugoslavia legitimized the right of the Croatian people to constitute them-
selves as a sovereign national body in their very own nation-state. This very objective,
the CDU maintained, was reflected in the constitution of the Socialist Republic of Yu-
goslavia, which represented SR Croatia as the nation state of the Croatian nation. This
thesis showed the limitations of CDU’s representation of the Yugoslavian constitution
in two important ways. First, the analysis rendered visible that the transformation of
sovereignty from an attribute of the Yugoslavian federation, to an attribute of its consti-
tutive republics, came about through debates and struggles that were embedded in the
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Yugoslavian system of social division. Second, it fleshed out the hierarchical identitary
logic between nation and class that underpinned the entire Yugoslavian institutional land-
scape and through which Yugoslavian identity was forged. The thesis showed that the
tenet that self-management determines the political essence of both nations and territo-
rial units was central to that particular constitutional order. The hierarchical identitary
logic made it possible to constitute sovereignty as shared between different nations in re-
publics. The analysis thus rendered visible that the CDU only evoked those elements from
the constitution that established the ‘objectivity’ of the Croatian nation that it claimed
to embody in 1990 while omitting completely the broader logic that underpinned it and
through which nations were constituted within it. I have argued that the real importance
of Yugoslavia’s constitutional order for the emergence of the ‘nationalist’ CDU’s lay in the
failures of its rules to sustain social unity in the changing circumstances of the 1980s and
the possibilities that those failures opened up. I mapped out the ways in which LCY’s
unity was undermined through interplay of institutional/ economic factors, and different
interpretations thereof. The analysis showed that the signifier of self-management, which
was central for the linking up of different national identities into a common working class
subject, attained a ‘floating’ character because of the inability of hegemonic LCY to con-
tain the economic crisis.
Central to CDU’s electoral programme in 1990 was the contention that its programme
embodied a much-needed national defence strategy against the politics of Slobodan Miloše-
vić and Serbian expansionism. This ‘threat’ made it possible for the party to infuse its
particular nation-state forming project with an objective urgency. This analysis showed
that Milošević impacted on the party’s emergence to the extent that the LCS’s trans-
formist project under his leadership contributed to the disarticulation of the class-centred
system of social division and the legitimation of nation-centred political demands. The
weakening and ultimate dissolution of the Yugoslavian social of division made it possible
for the ‘nationalist’ CDU to articulate alternative myths. I furthermore argued that the
transformist project was not the expression of an ‘objective’ Serbian national interest or a
pre-conceived Serbian expansion attempt. Rather, it was carved out of the failure of the
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Yugoslavian regime to ‘fix’ the contending demands for national equality that emerged in
AP Kosovo in response to the 1974 Constitution, within the hegemonic system of social
division, and the new (Serbian) nation-centred and anti-regime myths that the intellec-
tuals in Belgrade articulated in response to that failure. Milošević came to power in and
through this context. Under his leadership the LCS absorbed the nation-centred demands
of Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins, reinterpreted the Kosovo problem, adopted elements of
the discourse of the Belgrade intellectuals and lessened their anti-regime potential.
The analysis showed that Milošević came to occupy an ambiguous position after 1987;
he was both in power and the addressee of an evolving movement that demanded the
transformation of the existing order by overthrowing the so-called ‘bureaucracy’ that was
paralyzing the constitutional reform process. The movement amounted to the expan-
sion of a chain of equivalence between the LCS, Serbian intellectuals, the dissatisfied
Kosovo Serbs/Montenegrins, and the workers that supported socialism but demanded
its transformation. It was primarily about the transformation of the terms under which
the Yugoslavian federation was constituted and the expansion of the power of LC Serbia
within the existing order. The weaving together of the LCS’s transformist project through
the co-optation of (Serbian) nation-centred demands contributed to the progressive weak-
ening of the Yugoslavian imaginary horizon and the blurring of the lines of inclusion and
exclusion that based it. Already existing differences in position within the LCY were
exacerbated by this co-optation strategy and they eventually crystallized into a clear-cut
antagonistic frontier between LC Serbia and LC Slovenia. The introduction of a political
antagonism within the ranks of a party whose very hegemony was premised upon the
unity of the universal Yugoslavian working class meant that the LCY was undergoing
a full-fledged hegemonic crisis. Consequently, it also meant that the political imaginary
that accommodated different nations and nationalities into a single space of representa-
tion ever since the 1950s, was dissolving.
Lastly, I have argued that the first democratic elections in the Socialist Republic of
Croatia formed part and parcel of the hegemonic crisis of Yugoslavian self-managing so-
cialism. They were in effect a political struggle about the new terms under which social
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unity and division would be constituted in SR Croatia and the ways in which the Croat-
ian republican community would relate to Yugoslavia. As a result, they were also about
the ways in which the relationship between Croatia’s constitutive nations would be rep-
resented. The specific historical conjecture, characterized by both the hegemonic crisis of
the LCY and by the collapse of communism across Eastern Europe, made it possible for
the victorious party to play an exceptionally creative role after assuming power. In this
sense, the thesis has showed that the first democratic elections were ‘historic’ because of
the degree of indeterminacy that marked the context in which they were held and not
because, as it has later been claimed, they allowed for the nation to articulate its cen-
turies old desire for sovereignty. Rather, the first democratic elections were a battle for
the terms under which democratic social unity would be forged in the SR Croatia.
The nationalist CDU party came into being shortly before the pluralization of the
political space in SR Croatia and its political project was but one possible reading of the
past, the present and the democratic future. The party forged a Croatian national iden-
tity, whose essence it claimed to embody, by differentiating it from the socialist context,
and claimed it was the ‘true’ political identity emptied out of socialist-ideological dogma-
tism. However, the ‘old’ identity was still constitutive of its representation of the Croatian
nation to the extent that the ‘new’ nation was forged by subverting the terms under which
the Croatian socialist nation was fixed within the dying imaginary; it reintroduced those
elements that were previously excluded, into the nation as a subject of politics (fascist,
liberals, etc.) To normalize this subversion and imbue it with a sense of objectivity, the
CDU situated the national subject in a history that contained and transcended the so-
cialist context. The ‘new’ national subject was said to be present in incipient form ever
since the 7th century but was only making itself fully visible in 1990 through the CDU’s
democratic transformation project. The CDU represented the nation it evoked in 1990 as
having been present in Yugoslavia all along, but ‘blocked’ by the Communist Party delib-
erately for the purpose of promoting an ‘illusionary’ Yugoslavian identity. The ‘fact’ that
communism was collapsing across Europe was weaved into the project as a legitimation
strategy for the claim that Yugoslavia identity was always already illusionary and that it
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forged its ‘reality’ at the expense of the ‘true’ Croatian national identity.
To substantiate the nation in 1990, the CDU invoked the Yugoslavian past in so far as
it contributed to the nation’s alleged historical objectivity. This thesis has showed that,
in doing so the CDU reduced the Yugoslavian imaginary back to a myth because it artic-
ulated Yugoslavia as having always been a particular (mis)representation of a universal
‘older’ struggle of the Croatian nation for state-sovereignty. The manner in which the
signifier Yugoslavia was articulated within the party’s discourse was completely contin-
gent upon the signifier Croatian nation-state. The party demanded the transformation
of the federation into a confederation as part and parcel of its democratic transformation
project so that the Croatian nation could express its will fully.
Despite CDU’s claim that it had abolished all political divisions within its program,
this thesis has showed that the nation that the CDU evoked in 1990 was still carved out
of political frontiers drawn against ‘Great Serbian expansionism’ in response to which the
nation had to establish itself as sovereign with ‘natural’ and ‘historic’ borders. The CDU
maintained this was the only reasonable perspective from which the future democratic
order could be conceived. Furthermore, the analysis has showed that the party’s project
was underpinned by an ambiguous articulation of the signifier Croatian nation. On the
economic terrain it included all those that lived in SR Croatia including Serbs in Croatia,
and it did not refer to Croats living in other Yugoslavian republics or the Croatian dias-
pora. When it came to matters of national subjectivity and territory in a more explicit
sense, the nation included all Croats in Yugoslavia and as well as the diaspora, while
excluding the Serbian nation in Croatia.
Furthermore, its representation of the Croatian nation implied that an adequate re-
sponse to ‘Serbian expansionism’ would be the inclusion of the territories of Bosnia and
Herzegovina that were inhabited by Croats to the territories of SR Croatia. However, the
refashioning of Yugoslavia’s territorial units following the principle of ‘natural national’
borders would have legitimised the ‘Serbian expansionism’ into Serb majority parts of SR
Croatia that the CDU claimed to defend the Croatian nation from. Although the Serbian
nation was not a priori included in the party’s conception of Croatian social unity, the
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party also did not a priori exclude it. Rather, the thesis showed that the CDU set the
terms under which the Serbian nation could be included within the democratic community
and these terms boiled down to supporting the party’s own democratic transformation
project. This thesis also showed that ‘full’ Croatian national and state sovereignty be-
came the new empty signifier around which the ‘nationalist’ CDU weaved its democratic
myth. This signifier demarcated those that would be included within the scope of the
new Croatian democratic community and those that were excluded. Thus, the frontier
was not drawn in terms of national belonging exclusively, but in terms of supporting or
not full Croatian state sovereignty. In this sense, Croatian nationals that contested the
notion that state sovereignty was the exclusive attribute of a Croatian majority in the
republic would also be excluded from the scope of the new democratic community.
My analysis showed that the electoral programme of the League of Communists of
Croatia Party of Democratic Change offered an alternative to CDU’s nationalist repre-
sentations. However, its project did not seem like an alternative within the discursive
context of the 1990 because it drew extensively on the elements and logics from the dying
imaginary. The LCC PDC retained the signifier ‘socialism’ that formed the basis of the dy-
ing imaginary, and claimed it should continue to shape the new democratic order. Unlike
the CDU, the LCC PDC oriented its project towards the democratization of the entire
Yugoslavian political landscape and it expressed its willingness to form coalitions with
parties from other republics once political pluralism was introduced across Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, it retained the existing terms under which sovereignty was constituted and
demanded only cosmetic changes to the existing constitution of Yugoslavia. The party
also deployed the founding myths of the dying imaginary as the basis of its programme
and represented its socialist democratic project as an organic continuation of the 1945-
1989 period. Most importantly, the analysis revealed that the party retained the terms
under which national identities were represented in the dying imaginary and replaced
the working class subject with the individual-citizen as the common denominator that
would bond different national identities into a single democratic-socialist community in
the post-1990 period. Hence, it represented the republic of Croatia as a sovereign demo-
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cratic state of all citizens, and the nation state of the Croatian nation and the state of
the Serbian nation in Croatia. It reiterated the frontiers grounding the dying imaginary
to delineate the political identity it claimed to embody. It explicitly declared it project
to be in antagonism to all nationalist logics and totalitarianisms, be it fascist or Stalinist.
Despite having attained only 7% more votes than the LCC PDC, the CDU had an abso-
lute parliamentary majority in drafting the constitution that would base the new Croatian
democratic order, whose foundations have remained unchanged until today. This thesis
has showed that in and through the foundations of the democratic constitutional order
the nationalist party myth about the nature of social unity expanded into a collective
democratic imaginary horizon. The effect that this expansion had on the political land-
scape in Croatia in 1990 can be read-off from the analysis of the discourse of the Serbian
Democratic Party (SDP) presented in this thesis. In terms of logics, the SDP’s myth and
that of the CDU resembled one another remarkably although they pursued antagonis-
tic objectives. Both parties understood nations as undivided political subjects and both
parties disarticulated the link between the ‘Serbian nation in Croatia’ and ‘SR Croatia’
that was constitutive of the dying imaginary. Furthermore, both parties also produced
the national subjects whose political interests they claimed to embody in and through
the threat of an allegedly already consolidated nationalism of the other. As a result, they
both represented the relationship between the Croatian and Serbian nation in Croatia as
a relationship of power and, given the national composition of the republic, they both
represented the Serbian nation in Croatia as a national minority inhabiting a state of
the Croatian majority. In this sense, the expansion of the CDU’s representation of the
nature of social unity as being about the (Croatian) nation and its state into a collective
democratic imaginary also gave credibility to the SDP’s nation-centred project, and in
doing so contributed to the out-break of the ‘defensive’ Homeland War.
The analysis presented in this thesis contributes to understanding how the exclu-
sivist/essentialist representation of the Croatian nation, that underlies the present demo-
cratic order, actually came into being. It also contributes to understanding Yugoslavism
as a discursive formation, the particular system of division that was instituted by it, how
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this system was contested and how it failed as a hegemonic project. Socialist-national
identities were not dismissed as a priori failed because of the collapse of communism and
the break-up of Yugoslavia. Rather, how they operated as both subject positions and po-
litical subjectivities within the Yugoslavian imaginary has been examined in great detail,
to draw out the limitations of the CDU’s nationalist discourse.
In a theoretical sense, the analysis presented in this thesis contributes to understanding
the operation of nationalist discourses because it has showed the extent to which national
identities are weaved together through different strands of discourse that attempt to or-
ganize the field of meaning and that they are not alone in attempting to produce that
national position. What is characteristic of nationalist discourses however is the iden-
titary logic underpinning their particular representation of society. Irrespective of the
difference in the particular elements through which nationalist discourses are articulated
they share the conception that social unity and division are articulated through national
nodal points and the empty signifiers that imbue them with a purpose. From the nation-
alist perspective, society, politics and conflicts are contracted to an essential national core
and driven by alleged strategies for the core’s preservation. The nationalist discourses
examined in this thesis operated by masking the fact that the very signification of the
nation, what it included/excluded, was always an act of political institution created pri-
marily with the aim of critiquing/delegitimizing/transforming the existing structures that
organized social life. In the Yugoslavian imaginary a similar process could be observed.
The regime based its hegemony in binding together a set of differentiated national identi-
ties that were assumed to share an essential class core in and through which their political
meaning was exhausted, their mutual relations de-antagonised and the national question
resolved. However, that order was premised upon a class centred conceptualization of
social unity.
This analysis, I believe, showed the limitations of interpretations that maintain that
Croatian nationalism was a natural reaction to Serbian nationalism and that implicitly
hold that it is ‘legitimate’. Such interpretations overlook the fact that, in the Yugoslavian
context, nationalist discourses profited from one another precisely because they drew on
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the same logic of social unity and division and, in doing so, reinforced the credibility
of each other’s premises even when pursuing mutually exclusive objectives regarding the
structures that organize social life. Thus, a nationalist discourse that claimed to com-
bat another nationalist project that allegedly threatened the existence of ‘its’ particular
nation, contributed to the credibility/reality of that in response to which it said it had
emerged. In this sense, I believe that it is important to highlight the extent to which so-
called reactive nationalisms, like Croatian nationalism, contributed in and of themselves
to the expansion of nationalist discourses in Yugoslavia because they made the notion
that social unity translates into national unity ‘more real’ and undermined the credibility
of alternative non-national representations of democratic unity/division. This mechanism
is visible in the comparative analysis of the CDU’s and the SDP’s electoral programmes
in 1990.
Therefore, the analysis presented here contributes to the development of a concep-
tual infrastructure that can enable the examination of other nationalist discourses in the
former-Yugoslavia and elsewhere, since they emerged in response to and at the expense
of a similar discursive context. The strategy can be adapted to the particular contexts
in the process of the application, depending on the particular contents of the nationalist
party/movement at stake, like this analysis has done. The different discursive strategies
that were used by different national movements to disarticulate the ‘old’ system of social
division could be examined comparatively, to trace the trajectory of the Yugoslavia’s dis-
solution in a more all-encompassing way than the one presented in this thesis.
The status of the ‘old’ Yugoslavian identitary logic in Bosnia and Herzegovina today
can be examined so as to flesh out potential and context specific strategies that can help
to overcome the sedimented national divisions that are currently paralyzing the multi-
national state and its society. In the Croatian case, it would be interesting to examine
how the discursive terms of representing social unity shifted in the post-war period and
uncover the new empty signifier that bases the right-wing discourse and embodies the
fullness of the nation. Furthermore, the signifier ‘Yugoslavian’ has continued to circulate
as negative label within the nationalist discourses a strategy of discrediting the positions
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articulated by NGO’s, historians, artists, and left-wing parties etc. The labelling strategy
has intensified after November 2015 when a CDU-led right-wing coalition came to power.
Ever since, the public discourse has been flooded by accusations of alleged plots against
the Croatian national interest from something deemed to be a ‘Yugoslavian’ perspective.
Since Yugoslavia as a state and subject position has ceased to exist 26 years ago, it would
be interesting to examine how different articulations of the signifier ‘Yugoslavia’ continue
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